Linton v. Davis, No. 45A05-0610-CV-567.

• Decision Date: 03 June 2008
• Docket Number: No. 45A05-0610-CV-567.
• Citation: 887 N.E.2d 960
• Parties: Michael A. LINTON, M.D., Appellant-Defendant, v. Lawanda DAVIS, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

887 N.E.2d 960

Michael A. LINTON, M.D., Appellant-Defendant, v.Lawanda DAVIS, Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 45A05-0610-CV-567.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

June 3, 2008.

Michael E. O'Neill, Richard Girzadas, Patrick Devine, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Schererville, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Steve L. Langer, Tara M. Wozniak, Langer & Langer, Valparaiso, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

RILEY, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant-Defendant, Michael A. Linton, M.D.(Dr. Linton), appeals the trial court's Order entered on a jury verdict awarding Appellee-Plaintiff, Lawanda Davis(Davis), damages in the amount of one million two hundred fifty thousand dollars resulting from medical mismanagement of Davis' labor and delivery.¹

We affirm.

ISSUES

Dr. Linton raises four issues on appeal which we consolidate and restate as the following three issues:

(1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence testimony regarding the proceedings and rulings of the Indiana Medical Licensing Board;

(2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding from evidence the Indiana Medical Review Panel's statutory determination not to forward Dr. Linton's name to the Medical Licensing Board; and

(3) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by disallowing Ivanka Prcevski(Nurse Prcevski), called as a skilled lay witness pursuant to Ind. Evidence Rule 701, to testify about her perceptions of the baby's well-being during Davis' labor and delivery.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At approximately 8 a.m. on August 5, 2000, Davis arrived at Methodist Hospital in Gary, Indiana, in labor.She was admitted to Labor & Delivery and her progress was monitored throughout the day by the Labor & Delivery nurses.During the course of the day, she was placed on a fetal heart monitor to observe the well-being of the baby.Between approximately 8 and 10 p.m., Dr. Linton and Nurse Prcevski attended to Davis.During this time period, various maneuvers were attempted to help the baby descend through the birth canal.Finally, at 10:15 p.m., Davis delivered her son limp and pale.Despite efforts by a neonatologist to resuscitate the baby, he died of asphyxia four hours later.

On May 8, 2001, Davis filed her Proposed Complaint with the Indiana Department of Insurance.About three years later, on January 19, 2004, the Indiana Medical Review Panel(the Panel) reviewed Dr. Linton's care and rendered its unanimous opinion that: "The evidence supports the conclusion that [Dr. Linton] failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care as charged in the complaint.The conduct complained of was a factor of the resultant damages."(Appellee's App.pp. 1, 3, and 5).Thereafter, on March 12, 2004, Davis filed her Complaint with the trial court alleging medical malpractice against Dr. Linton and The Methodist Hospital, Inc.²

While the medical malpractice claim was pending before the trial court, the Indiana Medical Licensing Board(the Board), an administrative body charged with the duty and responsibility of regulating the practice of medicine, conducted an administrative proceeding against Dr. Linton.SeeInd.Code § 25-22.5-2-3.On October 27, 2005, the Board issued its Findings of Fact and Order with regard to allegations of malpractice made by eleven of Dr. Linton's obstetric patients.Concerning Dr Linton's care of Davis, identified as "Patient J.," the Board specifically found that:

(p) There were numerous deviations from the standard of care in this case.

(q)Dr Linton persisted in the use of oxytocin in the face of a non-assuring fetal heart rate tracing.

(r) Dr. Linton failed to recognize an abnormal labor.

(s) Dr. Linton failed to recognize an arrest of descent (obstructed labor).

(t) Dr. Linton inappropriately used a vacuum at too high a station.

(u) Dr. Linton delayed in performing a caesarean section in a timely manner.

(Appellant's App.pp. 90-91).Based on its detailed findings, the Board ordered Dr. Linton "placed [on] indefinite probation," with certain terms and conditions.(Appellant's App.p. 96).

Davis' medical malpractice Complaint was originally set to proceed to trial by jury on June 5, 2006.However, on April 20, 2006, Dr. Linton filed his "Motion to Bar all References to, and Evidence Relating to, [the Board] Action against [Dr. Linton]."³(Appellant's App.p. 61).Consequently, the trial court addressed the admissibility of the Board's considerations with regard to Dr. Linton's medical license in several pre-trial hearings.During a pre-trial hearing on June 1, 2006, the trial court denied Dr. Linton's motion and entered the following Order, in pertinent part:

8.[Dr. Linton's]"Motion to Bar all References to, and Evidence Relating to, the [Board] Action Against [Dr. Linton]" is denied, [Davis] is allowed to introduce into evidence Finding 15, q, r, s, t, u and the Order from [the Board] entitled State of Indiana vs.[Dr. Linton] file stamped October 28, 2005.This [c]ourt finds that evidence of [the Board's] action related to [Davis] is admissible to impeach in a variety of circumstances, including if Dr. Farb⁴ testifies that he is a consultant for the Minnesota Licensing Board or if Dr. Linton testifies as to the standard of care in this case.If [Davis] introduces such evidence, [Dr. Linton] may introduce additional evidence concerning [the Board's] findings if he so chooses.This [c]ourt also finds that Dr. Linton's medical license history and status is relevant during trial if Dr. Linton testifies as a witness.

(Appellant's App.p. 30).On June 30, 2006, Dr. Linton filed his Petition to Certify Interlocutory Appeal seeking appellate review of the trial court's Order.On July 17, 2006, the trial court denied Dr. Linton's petition.

September 5, 2006 through September 11, 2006, a jury trial was held.At trial, Davis called Dr. Linton as a witness in her case-in-chief.While examining Dr. Linton, Davis asked the witness's opinion on the standard of care he provided to Davis.Specifically, the following colloquy ensued:

[DAVIS]: You believe you adhered to the standard of care?

[Dr. LINTON]: Yes, I do

[DAVIS]: Now, Doctor, as you sit here today, you don't practice obstetrics anymore, do you?

(Transcriptp. 728).Dr. Linton immediately objected to this line of questioning.The trial court overruled Dr. Linton's objection and Davis introduced evidence regarding the Board's Order limiting Dr. Linton's license to practice medicine in Indiana.On cross-examination, Dr. Linton attempted to explain to the jury the Board's Order, including the number of cases investigated by the Board and its conclusion.

After Davis rested her case-in-chief, Dr. Linton called his only witness, Nurse Prcevski.The purpose of her testimony was to explain her role and introduce perceptions concerning Davis' labor.Favorably responding to Davis' objections, the trial court denied into evidence Nurse Prcevski's statements that she was continuously monitoring the baby's well-being and reporting this information to Dr. Linton.At the close of the evidence, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Davis in the amount of one million, four hundred thousand dollars, which the trial court reduced to the statutory limit of one million, two hundred and fifty thousand dollars.

Dr. Linton now appeals.Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION⁵

I.Standard of Review

The parties request us to decide three issues of first impression, all revolving around the admissibility of evidence.The decision to admit or exclude evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.City of Gary v. McCrady,851 N.E.2d 359, 363(Ind.Ct.App.2006).The trial court's determination is afforded great discretion on appeal.Id.To that end, we will not reverse the trial court's decision absent a showing of manifest abuse of discretion.Id.An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it or it misinterprets the law.Matzat v. Matzat,854 N.E.2d 918, 919(Ind.Ct.App.2006).Even if a trial court errs in a ruling on the admissibility of evidence, we will only reverse if the error is inconsistent with substantial justice.Fairfield Development Inc. v. Georgetown Woods Senior Apartments Ltd.,768 N.E.2d 463, 466-67(Ind. Ct.App.2002), trans. denied.To determine whether an evidentiary error requires reversal, we assess the probable impact upon the trier of fact.Wohlwend v. Edwards,796 N.E.2d 781, 789(Ind.Ct. App.2003).

II.The Indiana Medical Licensing Board

Dr. Linton first asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence the Board's proceedings and findings.Essentially, Dr. Linton's numerous arguments can be consolidated into three main claims.First, Dr. Linton elaborates on the different purpose served by the Panel versus the Board and its different burden of proof.Next, he claims the admission into evidence of the Board's findings to be overly prejudicial and irrelevant to the decision whether Dr. Linton breached the standard of care in his treatment of Davis.Finally, he characterizes Davis' conduct of calling him as a witness in her case-in-chief a "subterfuge to force open the door for the admission of" the Board's findings.(Appellant's Briefp. 23).

A.Different Purpose, Different Burden of Proof

The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act was adopted in 1975 in an effort to maintain the availability of healthcare services in Indiana that were believed to be eroded by tort suits, and to help control the costs of medical liability insurance, litigation, settlements, and excessive judgments against healthcare providers.Mayhue v. Sparkman,653 N.E.2d 1384, 1386(Ind.1995).The statute established the framework for pursuing medical malpractice claims in Indiana.Specifically, it requires that, before a lawsuit is pursued, the Panel determines whether the physician's behavior...