Lipkin v. U.S. S.E.C.
Decision Date | 22 December 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 06 CIV.0939 RJH.,06 CIV.0939 RJH. |
Citation | 468 F.Supp.2d 614 |
Parties | Michael LIPKIN and Joshua Shainberg, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Jack Kaufman, Esq., and Bohdan S. Ozaruk, Esq., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Michael Lipkin, Marlboro, NJ, Pro se.
Joshua Shainberg, New York City, Pro se.
Pierre G. Armand, Assistant United States Attorney, New York City, for Defendants.
In this action, pro se plaintiffs Michael Lipkin and Joshua Shainberg allege that, during a civil enforcement action brought against them in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") in 1999, SEC attorneys Jack Kaufman and Bohdan S. Ozaruk defamed Lipkin and Shainberg, lied to the court, and concealed exculpatory evidence. The enforcement action culminated in a jury verdict against Lipkin and Shainberg, and the court issued a final judgment that included disgorgement, prejudgment interest, and civil penalties. See SEC v. Lipkin, No. 99 Civ. 7357(VVP), 2006 WL 435035, at *1, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10496 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2006). That judgment is currently the subject of an appeal. See SEC v. Shainberg, No. 06-0384 (2d Cir. filed Jan. 25, 2006). Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs filed the instant action against the SEC, Kaufman, and Ozaruk, seeking compensatory, exemplary, and punitive damages and various types of injunctive relief.
Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction [8]. In a Report and Recommendation ("Report") dated November 9, 2006, Magistrate Judge Gabriel W. Gorenstein recommended that the Court grant defendants' motion and dismiss the Complaint with prejudice. For the reasons stated below, the Court adopts Judge Gorenstein's Report in its entirety and rejects plaintiffs' objections. The facts underlying the instant action are discussed in greater detail in the Report, familiarity with which is assumed, and which is attached to this opinion for ease of reference.
On a potentially dispositive motion, the district court must review de novo those portions of the report to which objection is made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (2006); United States v. Male Juvenile, 121 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir.1997). However, "[i]f no objections are filed, or where objections are merely perfunctory responses, argued in an attempt to engage the district court in a rehashing of the same arguments set forth in the original petition, reviewing courts should review a report and recommendation for clear error." Edwards v. Fischer, 414 F.Supp.2d 342, 346-47 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, plaintiffs object to the Report's conclusion that they must file an administrative claim with the SEC before seeking monetary damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). Plaintiffs object to the Report's conclusion that they were free to challenge any claimed misconduct by making an application to the trial court or raising the issue on appeal, and thus they now are barred from bringing a Bivens claim for monetary damages. The Court reviews de novo these portions of the Report.
The Report concludes that where, as here, tort claims are asserted against federal employees acting within the scope of their employment, the United States should be substituted as the proper defendant under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) (). The Report further concludes that any claims brought under the FTCA are barred nonetheless because plaintiffs have failed to submit an administrative claim to the SEC. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (). "Absent compliance with the statute's requirements the action is barred by sovereign immunity and the district court had no subject matter jurisdiction." Wyler v. United States, 725 F.2d 156, 159 (2d Cir.1983); see Millares Guiraldes de Tineo v. United States, 137 F.3d 715, 719 (2d Cir.1998) ( ). Although plaintiffs do not object to the Report's conclusion that they never filed an administrative claim with the SEC, they state:
It is not the intention of the Plaintiffs to file a form with the SEC and have the [defendants'] supervisors investigate them. In fact these individuals received a complaint but have decided to deny that fact. How can such an investigation continue with this type of attitude and blatant mistruths?
(Objections 1.) Plaintiffs appear to be asking the Court to recognize an exception to the exhaustion requirement because filing an administrative claim would be futile. However, the Second Circuit has held in a similar context that "[u]ntil the Commission has acted and actual bias has been demonstrated, the orderly administrative procedures of the agency should not be interrupted by judicial intervention." Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 575 (2d Cir.1979) ( ). Plaintiffs cite no precedent, and this Court is aware of none, in which a district court has permitted a plaintiff to proceed with an FTCA claim without exhausting administrative remedies.
However, even if this Court were to find that plaintiffs' failure to file an administrative claim with the SEC should be excused because of agency bias, the Court adopts the Report's conclusion that plaintiffs' fraud, perjury, interference with contract, slander, "conspiracy for libel," spoliation, and concealment of evidence claims all fall outside the limited waiver of sovereign immunity provided by the FTCA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Accordingly, plaintiffs' FTCA claims must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Complaint also can be construed as an action for monetary damages against defendants Kaufman and Ozaruk in their individual capacities. To the extent that this action is based on claims that sound in common-law tort, the FTCA provides federal employees with absolute immunity. See Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592, 608 (2d Cir.1991) ( ); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1). However, the FTCA does not apply to suits for violations of federal constitutional rights. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2). Thus, for plaintiffs' claims against Kaufman and Ozaruk to survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must allege a constitutional wrong under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).
As Judge Gorenstein observed, the Complaint may be liberally construed to allege that the individual defendants intentionally, or at least negligently, engaged in misconduct during the enforcement action that resulted in a deprivation, of plaintiffs' property interests (disgorgement, interest, and penalties). However, the Second Circuit has held that "the negligent or intentional deprivation of property through the random and unauthorized acts of a state or federal employee does not constitute a deprivation of due process if `a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.'" Stuto v. Fleishman, 164 F.3d 820, 825 (2d Cir.1999) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984)) (plaintiff, who alleged that federal employees had violated his constitutional due process rights by mishandling and terminating a claim for disability benefits, could not assert a Bivens claim for denial of constitutional due process where an array of postdeprivation remedies were available) that .
Here, plaintiffs had several remedies for defendants' alleged misconduct available to them. Plaintiffs could have addressed any improper conduct during the trial in an application to the trial judge, or they could have moved for a mistrial based on defendants' alleged misconduct. Cf. SEC v. Prater, 296 F.Supp.2d 210, 218 n. 3 (D.Conn.2003) (). After trial, plaintiffs could have moved the district court for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. See Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Victor Co. of Japan, Ltd., 208 F.Supp.2d 344, 359 (S.D.N.Y.2002) . Alternatively, plaintiffs could have applied to the district court for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), and they were free to raise their claims on appeal.1 The fact that plaintiffs might not have been able...
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