Lion Oil Company v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 15158.
Decision Date | 22 April 1955 |
Docket Number | No. 15158.,15158. |
Citation | 221 F.2d 231 |
Parties | LION OIL COMPANY, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Jeff Davis, El Dorado, Ark. (B. L. Allen and H. D. Dickens, El Dorado, Ark., on the brief), for petitioner.
Duane Beeson, Washington, D. C. (George J. Bott, David P. Findling, Marcel Mallet-Prevost and Frederick U. Reel, Washington, D. C., on the brief), for respondent.
Lindsay P. Walden and William E. Rentfro, Denver, Colo., filed brief for Oil Workers International Union, CIO, as amici curiæ.
Before SANBORN, JOHNSEN and VOGEL, Circuit Judges.
This case is before the court upon the petition of Lion Oil Company to review and set aside an order of the National Labor Relations Board, and upon request of the Board for enforcement of its order issued against the Lion Oil Company on August 5, 1954, following proceedings under Section 10 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq.
The petitioner, Lion Oil Company (hereinafter referred to as "Company") and Oil Workers International Union CIO (hereinafter referred to as "Union") entered into a collective bargaining contract providing in detail the wages, hours and conditions under which employees should work for the Company during the term of the agreement. Insofar as it is applicable to the problem presented herein, the agreement between the Company and the Union provided as follows:
On August 24, 1951, the Union transmitted by mail to the Company and to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service the following letter:
Representatives of the Company and the Union first met on August 29, 1951, to discuss the proposed amendments. Between that date and April 30, 1952, there were 37 meetings held for the same purpose. No agreement was arrived at.
On April 30, 1952, the employees of the Company went on strike for a wage increase and other benefits.
Neither the Company nor the Union notified the other that it intended to terminate the contract. On June 21, 1952, after the employees here involved had been on strike continuously from April 30, 1952, the Union offered to return all striking employees to work unconditionally. The Company refused such offer. Subsequently it distributed to all employees copies of a letter to the Union in which it defended its position that there would be no reinstatement of the strikers "until such time as the (employees) are willing to agree to go to work and continue to work for a period of at least one year with no strike or other work stoppage during that period".
Subsequent to June 21st numbers of employees, singly and in groups, appeared at the Company's plant, were interviewed by the plant superintendent and rehired upon the assurance of each individual that he would "continue to come to work daily and continuously throughout the period of the remainder of the strike" and that he would not honor any picket line at the Company's plant. It was made clear that without such assurances no striker would be permitted reinstatement. Between June 21, 1952, and August 3, 1952, 27 negotiation meetings between representatives of the Company and the Union were held in an effort to settle the dispute.
On August 3, 1952, a new agreement was formally executed with the employees being reinstated the following day.
During the period of negotiations the Union filed with the National Labor Relations Board a charge of unfair labor practices against the Company. The charge was based upon the activities of the Company subsequent to the Union's offer to return the strikers to work.
The Company filed an answer to the charge in which it denied the allegations of unfair labor practices and, further, set up as a separate defense the claim that the strike was an unlawful one because it was called by the Union at a time when there was in effect between the Union and the Company a collective bargaining contract; that the strike was in violation of the contract provisions, constituted an unfair labor practice and that the employees participating therein thereby lost their status as employees and were not entitled to relief.
By a split decision, (one member dissenting and one concurring specially) the Board held that the Company was guilty of unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sections 8(a) (1), 8(a) (3) and 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act and rejected the Company's defense that the strikers had lost the protection of the Act because they had struck while a contract was in effect. It is this decision and the resulting order that are under review here.
The primary question is this: Was the strike of April 30, 1952 in violation of the agreement between the parties and contrary to the provisions of Section 8 (d) of the Act? The relevant portions of that Section are as follows:
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