Linz v. Montgomery Cnty.
| Decision Date | 01 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1289, Sept. Term, 2021 |
| Parties | Christopher Andrew LINZ v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, Maryland |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Argued by: Stuart L. Plotnick, Rockville, MD, for Appellant.
Argued by: Kathryn Lloyd (Jeannette L. Frumkin, Patricia Lisehora Kane, Chief Litigation Division, Edward B. Lattner, Chief Division of Government Operations, John P. Markovs, Acting Cnty. Atty., Rockville, MD), all on the brief, for Appellee.
Panel: Reed, Beachley, Deborah S. Eyler (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.*
Eyler, Deborah S., J. Christopher Andrew Linz, the appellant, was injured in an automobile accident with a vehicle driven by Michael J. Chindblom, a police officer employed by Montgomery County, the appellee (the County). In the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Mr. Linz brought a timely suit for negligence against the County. After limitations had run, he moved for leave to file an amended complaint substituting Officer Chindblom as the sole defendant in place of the County. He asserted that the amendment was necessary to correct a misnomer and that the relation back doctrine would apply to make his amended complaint timely. The court denied the motion, and a motion for reconsideration, on the ground that there was no misnomer to correct and therefore the relation back doctrine did not apply.
We agree that there was no misnomer in this case and conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motions for leave to file an amended complaint and for reconsideration. Mr. Linz was attempting to sue a new defendant after the statute of limitations had run; and Officer Chindblom was not required to be joined as a necessary party and was not a real party in interest. We disagree with Mr. Linz's argument that Officer Chindblom was the intended defendant all along, and that upon a showing that he knew about the potential claim against him during the limitations period, the relation back doctrine would apply because the statute of limitations would not serve any purpose.
The statute of limitations had expired on Mr. Linz's negligence claim against Officer Chindblom and the relation back doctrine did not apply to make an action against him timely. Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment.
As context for our recitation of the facts and later discussion, we give an overview of the operation of the statutes that control the claims Mr. Linz brought against the County and attempted to bring against Officer Chindblom.
For our purposes in this appeal, it is undisputed that the vehicle Officer Chindblom was driving was owned by the County and the officer was acting within the scope of his employment when the accident happened. By operation of Md. Code § 5-524 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (CJP) and Md. Code § 17-107(c) of the Transportation Article (TA), governments such as the County have partially waived their immunity in actions for damages arising out of the negligent use of motor vehicles they own or lease, up to the minimum mandatory limits of insurance set by TA § 17-103(b). Williams v. Maynard , 359 Md. 379, 383, 754 A.2d 379 (2000).1 Under the latter statute, the minimum limits are $30,000 per person and $60,000 for two or more people.
These statutes have been interpreted to allow a suit against a government entity for negligent use of its vehicle, while in service or for its benefit, up to the applicable mandatory minimum limit. Id. at 382-83, 754 A.2d 379 (). Thus, in the case at bar, Mr. Linz could sue (and did sue) the County directly for negligence, on a vicarious liability theory based on the actions of Officer Chindblom as its employee, but the County could not be liable for more than $30,000 in damages.
By contrast, a claim by Mr. Linz for negligence against Officer Chindblom would be governed by the Local Government Tort Claims Act (LGTCA), CJP §§ 5-301, et seq . The County is a "local government" within the meaning of the LGTCA. CJP § 5-301(d)(1). As an employee of a local government, had Officer Chindblom been sued for negligence committed in the scope of his employment, the County would have been obligated to provide him a legal defense. CJP § 5-302(a). Any judgment for compensatory damages entered against Officer Chindblom could not have been executed against him. CJP § 5-302(b)(1). Rather, the County would have been "liable" to pay the judgment against him, CJP § 5-303(b)(1), up to $400,000. CJP § 5-303(a)(1).2 The County could not have raised governmental immunity "to avoid the duty to defend or indemnify[.]" CJP § 5-303(b)(2). By motion in this case or by a separate action for enforcement, Mr. Linz could have sought payment by the County of the judgment against Officer Chindblom. See Baltimore City Police Dep't v. Esteppe , 247 Md. App. 476, 507-11, 236 A.3d 808 (2020) (), aff'd , 476 Md. 3, 258 A.3d 210 (2021).
Notwithstanding that the LGTCA makes a local government liable to pay a judgment for compensatory damages entered against its employee in most situations and up to a certain amount, it does not create a cause of action for negligence or any other tort directly against the local government itself or allow a direct suit for negligence against a local government. Williams , 359 Md. at 394, 754 A.2d 379 ; see also Williams v. Prince George's Cnty. , 112 Md. App. 526, 552, 685 A.2d 884 (1996). In this case, Mr. Linz's negligence action against the County, based on the acts of Officer Chindblom, only could have been premised on the partial waiver provisions in CJP § 5-524 and TA § 17-107(c). Any action for negligence against Officer Chindblom, as opposed to the County, would be governed by the LGTCA.
Finally, the LGTCA carries notice requirements, spelled out in CJP § 5-304, for any action brought pursuant to that statute. When an action is brought directly against a local government under CJP § 5-524 and TA § 17-107(c), however, the notice requirements of the LGTCA apply, even though the action is not brought under the LGTCA. Williams , 359 Md. at 394, 754 A.2d 379 ().
On September 12, 2017, Officer Chindblom was on duty in Montgomery County, driving a marked police cruiser. He was not responding to an emergency. Allegedly, he made a left turn in front of Mr. Linz's vehicle when Mr. Linz had the right-of-way, colliding with it. Mr. Linz suffered a broken ankle and other injuries in the accident.
Mr. Linz served a timely notice of intent to sue on the Montgomery County Executive, pursuant to CJP § 5-304. The Montgomery County Police Department was served with the same notice. Two years later, his lawyer and lawyers for the County engaged in settlement negotiations. Mr. Linz's lawyer sent a demand letter that, among other things, specified that Officer Chindblom was the person who had caused the accident. No settlement was reached.
On August 31, 2020, 12 days before the statute of limitations was going to expire, Mr. Linz filed a one-count complaint for negligence against the County in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. See CJP § 5-101 (). He did not sue Officer Chindblom. The complaint identified Officer Chindblom as the driver who caused the automobile accident. The County filed an answer.
By the close of 2020, both parties had propounded and responded to written discovery. In its answer to an interrogatory requesting information about immunities or limitations on liability, the County referenced CJP § 5-524 and TA § 17-103.
In early February 2021, counsel for the parties renewed their settlement discussions. The County took the position that its maximum liability was $30,000. On February 11, 2021, in response to Mr. Linz's lawyer's request for an explanation for that stance, counsel for the County sent him a memorandum explaining the operation of the statutes discussed above.
The next day, Mr. Linz filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint, under Rule 2-341, to "substitute" Officer Chindblom for the County as the sole defendant in the case. He asserted: He requested arguing that the new complaint would relate back to the filing date of the original complaint, making it timely.
The County filed an opposition in which it argued that the relation back doctrine would not apply to Mr. Linz's proposed amended complaint and therefore any negligence action against Officer Chindblom was time-barred. The motion was scheduled for a hearing. In the meantime, Mr. Linz's lawyer deposed Officer Chindblom. According to Mr. Linz, the officer admitted that he was at fault in the accident and testified that, in 2017, he had been advised by representatives of the County to be on the alert for a lawsuit arising out of the accident.
Without holding the scheduled hearing, the court issued a one-page order stating: "ORDERED, as Plaintiff seeks to add a party several months beyond the Statute of Limitations, Plaintiff's Motion...
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