Lipford v. City of Chi., Case No. 15-cv-6988
| Decision Date | 05 March 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 15-cv-6988 |
| Parties | MICHAEL LIPFORD, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Michael Lipford sued the City of Chicago and numerous police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they searched his home and arrested him in September 2013. See generally [45]. Plaintiff also asserts a state-law malicious-prosecution claim against the officers and a state-law indemnity claim against the City. Id. Defendants moved for summary judgment. [86]. For the reasons explained below, this Court partially grants and partially denies Defendants' motion.
The following facts come from Defendants' Local Rule 56.1 statement of facts [87] and Plaintiff's Local Rule 56.1 statement of additional facts [93].
In September 2013, Plaintiff lived with Deandre Norfleet, a probationer. [87] ¶¶ 12-13. On September 18, 2013, Officers Dailey, Goff, and Veleta (the Defendant Officers) accompanied Cook County probation officers (no longer parties to this case) to Plaintiff and Norfleet's apartment to conduct a probation check on Norfleet. Id. ¶ 11. Defendants say that the probation officers had a search warrant related to Norfleet that they showed Plaintiff, who then allowed all the officers to enter his home. Id. ¶¶ 15-16.1
Plaintiff denies that he let the officers into his apartment voluntarily. He says that he let the officers in because they showed him a piece of paper that they claimed was a search warrant for Norfleet. [94] ¶ 31. But, Plaintiff says, Defendants never produced a warrant during discovery, no Defendant mentioned a warrant during their depositions, and Plaintiff's official arrest report says—without mentioning a warrant—that officers were "let into the location by Michael Lipford." Id.; [93-2] at 3. In other words, Plaintiff says that the officers lied to him about having a warrant to gain entry to his apartment. [94] ¶ 31.
The parties agree that, once inside, Dailey walked through the apartment toward the open door to Plaintiff's bedroom. [87] ¶ 20. When Dailey looked through the door, he saw a shotgun sitting on a shelf above the bed. Id. ¶ 21. Dailey then entered Plaintiff's bedroom and saw another shotgun in the corner of the room. Id. ¶ 22. At this point, Goff, Veleta, the probation officers, and Plaintiff came into the room. Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiff admitted that he owned both guns, and Veleta asked him for his Firearm Owners Identification (FOID) card. Id. ¶ 25.
Plaintiff searched his bedroom and a safe for his FOID card. Id. ¶ 26. When Plaintiff opened the safe, the Defendant Officers saw boxes of ammunition. Id. ¶ 29. Despite his search, Plaintiff could not produce a FOID card, so the Defendant Officers arrested him for failure to possess a FOID card. Id. ¶ 31. After arrestingPlaintiff, the Defendant Officers transported him to the police station, where he was charged with failure to possess a FOID card while in possession of firearms and ammunition. Id. ¶ 40. At his subsequent criminal trial, Plaintiff stipulated that his last FOID card expired in 2009. Id. ¶ 46. Plaintiff was ultimately found not guilty of all charges. Id. ¶ 49.
Courts should grant summary judgment when the moving party shows that no genuine dispute exists as to any material fact and the evidence weighs so heavily in the moving party's favor that the moving party "must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. A genuine dispute as to a material fact exists when, based upon the evidence, a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. To show a genuine dispute as to a material fact, the non-moving party must point to "particular materials in the record," and cannot rely upon the pleadings or speculation. Olendzki v. Rossi, 765 F.3d 742, 746 (7th Cir. 2014).
At summary judgment, courts must evaluate evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing evidence. Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 477 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). The moving party bears the burden of establishing the lack of genuine disputes as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights by lying about having a search warrant to enter his apartment. [92] at 7. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Rasho, 856 F.3d at 477, triable issues of fact exist regarding whether the Defendant Officers lawfully entered Plaintiff's home.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." Warrantless searches presumptively violate the Fourth Amendment. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001). That said, an occupant's voluntary consent to a search of his home generally makes a warrantless search reasonable. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006). An occupant does not consent to a search, however, when he allows officers to enter his home based upon their claim of a search warrant. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 549-50 (1968) ().
Oddly, although Defendants' fact statement says (twice) that probation officers showed Plaintiff a search warrant when they arrived with Dailey, Goff, and Veleta, [87] ¶¶ 15-16, Defendants now argue that they rely only upon Plaintiff's consent for their authority to enter his apartment, see [99] at 5 (). Clearly, if the officers lied about having a search warrant—as Plaintiff's evidence suggests—then Plaintiff did nottruly consent to them entering his home. See Hadley v. Williams, 368 F.3d 747, 749 (7th Cir. 2004) (). Plaintiff repeatedly testified at his criminal trial and during his deposition that he allowed the officers in because they showed him a "piece of paper" and told him it was a search warrant for Norfleet. [93] ¶ 31. Based upon Plaintiff's testimony and Defendants' current position regarding the existence of a search warrant (which they had asserted existed in their fact statement, but failed to mention in the Defendant Officers' depositions and the arrest report), as well as Defendants' failure to produce any warrant during discovery, the record contains genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Plaintiff consented to the search. Specifically, it remains unclear whether the officers had a warrant and whether Plaintiff voluntarily consented to the search.
Defendants hint, but do not fully argue, that Norfleet's status as a probationer reduced Plaintiff's expectation of privacy such that he has limited grounds to challenge the search. [88] at 11; [99] at 5. Undeveloped arguments are considered waived. See Crespo v. Colvin, 795 F.3d 711, 718 (7th Cir. 2016).
Even if Defendants made this argument properly, it fails to help them here. True, probationers have a reduced expectation of privacy. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006). But the law has not yet explicitly reduced the expectation of privacy for people who live with probationers, absent, at the very least, some showing of knowledge regarding that status. Compare Thornton v. Lund, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1058 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (), and Barajas v. City of Rohnert Park, 159 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (), with Taylor v. Brontoli, No. 1:04-cv-0487, 2007 WL 1359713, at *1 n.4 (). Neither side provided evidence of the conditions of Norfleet's probation—such as whether probation officers could search his home at any time without reasonable suspicion—and neither side offered evidence about Plaintiff's knowledge of Norfleet's specific probation conditions.
Defendants also fail to raise qualified immunity as a defense to this claim. See [99] at 11 (). Even if they had raised qualified immunity, the disputed material facts (whether officers lied about having a search warrant and whether Plaintiff actually consented to officers entering his home) would prevent this Court from finding that Defendants merit qualified immunity. See Hill v. Coppleson, 627 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2010). Thus, this Court denies Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claim of an unreasonable search.
Plaintiff claims that the Defendant Officers falsely arrested him because theylacked probable cause to ask for his FOID card in the first place, and still lacked probable cause after asking because he "gave every indication of believing that he had a FOID card." [92] at 9-10. Defendants argue that they did not need probable cause to ask for the FOID card and that Plaintiff's failure to produce the card gave them probable cause to arrest him. [99] at 7-9. This Court agrees.
Probable cause provides an absolute defense to a false arrest claim. Gonzalez v. City of...
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