Lipphardt v. Durango Steakhouse of Brandon

• Decision Date: 28 September 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-11922,00-11922
• Citation: 267 F.3d 1183
• Parties: (11th Cir. 2001) MARY HOPE LIPPHARDT, an individual, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DURANGO STEAKHOUSE OF BRANDON, INC., a Florida Corporation, Defendant-Appellee
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1183

267 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2001)

MARY HOPE LIPPHARDT, an individual, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DURANGO STEAKHOUSE OF BRANDON, INC., a Florida Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 00-11922

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

September 28, 2001

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, D. C. Docket No. 97-01692-CV-T-17C

Before BIRCH, WILSON and FARRIS^*, Circuit Judges.

BIRCH, Circuit Judge:

In this case we determine whether a plaintiff who was formerly involved in an intimate relationship with a co-worker is precluded from bringing a claim against the employer for retaliatory discharge when the plaintiff was fired after reporting her ex-boyfriend's harassing conduct to their employer. The district court granted defendant's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law after a jury found for the plaintiff.¹ We REVERSE.

I. BACKGROUND²

Plaintiff-Appellant, Mary Hope Lipphardt, and Donald Knuth were employees of Defendant-Appellee Durango Steakhouse ("Durango"). Lipphardt began dating Knuth, one of her supervisors, while they were both working at Durango. During this time, their relationship at work was positive and Lipphardt was being considered for an assistant manager position. After they had lived together for approximately one month, Lipphardt ended their personal relationship and moved out of Knuth's apartment.

Lipphardt contends that, after their personal relationship ended, she began having difficulties with Knuth at work. Generally, Knuth was consistently attempting to convince Lipphardt to resume their intimate relationship. He frequently paged her, called her at work, and left her messages at home while intoxicated. He refused to work with her while at Durango but, on several occasions, brushed up against her in a way that Lipphardt testified was sexual and made her uncomfortable. At one point, Lipphardt claims that Knuth threatened to hurt her or her child.

On 12 December 1996, Lipphardt and Knuth had a confrontation in the restaurant office. Knuth, who had been drinking at the bar for a few hours, followed Lipphardt into the back office and propositioned her. Eventually, Knuth blocked Lipphardt's exit from the office and closed the door. After a heated argument, Lipphardt was able to leave the office 15 minutes later. She told a co-worker that she was afraid of what Knuth would do to her, and another co-worker agreed to stay with Lipphardt until she was able to go home. When Lipphardt left the restaurant that night, Knuth followed her to her car and blocked her from closing her car door, all the while asking her to resume their relationship.

On 13 December 1996, Knuth asked Lipphardt if she was going to report his conduct. Later that evening, after Knuth had a meeting with the general manager of Durango, Lipphardt met with that same manager and a second manager and described Knuth's actions and their affect on her. She also reported the incidents to a regional manager and requested a transfer. While Lipphardt was on a previously-scheduled vacation, the general manager told Knuth that his supervisor was considering firing both Lipphardt and Knuth. According to Knuth, the general manager asked Knuth if he knew anything that could get Lipphardt fired, as the restaurant would rather keep Knuth and "get rid of the bitch." R11-252. Knuth told the general manager that Lipphardt had given free food to employees at a nearby tanning salon in exchange for tanning services.³ It was established at trial that a different employee was trading food for tanning services, and that Knuth had never actually seen Lipphardt engage in this practice when he made the allegation. Regardless, the general manager recommended that the regional manager fire Lipphardt, and she was fired upon return from vacation. No one followed up with Knuth regarding his allegations before firing Lipphardt.

Lipphardt filed a four-count complaint, alleging hostile work environment sexual harassment, quid pro quo sexual harassment, retaliation, and negligent retention. The district court granted Durango's motion for summary judgment on the quid pro quo sexual harassment charge and, at the close of evidence, its motion for judgment as a matter of law on the claim of negligent retention. The two remaining issues were submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict for Durango on hostile work environment sexual harassment and for Lipphardt on retaliation. Following the trial, the district court granted Durango's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the retaliation claim, and, in the alternative, conditionally granted Durango's motion for a new trial. Lipphardt appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review the district court's decision to enter a judgment as a matter of law de novo. Gupta v. Fl. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 582 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1076, 121 S. Ct. 772 (2000). In this analysis, "[w]e will not second-guess the jury or substitute our judgment for its judgment if its verdict is supported by sufficient evidence." Id.

We have a well-established standard governing motions for judgment as a matter of law:

If the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the Court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict, granting of the motions is proper. On the other hand, if there is substantial evidence opposed to the motions, that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, the motions should be denied, and the case submitted to the jury. . . . [I]t is the function of the jury as the traditional finder of the facts, and not the Court, to weigh conflicting evidence and inferences, and determine the credibility of witnesses.

Watts v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 842 F.2d 307, 309-10 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (citation omitted). A party's motion for judgment as a matter of law can be granted at the close of evidence or, if timely renewed, after the jury has returned its verdict, as long as "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find" that the discharge was retaliatory. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 50 (a)(1),(2) and (b).⁴

We review the district court's grant of a new trial for abuse of discretion. Lambert v. Fulton County, Ga., 253 F.3d 588, 595 (11th Cir. 2001). The district court should grant a motion for a new trial when "the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence or will result in a miscarriage of justice, even though there may be substantial evidence which would prevent the direction of a verdict." Hewitt v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 732 F.2d 1554, 1556 (11th Cir. 1984) (internal quotations and punctuation omitted). Because it is critical that a judge does not merely substitute his judgment for that of the jury, "new trials should not be granted on evidentiary grounds unless, at a minimum, the verdict is against the great--not merely the greater--weight of the evidence." Id.

B. Judgment as a Matter of Law

In order to prevail on her retaliation claim, Lipphardt was required to "establish a prima facie case by showing (1) statutorily protected expression, (2) adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link between the protected expression and the adverse action." Goldsmith v. City of Atmore, 996 F.2d 1155, 1163 (11th Cir. 1993). One example of "statutorily protected expression" is "oppos[ing] any practice made an unlawful employment practice" by Title VII, such as sexual harassment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The jury found that Lipphardt had established a prima facie case of retaliation because she was fired after she reported to management that Knuth's behavior constituted sexual harassment.

Lipphardt was not required to prove that Knuth's behavior legally constituted harassment in order to recover for retaliation.⁵ Sullivan v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 170 F.3d 1056, 1058 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 528 U.S. 966, 120 S. Ct. 402 (1999) ("[t]he fact that the jury concluded that Sullivan's claims did not meet all the elements for a successful sexual harassment action does not mean that it could not have found that the incident did take place and that Sullivan could have reasonably believed himself the victim of sexual harassment."). Instead, Lipphardt was required to show that a "good faith, reasonable belief" that she was the victim of hostile work environment sexual harassment led her to report Knuth's conduct to Durango's management. Little v. United Techs., Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1997). We have noted that:

[i]t is critical to emphasize that a plaintiff's burden under this standard has both a subjective and an objective component. A plaintiff must not only show that [s]he subjectively (that is, in good faith) believed that [her] employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices, but also that [her] belief was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and record presented.

Id. The belief must also be measured against substantive law at the time of the offense. Clover v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1351 (11th Cir. 1999) (conduct must be "close enough to support an objectively reasonable belief that it is" sexual harassment). In order to prove hostile work environment sexual harassment, Lipphardt was required to prove, "among other things, that the harassment occurred because of her sex, and that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive working environment." Id. (internal quotations omitted).

After Lipphardt established this prima facie case, Durango proffered the fact that Lipphardt was trading food for tanning services as the legitimate reason for her discharge. The burden then shifted back to Lipphardt to prove "by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons offered by the defendant are pretextual."...