Linton v. Linton, No. 2--374A56
| Docket Nº | No. 2--374A56 |
| Citation | 166 Ind.App. 409, 339 N.E.2d 96 |
| Case Date | December 10, 1975 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
Page 96
v.
Nancy Anne LINTON, Appellee.
[166 Ind.App. 428] Stephen B. Caplin, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Richard A. Young, Young & Young, Indianapolis, for appellee.
Page 97
OPINION ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
SULLIVAN, Presiding Judge.
Appellant Ray Linton, Jr., has filed his Petition for Rehearing asserting, inter alia, that our opinion [166 Ind.App. 429] on the merits (Linton v. Linton (1975), Ind.App., 336 N.E.2d 687), was in error in holding that the trial court correctly denied Ray's Motion For Change of Venue from the County. In that opinion we disposed of the issue upon the sole ground that a civil contempt proceeding is not considered a civil action so as to contemplate a change of venue under TR. 76.
Ray, however, correctly points out that in other portions of our opinion, we noted that the proceeding was not restricted to a prayer for a contempt judgment but that Appellee Nancy Linton sought nullification of the modification agreement and reinstatement of the original divorce decree. it is Ray's position that such issues, additional to the contempt issue, render our reliance solely upon State ex rel. Grile v. Allen Circuit Court (1967), 249 Ind. 173, 231 N.E.2d 138, an inadequate basis for our determination that the Motion for Change of Venue was properly denied.
We deem it appropriate to resolve hereby any real or apparent inconsistency which might be drawn in this regard from our original opinion.
Insofar as the issues to be resolved by the trial court were not directly related to the matter of contempt, they involved the continuing matter of child support and unpaid alimony. The latter was involved only tangentially, i.e., as to whether Ray had breached the agreed modification order by failing to pay previously ordered installments.
Whether Ray breached the modification agreement and insofar as that determination rested upon his failure to pay alimony, we deem the proceeding but a continuation of the court's previously established jurisdiction.
A court has inherent power to see that its orders and judgments are carried out. 60 C.J.S. Motions and Orders § 67. Normally, such power is exercised through the contempt process but contempt need not be the exclusive tool for remedying failures to honor judgments and orders. For example,[166 Ind.App. 430] Proceedings Supplemental pursuant to TR....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Jackson v. Farmers State Bank, No. 4-284
...to insure and protect the orderly administration of justice. Johnson v. State (1981), Ind.App., 426 N.E.2d 104; Linton v. Linton (1975), 166 Ind.App. 409, 339 N.E.2d 96, trans. denied. The evidence reveals that the Jacksons were aware of the court's order and it is uncontradicted that they ......
-
Moore v. State, No. 64S00-9402-CR-145
...is obligated to adhere to the trial court's request to refrain from using certain language. See Linton v. Linton (1975), Ind.App. 166 Ind.App. 409, 339 N.E.2d 96, 97 (on rehearing). It follows that the prosecutor's repeated failure to comply with the trial court's request to refrain from us......
-
Hudson v. Tyson, No. 2-377A88
...order to this Court without the necessity of filing a T.R. 59 Motion to Correct Errors. See also Linton v. Linton (1975), Ind.App., 339 N.E.2d 96; Myers v. Hoover (1973), 157 Ind.App. 310, 300 N.E.2d 110. Such proceedings are a means of enforcing the underlying judgment and are ancillary to......
-
1999 -NMSC- 2, Dugie v. Cameron, No. 25,140
...Changes of venue from the county as to requested modifications are not contemplated nor [sic] permitted.' " (quoting Linton v. Linton, 166 Ind.App. 409, 339 N.E.2d 96, 97 (Ind.Ct.App.1975))). In Texas, for [i]nitially, the [court which rendered the initial decree] acquired dominant jurisdic......
-
Jackson v. Farmers State Bank, No. 4-284
...to insure and protect the orderly administration of justice. Johnson v. State (1981), Ind.App., 426 N.E.2d 104; Linton v. Linton (1975), 166 Ind.App. 409, 339 N.E.2d 96, trans. denied. The evidence reveals that the Jacksons were aware of the court's order and it is uncontradicted that they ......
-
Moore v. State, No. 64S00-9402-CR-145
...is obligated to adhere to the trial court's request to refrain from using certain language. See Linton v. Linton (1975), Ind.App. 166 Ind.App. 409, 339 N.E.2d 96, 97 (on rehearing). It follows that the prosecutor's repeated failure to comply with the trial court's request to refrain from us......
-
Hudson v. Tyson, No. 2-377A88
...order to this Court without the necessity of filing a T.R. 59 Motion to Correct Errors. See also Linton v. Linton (1975), Ind.App., 339 N.E.2d 96; Myers v. Hoover (1973), 157 Ind.App. 310, 300 N.E.2d 110. Such proceedings are a means of enforcing the underlying judgment and are ancillary to......
-
1999 -NMSC- 2, Dugie v. Cameron, No. 25,140
...Changes of venue from the county as to requested modifications are not contemplated nor [sic] permitted.' " (quoting Linton v. Linton, 166 Ind.App. 409, 339 N.E.2d 96, 97 (Ind.Ct.App.1975))). In Texas, for [i]nitially, the [court which rendered the initial decree] acquired dominant jurisdic......