Liptok v. Bank of Am.
| Decision Date | 20 October 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 3:15-CV-156 |
| Parties | JOHN JOSEPH LIPTOK, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BANK OF AMERICA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(Judge Munley)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
The persistent petulance of the lead plaintiff in this case, John Liptok, calls to mind the wisdom of the American humorist Will Rogers, who once said: "People who fly into a rage always make a bad landing."
So it is in this case. For the past twenty-two months John Liptok, a pro se plaintiff, has litigated this case on behalf of an array of co-plaintiffs in a fashion which substitutes anger for analysis, fury for facts, and enmity for evidence. Liptok's largely inarticulate anger has frustrated every effort to fairly address his underlying concerns. This unthinking anger has also seemingly rendered Liptok both blind and deaf. Thus, Liptok seems blind to the consequences which must inevitably flow from a wholesale refusal to follow the court's instructions, and has consistently been deaf to the entreaties of the court that he follow the rules when prosecuting the case which he elected to file in federal court.
We note that we are not the first court to observe that John Liptok's incomprehensible pro se litigation style completely frustrates any informed understanding of whatever claims he may be attempting to advance. As the Pennsylvania Superior Court noted in 2015 when it dismissed a pro se criminal appeal by Liptok from a state summary offense conviction, oftentimes Liptok's filings are "incomprehensible and lack[] pertinent analysis." Com. v. Liptok, No. 176 MDA 2014, 2015 WL 6179515, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 2015). Notwithstanding these persistent deficiencies, over the past twenty-two months we have repeatedly strived to afford Liptok with every opportunity to comply with the law and the rules of this court by advancing claims and arguments in a cogent, comprehensible and respectful fashion.
These efforts have been unavailing and we now see that Liptok's flights of rage lead to the result predicted by Will Rogers, a bad landing. This case comes before us for consideration of a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant, Bank of America. (Doc. 69.) Liptok has never properly responded to this motion in accordance with the rules of this court, despite being directed twice to do so. Instead, two months after the deadline for responding to this motion for summary judgment,the plaintiffs filed pleading styled as a motion to dismiss the motion for summary judgment, which advances legally bankrupt claims in a manner which is often difficult to discern. (Doc. 78.)
Given the plaintiffs' persistent failures spanning the past two years to comply with the basic minimum requirements imposed upon all litigants, for the reasons set forth below it is recommended that this complaint be dismissed.
The plaintiffs, who are representing themselves in this lawsuit, filed a complaint on January 23, 2015, which named the Bank of America as the defendant. In their complaint the plaintiffs recited that John Liptok owns and resides in one half of a duplex property in Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1.) While this pro se complaint demands a great deal of the reader, very liberally construed it appears that the plaintiffs were alleging that the other half of the duplex in which they resided was owned by the defendant Bank, which failed to care for and maintain the property, despite agreeing to do so. (Id.) As a result of this alleged neglect and inaction by the defendant, the plaintiffs allege that their property has been damaged. Asserting that the defendant breached promises made to them, and negligently maintained the property, the plaintiffs have sued Bank of America, and apparently now seek onetrillion dollars in damages. (Doc. 79, p. 1 "The lawsuit was filed for $1 trillion dollars.")
From its inception, progress in this litigation has been stymied by John Liptok's persistent refusal to cooperate in the simplest of matters. Thus, on April 16, 2015, Liptok was instructed to cooperate in the preparation of a case management plan. (Doc. 18.) He refused to meaningfully participate in this initial step in the litigation process, compelling Bank of America to unilaterally file a case management plan. (Docs. 21 and 22.) When a telephonic case management conference was held, Liptok immediately reduced this conference to a wholly unproductive and acrimonious exchange, an irrational and irascible course of conduct which led the first United States Magistrate Judge assigned to this matter to recuse herself from this case. (Doc. 23.)
The case was then reassigned to the undersigned. As part of our pretrial management of this lawsuit, we have repeatedly informed Liptok that we are committed to assisting all parties in reaching a prompt and fair resolution of this matter. We also explained that we understand that the plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, and, therefore, we consistently endeavored to make allowances for their pro se status and liberally construed the requests and pleadings that they filed. We have underscored, however, that in order to ensure the fair administration of justice we must treat all parties equally, and we have insisted that all parties meet certainminimum requirements. Our duty of candor to all parties has also required that we advise the plaintiffs that the actions taken through the lead plaintiff, John Joseph Liptok, have actually impeded their efforts to fairly adjudicate this matter.
In particular, we instructed Liptok that all parties must communicate with one another in a respectful and professional fashion. This obligation is placed equally upon attorneys and pro se litigants. In short, we have consistently advised John Liptok that all parties that: " '[p]ersonal attacks ... are never appropriate in any court filing,' Lewis v. Delp Family Powder Coatings, Inc., CIV.A 08-1365, 2010 WL 3672240 (W.D.Pa. Sept.15, 2010)." Dougherty v. Advanced Wings, LLC, No. 1:13-CV-447, 2013 WL 4041589, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 2013). Therefore, we have warned Liptok on numerous occasions that "the routine use of personal invective, acerbic asides, caustic commentaries, disgruntled digressions, and ad hominem observations" will not be permitted by the court and will result in pleadings being stricken by the court. Id.
These repeated admonitions were made by the court as part of a patient effort to secure some minimal modicum of courtesy, civility and rules compliance from the plaintiffs. However, our experience over the past two years now amply demonstrates that those efforts have been completely unavailing, and John Liptok, the architect ofthis case, is simply unable to comply with multiple, clear and precise instructions from the court.
Our efforts to secure compliance from the plaintiffs with the minimum requirements of conduct expected from all litigants began the day after Judge Schwab's recusal, on May 12, 2015, when we entered a case management scheduling order in this case. (Doc.25.) One month later, Liptok wrote the court on June 11, 2015, leveling a series of wild and baseless charges against opposing counsel and Judge Schwab, and coupled those accusations with a series of averments which reflected a fundamental misunderstanding regarding the legal process. Accordingly, we responded to Liptok though an order which addressed Liptok's specific concerns, admonished Liptok to refrain from ad hominem attacks, and provided Liptok with a copy of the court's Standing Practice Order for pro se litigants. That Standing Practice Order provided clear and precise guidance to Liptok regarding his obligation to file briefs in support of motions which he submitted, as well as Liptok's obligation to respond in a timely and complete fashion to defense motions. (Docs. 27 and 28.) Despite this clear direction from the court, Liptok's litigation practice swiftly descended into an irate but largely unintelligible chaos. This chaotic, undisciplined, and inappropriate litigation practice was marked by at least four cardinal errors.
First, Liptok has persisted in repeatedly filing documents which he styles as motions, without submitting supporting briefs to explain the legal basis for what are often eccentric requests which have no legal foundation. As early as November 2015, (Doc. 41.), we informed Liptok that the failure to file a brief has consequences for the plaintiffs since we are entitled to deem the plaintiffs to have withdrawn a motion when they fail to properly support that motion by filing a brief in a timely fashion. See, e.g., Salkeld v. Tennis, 248 F. App'x 341 (3d Cir.2007) (); Booze v. Wetzel, 1:12-CV-1307, 2012 WL 6137561 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2012) report and recommendation adopted, 1:CV-12-1307, 2012 WL 6138315 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2012); Breslin v. Dickinson Twp., 1:09-CV-1396, 2011 WL 1577840 (M.D.Pa. Apr.26, 2011); Prinkey v. Tennis, No. 09-52, 2010 WL 4683757 (M.D.Pa. Nov.10, 2010) (dismissal under Local Rule 7.5); Griffin v. Lackawanna County Prison Board, No. 07-1683, 2008 WL 4533685 (M.D.Pa.Oct.6, 2008) (dismissal under Local Rule 7.6). Despite these admonitions, Liptok continues to file motions without accompanying briefs, a course of conduct which has compelled us to deny these motions. (Doc. 71.)
In addition, Liptok has consistently neglected to obey court orders directing him to respond to defense motions. Liptok has continued to ignore this basic fundamental responsibility of a litigant despite being advised on at least fouroccasions in clear and precise terms that dismissal of his lawsuit could be one consequence of failing to comply with court orders and the rules of this court. (Docs. 47, 49, 72, 76.)
Further, by March of 2016, it had become apparent that John Liptok, a pro se plaintiff was, in effect, acting as counsel for the other named pro se pla...
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