Lippman v. People

• Citation: 175 Ill. 101,51 N.E. 872
• Parties: LIPPMAN v. PEOPLE.
• Decision Date: 24 October 1898
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

175 Ill. 101

51 N.E. 872

LIPPMAN

v.PEOPLE.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 24, 1898.

Error to criminal court, Cook county; Theodore Brentano, Judge.

Louis Lippman was convicted of using marked and registered bottles, and he brings error. Reversed.

Zolotkoff & Zoline, for plaintiff in error.

E. S. Cummings, for defendant in error.

CARTWRIGHT, J.

On the affidavit of John A. Carey, agent of the Gottfried Brewing Company, a warrant was issued by a justice of the peace of Cook county, directed to all sheriffs, coroners, and constables of this state, commanding them to search the premises of the plaintiff in error for 400 beer bottles, and 40 casks, barrels, kegs, and boxes, having the marks of said company on them, and, if the same or any part thereof should be found upon such search, to bring the same before the justice, and arrest the plaintiff in error, and bring him also before the said justice, to be disposed of according to law. Return was made on the warrant by the constable who executed it that he found 27 bottles marked ‘Gottfried Brewing Co.’; and he brought the same before the court, and arrested plaintiff in error, and brought him also. The prosecution was instituted under an act entitled ‘An act to protect manufacturers, bottlers and dealers in ale, porter, lager beer, soda, mineral water and other beverages, from the loss of their casks, barrels, kegs, bottles and boxes.’ Rev. St. c. 140, entitled ‘Trade-Marks.’ Plaintiff in error was found guilty, and fined. He appealed to the criminal court of Cook county, and, at the trial there, the following facts were agreed upon: The Gottfried Brewing Company is a corporation, organized for the purpose of brewing beer. It complied with the provisions of said act by filing in the office of the secretary of state and in the office of the county clerk of Cook county a description of the names and marks on its bottles and boxes, and by publishing the same. On the bottles are the words ‘Gottfried Brewing Co., Chicago, Ill.,’ and ‘This bottle is never sold,’ or ‘Golden Drop,’ and ‘Gottfried Brewing Co., Chicago,’ cast or blown in the glass. The words ‘Gottfried Brewing Co.'s Golden Drop Berr, Chicago, Tel. South 429,’ are stamped or marked on the boxes. The defendant is a bottler of lager beer in Chicago, and on July 2, 1894, filled with lager beer 27 bottles so marked. It was proved that he did not have the written consent of the brewing company to make such use of the bottles. He was again convicted, and fined $13.50 and costs, and sued out the writ of error in this case to review the proceedings.

It is conceded that defendant violated the provisions of the act under which he was prosecuted, but it is claimed that the act is unconstitutional, and the case it brought here direct from the trial court on that ground. The provisions of the constitution which it is claimed are violated by the enactment are section 22 of article 4, which prohibits the general assembly from passing a special law granting to any corporation, association, or individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity, or franchise whatever, or in any other case where a general law can be made applicable; and section 6 of article 2, which protects the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. The act in question applies only to manufacturers, bottlers, and dealers in ale, porter, lager beer, soda, mineral water, and other beverages. The term ‘other beverages,’ under the settled rule of construction, includes only beverages of the same kind or class as the particular antecedent terms of description employed in the act. The object of the act, as gathered from its provisions, is to protect and benefit that class of persons. It gives to them the exclusive right to register the names and marks of ownership, stamped or marked on their casks, barrels, kegs, bottles, or boxes, and gives to them the exclusive privileges and protection arising therefrom. It confers upon them the power to call upon the state and its officers and judiciary to act as collectors of their bottles, kegs, and boxes which they have voluntarily scattered over the state among their customers. It attempts to place at their disposal the extraordinary right of the search warrant, by which they may arm a constable or other officer with process to intrude upon the premises or the home of any citizen to recover their bottles, kegs, and the like. The object of the act is not only evident from its provisions, but also from its title, where the legislature is required to express its general purpose, and which they have expressed as follows: ‘An act to protect manufacturers, bottlers and dealers in ale, porter, lager beer, soda, mineral water and other beverages, from the loss of their casks, barrels, kegs, bottles and boxes.’ While, perhaps, no precise and comprehensive definition of the word ‘privilege,’ as used in constitutions, has been attempted, the right to employ remedies for the collection of debts, the recovery of property, and the enforcement of rights has always been included in the term as used in the federal constitution. It seems that the peculiar benefits, advantages, and rights conferred by this act upon the persons named in it, and the right to employ an unusual remedy for the recovery of their property, must be classed as privileges; and this does not seem to be denied in the argument. It is argued, however, that the law conferring these privileges is not a special, but a general, one, because it applies to all persons similarly situated. General laws have been defined to be those which relate to or bind all within the jurisdiction of the lawmaking power, while a special law is limited in the object to which it applies. It is often the case, however, that the rights and protection given by a law cannot be enjoyed by every citizen by reason of the subject to which the law relates. If the law is general, and uniform in its operation upon all persons in like circumstances, it is general in a constitutional sense, but it must operate equally and uniformly upon all brought within the relation and circumstances for which it provides. On the other hand, if it is limited to a particular branch or designated portion of such persons, it is special. People v. Wright, 70 Ill. 388;People v. Cooper, 83 Ill. 585;Hawthorn v. People, 109 Ill. 302. Although general in its character, a law may, from the nature of the case, extend only to particular classes, such as minors, married women, laborers, bankers, or common carriers. Such a law is not obnoxious to the provisions of the constitution if all persons of the class are treated alike under similar circumstances and conditions; but it is not a proper application of the definition to say that a law is general because it applies uniformly to all persons in the conditions and circumstances for which it provides, although only a particular branch of a class or some particular description of persons. If an act should attempt to confer privileges only on persons of a certain stature, it could be said to apply uniformly to all people answering such description, and yet it would be absurd to say that such a law would be a general one. The classification must be so general as to bring within its limits all those who are in substantially the same situation or circumstances.

This act singles out one branch of a class of manufacturers and dealers who may have occasion to use, or who do use, in their business, bottles, barrels, kegs, or other packages for their goods. It selects those whose particular manufacture or stock consists of certain varieties of drink. No other person who manufactures any product, or sells it in casks, barrels, kegs, bottles, or boxes, can avail himself of the privilege of registering his trade-marks, or of the consequent protection; but the act denies to him the privileges afforded to those named in the act. The grocer, farmer, fruit dealer, merchant, druggist, or other dealer or manufacturer cannot avail himself of the privileges or remedy afforded by this act to protect himself against the loss of his property under the same circumstances. The purpose of this act, passed in behalf of the persons named in it, is not to recover bottles stolen, embezzled, or fraudulently obtained by false tokens or pretenses, but to make the proceedings under it, as to such persons, a substitute for the action of replevin. The general search warrant law of the state covers all the cases just mentioned, and was on our statute book when this act was passed. There are and were general laws in force, applicable uniformly to all persons in the state, for the recovery of personal property wrongfully obtained by another. This law was needless for that purpose, and it could only have been passed to give to the particular persons named in it additional privileges, by making the criminal law supersede the writ of replevin. The plain purpose of the act is to make the officers of the state detectives, searchers for and collectors of beer bottles, beer kegs, and the like. It is for a mere private benefit, having no relation to the police power or the protection of the public against frauds or injurious preparations; since, if the brewer or dealer consents, the bottles or kegs may be refilled with any sort of drink different from the marks, and it will be no offense under the act, however injurious to the public. The citizen or the health officer can neither institute a prosecution, nor cause search to be made, but in either instance it must be by the owner or agent. The public has no rights under it, and neither the title nor any provision indicates any public purpose.

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