Lionetti v. Coppola

• Decision Date: 09 August 1932
• Citation: 115 Conn. 499,161 A. 797
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: LIONETTI v. COPPOLA et al.

161 A. 797

115 Conn. 499

LIONETTI v. COPPOLA et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

August 9, 1932

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Ernest A. Inglis Judge.

Action by Adolph Lionetti against Generoso Coppola and Michael Coppola to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by defendants' heedless and reckless disregard of plaintiff's rights. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff against defendant last named, and latter appeals.

No error.

Argued before MALTBIE C.J., and HAINES, HINMAN, BANKS, and AVERY JJ.

Raymond E. Hackett, of Stamford, for appellant.

Justus J. Fennel, of Stamford, Ira L. Cressler and George Dimenstein, of Stamford, for appellee.

MALTBIE, C.J.

The jury might reasonably have found the following facts: An automobile truck operated by Michael Coppola, hereafter called the defendant, and one operated by Carmine Lionetti, were in an election night parade in Stamford November 4, 1930. After the parade broke up, the two trucks proceeded along Stillwater avenue and turned into Spruce street, which intersects it at right angles; Lionetti's truck then being ahead. Spruce street is about twenty-four feet wide between curbs. It was or had been raining that night, and it was somewhat misty and drizzly, and the pavement was wet. Spruce street at this point is dimly lighted, and the defendant's truck had only dim headlights. The body of the truck, with which the defendant was familiar, was apt to sway, particularly when carrying a load, because it was built upon a low chasis. In the truck at the time of the accident were some fifteen boys who were pushing each other about and shouting, and there were three boys upon the left running board. One of these was the plaintiff, then 14 years old, who was standing holding to the door by the driver's seat; another boy was lying between the fender and the hood of the truck; and the defendant must have known of the position of both of these. A third boy, 13 years old, was standing on the running board behind the plaintiff. When the defendant turned into Spruce street, he cut the corner so short that the truck struck the curb. He was then going at a speed of twenty-five to thirty miles an hour. After turning the corner, he increased his speed and was going so fast that a boy standing inside the track testified that he was frightened. He tried twice to pass Lionetti on the left side, causing the body of his truck to sway, but found that he did not have room to do so. He then increased his speed somewhat swang rather abruptly to the left, and tried to pass again. Some of the passengers in Lionetti's truck shouted to Lionetti to pull to one side, one passenger testifying that if he had not done so both the trucks would have been wrecked. Lionetti did drive as far to the right as he could in view of the fact that there were parked cars standing in the street, bringing his truck almost to a stop. This left just room for the defendant to pass between it and the curb. Without slackening his speed, he went by. He was then driving about thirty-five to forty miles an hour, and the body of the truck was swaying somewhat. At this point in the street a pole was very close to the outside of the curb, leaning somewhat toward the street. This pole the defendant might have seen had he been keeping a reasonable outlook. As the truck passed it, the body swayed toward it and went so close that the plaintiff was swept off the running board and fell to the ground, receiving the injuries to recover for which he brought this action. After the accident, when Lionetti said to him. " It's mighty crazy to go so fast, you want to kill people," the defendant asked Lionetti if he was insured, and when he replied that he was not, the defendant said, " Well, my truck is insured."

The plaintiff was a gratuitous passenger in the defendant's truck, and therefore entitled to recover only in accordance with the provisions of the guest statute, so called, that is upon a reasonable finding by the jury that the defendant operated the truck in a manner to evince a headless and reckless disregard of the consequences of harm to those riding with him or to others. General Statutes, § 1628: Sadinsky v. Coughlin, 114 Conn. 383, 589, 159 A. 492. But if the jury found the facts to be such as have been stated, we cannot say that they might not reasonably reach the conclusion that the requirements of the...