Lipin v. National Union Fire Ins. of Pittsburgh

• Decision Date: 28 March 2002
• Docket Number: No. 00 CIV 3457 LTS DFE.,00 CIV 3457 LTS DFE.
• Citation: 202 F.Supp.2d 126
• Parties: Joan Carol LIPIN, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA., Lawrence J. Baer, Mark A. Jacoby Christopher A. Parlo, Steven R. Wall American National Red Cross Arthur W. Greig, in his individual and official capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

202 F.Supp.2d 126

Joan Carol LIPIN, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA., Lawrence J. Baer, Mark A. Jacoby Christopher A. Parlo, Steven R. Wall American National Red Cross Arthur W. Greig, in his individual and official capacity, Defendants.

No. 00 CIV 3457 LTS DFE.

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

March 28, 2002.

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Joan Carol Lipin¹, New York City, Plaintiff Pro Se.

Wisehart & Koch by Arthur M. Wisehart, New York City, Former Attorney for Plaintiff.

Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of the State, of New York, Department of Law by Carol Cairns Olson, Assistant Attorney General, New York, for Defendant Greig.

Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP by Kevin T. Rover, Melinda E. Hoffmann, New York City, for Defendants Parlo and Wall.

Ohrenstein & Brown, LLP by Geoffrey W. Heineman, New York City, for Defendant National Union Fire Insurance Company.

Weil, Gotshal & Manges by Kevin P. Hughes, New York City, for Defendants National Red Cross, Baer and Jacoby.

OPINION

SWAIN, District Judge.

Joan Carol Lipin ("Plaintiff") brings this action ("Lipin IV") against National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA ("National Union"), Lawrence J. Baer ("Baer"), Mark A. Jacoby ("Jacoby"), Christopher A. Parlo ("Parlo"), Steven R. Wall ("Wall"), the American National Red Cross (the "National Red Cross"), and Arthur W. Greig ("Greig"), in his individual and official capacity (collectively, "Defendants"), asserting causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1985(2) for defamation, injurious falsehood, and obstruction of justice, civil rights causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sections 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988, and a claim for retaliation allegedly violative of the New York City Human Rights Law.

All defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint. Defendants Baer, Parlo and the National Red Cross have in addition moved for sanctions and other relief, including injunctive relief barring Plaintiff and her former counsel² from pursuing new litigation arising from the events that are the subject matter of the instant case. Plaintiff has interposed her own motion for injunctive relief.

The Court has considered thoroughly all submissions and arguments related to these motions, and the decision here rendered reflects such consideration. For the following reasons, Defendants' motions are granted and Plaintiff's action is dismissed with prejudice as to all defendants. Because Defendants' motions are dispositive of Plaintiff's claims, the Court need not address Plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief.

BACKGROUND

The following background facts are undisputed and/or matters of public record. In February 1988, Plaintiff's employment as Manager of Health Services for the National Red Cross was terminated. Thereafter, Plaintiff commenced an action in state court against the National Red Cross, the American Red Cross of Greater New York, and her former supervisor, Robert Bender, Jr. Plaintiff alleged sexual harassment, discrimination, wrongful termination, civil rights violations, conspiracy, conspiratorial cover-up, defamation, blacklisting, breach of contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The state court dismissed that action, which was captioned Lipin v. Robert M. Bender, Jr., The American National Red Cross and American Red Cross in Greater New York ("Lipin I"), pursuant to New York Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR") section 3103(c) as a sanction following certain "heinous" and "egregious" actions by Plaintiff and her attorney, Arthur M. Wisehart ("Wisehart"). The sanctioned conduct included taking and photocopying certain privileged documents belonging to the defendants in that action. Both the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court and the New York State Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Lipin v. Bender, 193 A.D.2d 424, 428, 597 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1st Dep't 1993); Lipin v. Bender, 84 N.Y.2d 562, 572, 620 N.Y.S.2d 744, 644 N.E.2d 1300 (N.Y.1994).

In June 1992, while her appeal from the dismissal of Lipin I was pending, Plaintiff commenced Lipin II in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, asserting the claims previously raised in Lipin I, and an additional claim that defendants had engaged in a conspiracy to entrap Plaintiff into taking the privileged documents and committing other litigation-related misconduct. Plaintiff made express references in her complaint to information in the privileged documents that she had been prohibited from using. The District Court entered an order sealing the complaint and staying further proceedings in Lipin II.

In March 1993, Plaintiff commenced Lipin III, again in this District, again asserting the same claims. The District Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss Lipin II and Lipin III on the ground of claim preclusion, holding that the disposition of Lipin I barred further litigation of the underlying claims. Lipin v. American National Red Cross, Nos. 93 Civ. 1334, 92 Civ. 4455(LBS), 1996 WL 18901 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 1996), aff'd, 104 F.3d 355 (2d Cir.1996), opinion vacated and superseded on reh'g, 113 F.3d 1229 (2d Cir.1997). Applying New York's claim preclusion law, the District Court examined each of Plaintiff's claims and found that they were all transactionally related to the claims in the state action and were therefore precluded. It found that Plaintiff's claims alleging sexual discrimination, sexual harassment, and wrongful termination had already been dismissed by the state court with prejudice. The claims of defamation and blacklisting were held identical to those dismissed in Lipin I. Her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was held precluded as an alternative theory of relief arising from the allegations pled in Lipin I. Finally, Plaintiff's breach of contract and quantum meruit/unjust enrichment claims were found to be based on nearly identical allegations in Lipin I, and were also held precluded by the earlier dismissal of that action. Lipin, 1996 WL 18901, at *7-8. The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Lipin II and Lipin III, finding Plaintiff's arguments without merit. Lipin v. American National Red Cross, 113 F.3d 1229 (2d Cir.1997).

Lipin IV, the matter now before the Court, is another attempt to assert the claims raised and dismissed in Lipin I, Lipin II, and Lipin III. In addition to reiterating the allegations of sexual harassment and discrimination in connection with her employment by the National Red Cross, Plaintiff asserts a number of purported conspiracy and civil rights claims that are all premised on the notion that the evidence on which the state court based its misconduct findings in Lipin I was fraudulent. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conspired to defame her, to obstruct justice, and to deprive her of her constitutional rights by, among other things, referring to the Lipin I misconduct findings in later litigation papers and in a report in connection with a disciplinary proceeding later commenced with respect to Wisehart, her attorney.³ Plaintiff also contends that Defendants conspired to retaliate against her because of her commencement of Lipin I.

In Plaintiff's First Claim for Relief, she alleges that she is the victim of a conspiracy, arising out of her claims of sexual harassment and claims of litigation misconduct, to defame her. Plaintiff alleges that defendants Parlo and Wall, who are attorneys with Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, the firm that represented the American National Red Cross in Lipin I, defamed Plaintiff by including in memoranda filed in an unrelated federal court case and arbitration proceeding statements that describe the findings of misconduct by Plaintiff and her attorney in Lipin I. Plaintiff alleges that defendants Parlo and Wall conspired with defendants National Red Cross and its attorneys Jacoby and Baer to publish the allegedly defamatory statements as a continuation of a conspiracy of litigation misconduct arising out of Lipin I. (Am.Compl.¶¶ 40(i), 49, 50, 54, 55.)

Plaintiff's Second Claim for Relief alleges a conspiracy to obstruct justice and deprive Plaintiff of her constitutional rights, and also arises out of the publication of statements reporting the misconduct of Plaintiff and her attorney, Wisehart. The allegedly offending statements were made in a report, dated March 14, 2000, that was apparently prepared by defendant Greig in his capacity as Chair of the state court disciplinary committee "that has been investigating the disciplinary matter of plaintiff's attorney and who [sic] has threatened certain imminent action in connection therewith." (Am. Compl.¶ 36(h)). As in her First Claim for Relief, Plaintiff seeks to relitigate her underlying claims of sexual harassment and a continuing conspiracy of litigation misconduct arising out of Lipin I. (Am. Compl.¶¶ 36, 62, 64-75, 77, 80-85, 139, 140, 143-146).

Plaintiff's Third Claim for Relief alleges that Defendants conspired to retaliate against her because of her filing of Lipin I by defending that action and by seeking dismissal of Lipin I on account of the misconduct committed by Plaintiff and her attorney in that action. (Am. Compl.¶¶ 148-149). Plaintiff's Third Claim for Relief repeats the retaliatory misconduct claims that were dismissed by the state and federal courts in Lipin I, Lipin II and Lipin III.

DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiff's claims are barred by collateral estoppel and/or res judicata, by virtue of the prior decisions. Defendants further contend that the complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim for defamation and conspiracy. Defendant Greig asserts that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of Plaintiff's claims, citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and that dismissal pursuant to Rule...