Lipscomb Ind. School Dist. v. County School Trustees of Lipscomb County

• Court: Texas Civil Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: JOY
• Citation: Lipscomb Ind. School Dist. v. County School Trustees of Lipscomb County, 498 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973)
• Decision Date: 23 July 1973
• Docket Number: No. 8361,8361
• Parties: LIPSCOMB INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellants, v. COUNTY SCHOOL TRUSTEES OF LIPSCOMB COUNTY, State of Texas, et al., Appellees.

Page 364

498 S.W.2d 364

LIPSCOMB INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellants, v. COUNTY SCHOOL TRUSTEES OF LIPSCOMB COUNTY, State of Texas et al., Appellees.

No. 8361.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas Amarillo.

July 23, 1973.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 4, 1973.

Allen, Gaines & Julian, Ronnie Gaines, Perryton, for appellants.

Lemon, Close, Atkinson & Shearer, Otis C. Shearer, Booker, for appellees.

JOY, Justice.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered against appellants, Lipscomb Independent School District, Donald L. Beard, Don W. Rader, Bill B. King, L. A. Pundt, and Hillmer Koch, plaintiffs below, denying appellants an injunction against defendants-appellees, County School Trustees of Lipscomb County, Texas, and Warren C. Jenkins, County Judge, Lipscomb County, Texas. Affirmed.

Appellants brought this action for an injunction prohibiting the appellees from any further consideration of detaching territory from appellant school district and of annexing such territory to adjoining independent school districts. Appellants' petition recited that Lipscomb Independent School District is a body corporate within Lipscomb County, Texas, and the other appellants are residents of Lipscomb County, Texas, and all reside within the school district. Appellants alleged they suffered irreparable harm and injury due to the acts of appellees. They alleged that two of the county school trustees filed a motion with E. J. Tarbox, then County Judge and secretary to the County Board of School Trustees. This motion was to be considered at a regular meeting of the County School Trustees and called for the trustees to 'assert the exclusive jurisdiction to detach territory from the Lipscomb Common School District and add such territory so detached to adjoining Independent School Districts.' Appellants further alleged that written notice of the date, place, and subject of appellees' subsequent meeting was not given in compliance with Article 6252-17 ¹ to appellants' prejudice. Appellants state the appellee County School Trustees met on May 26, 1970, and passed the order calling for the Board of assert its exclusive jurisdiction to detach territory from appellant school district and set June 29, 1970, at 1 p.m. as the date for the public hearing to determine whether or not the Board should undertake to detach such territory. Appellees stated that the public meeting was held on June 29, 1970, at 1 p.m., wherein appellee county school trustees did pass a motion which called for the detachment of territory from appellant school district. It is appellants' position that these acts of the county school trustees were void because of a lack of proper public notice of the subject of the meeting held on May 26, 1970.

After a hearing on the above allegations, the district court of Lipscomb County granted appellees a summary judgment which decreed appellants take nothing by their suit and denied injunctive relief. Appellants brought this appeal based upon seven points of error.

Appellants' first four points are discussed together. Summarized, they are: The trial court erred because the mandatory provisions of Art. 6252-17, prohibiting governmental bodies from holding closed meetings and providing for notice to the public of such meetings, were not followed by the county school trustees of Lipscomb County; consequently, such meeting was illegal and all acts accomplished at such meeting were void, voidable, and/or ineffectual thereby precluding a summary judgment for appellees.

The pertinent parts of Art. 6252-17 provide that every regular, special, or called meeting of a county board of school trustees shall be open to the public. This article further provides that written notice of the date, place, and subject of each such meeting shall be posted on a bulletin board to be located at a place convenient to the public In ² the county courthouse for at least three days preceding the day of the meeting.

The notice itself recited that the May meeting of the Lipscomb County Board of Trustees would be held Tuesday, May 26, 1970, in the Judge's Office in the Lipscomb County Courthouse. Under the heading 'Subjects,' was listed a motion to detach territory from the Lipscomb Common School District and add such territory to adjoining Independent School Districts. This notice was signed by E. J. Tarbox, as Ex Officio County Superintendent and Secretary of County Board of Trustees. The record indicates such notice was posted sometime between 4:30 and 5 p.m., Friday, May 22, 1970, on a bulletin board located near the judge's office inside the county courthouse.

Appellants urge that since the doors t the courthouse were locked between 5 and 6 p.m. on Friday and remained closed on Saturday, May 23, and Sunday, May 24, the notice was not posted for the mandatory three day period prior to the May 26 meeting and, consequently, the letter and the spirit of Art. 6252-17 was disregarded. To support this position, they cite the case of Toyah Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Pecos-Barstow Ind. Sch. Dist., 466 S.W.2d 377 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1971, no writ). In that case, the Toyah Independent School District filed suit to enjoin enforcement of a order annexing the Toyah Independent School District. Toyah contended the annexation order was invalid because it was adopted at a meeting from which the public had been excluded. Notice of such meeting had been given and public representatives were in the building wherein the meeting was held, but only the members of the interested boards and their attorneys were actually present in the meeting room. In addition, after presentations and arguments, all but the annexing board were required to leave the meeting room. The court held the meeting to be illegal in that there had been no compliance with Art. 6252-17, thus the order emanating from such meeting was ineffectual. Appellants contend that the holding in the Toyah case is applicable to the order in question here.

The terms of Art. 6252-17 are mandatory so as to require at least substantial compliance with its provisions in order to uphold proceedings to which the statute is applicable. Toyah Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Pecos-Barstow Ind. Sch. Dist., supra; Hall v. Thomas, 474 S .W.2d 276 (Tex.Civ.App.--Texarkana 1971, writ dism'd). A careful review of the record indicates the notice in question listed the date, place, and subjects to be discussed in the May 26 meeting. The record indicates such notice was posted, as required by Art. 6252-17 in a bulletin board located at a place convenient to the public In the county courthouse; the record indicates the notice was posted on the bulletin board on May 22, 1970, and the county school trustees' meeting was held at 1 p.m. on May 26, 1970....