Lipton v. County of Orange, Ny
| Decision Date | 14 April 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 02 CIV. 0891(WCC).,02 CIV. 0891(WCC). |
| Citation | 315 F.Supp.2d 434 |
| Parties | Ronald LIPTON, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF ORANGE, NEW YORK, H. Frank Bigger, Sheriff of Orange County, Antoinette Catletti, Administratrix of the Estate of Theodore Catletti, Deceased, and Thomas Madden, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
O'Hare & O'Hare, P.C., Attorneys for Plaintiff, Poughkeepsie, NY, Stephen P. O'Hare, Esq., Of Counsel.
Catherine M. Bartlett, County Attorney for Orange County, Attorneys for Defendants County of Orange, New York and H. Frank Bigger, Theodore Catletti and Thomas Madden in Their Official Capacities, Goshen, NY, Matthew J. Nothnagle, Sr. Asst. County Attorney, Of Counsel.
Burke, Miele & Golden, LLP, Attorneys for Defendant H. Frank Bigger (in his Individual Capacity), Goshen, NY, Thomas K. McCarren, Esq., Of Counsel.
Appelbaum, Bauman & Appelbaum, Attorneys for Defendants Antoinette Catletti, Administratrix of the Estate of Theodore Catletti, Deceased, and Thomas Madden (in their Individual Capacities), Liberty, NY, Joel R. Appelbaum, Esq., Of Counsel.
Plaintiff Ronald Lipton brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants the County of Orange (the "County"), a municipal corporation, and H. Frank Bigger, Thomas Madden and Antoinette Catletti as administratrix of the Estate of Theodore Catletti (collectively the "individual defendants") in their individual and official capacities.1 (Complt.¶¶ 8-9.) At all times relevant to the events on which this action is based, the individual defendants occupied the following positions with the County: (1) Bigger was the County's elected Sheriff; (2) Theodore Catletti was the County's corrections administrator, holding the rank of Colonel within the Sheriff's department; and (3) Madden was the assistant corrections administrator, holding the rank of Major within the Sheriff's department. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 5-6.) Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages from the County and compensatory and punitive damages from the individual defendants, claiming that defendants' actions with respect to his pretrial detention and release therefrom constituted a violation of his free speech, due process and equal protection rights secured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.2 (Id. ¶¶ 7, 29.) Specifically, plaintiff contends that defendants retaliated against him for his public criticism of police misconduct by causing or acquiescing in maltreatment by Sheriff's deputies who: (1) kept him in an unheated holding cell while he was wearing only thin jail-issue clothing; (2) deprived him of food and drink except for one sandwich and water given to him on the night he entered defendants' custody; (3) arbitrarily and capriciously changed his inmate classification and transferred him to the correctional facility on Riker's Island in New York City ("Riker's"), where Sheriff's deputies falsely informed the staff that he was a pedophile; (4) physically abused him while they transported him back to the jail from Riker's; (5) subjected him to an unjustified strip search prior to his release pursuant to an unconstitutional policy of strip searching all pretrial detainees; and (6) released him into cold weather with no jacket or money and refused him access to shelter or a telephone to call for help. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 14, 17, 20-24.)
Defendants now move for summary judgment pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56 dismissing plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety, arguing that: (1) the claimed misconduct was de minimis and thus not of a level necessary to support constitutional claims; (2) with respect to the County and the individual defendants in their official capacities, plaintiff has failed to prove that the alleged deprivations were pursuant to a County custom or policy; (3) plaintiff's claims fail to state an equal protection violation; and (4) the individual defendants were not personally involved in the alleged deprivations, and in any event would be entitled to qualified immunity for their actions. (Def. County Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 12-21, 23-33, 37-38; Defs. Catletti & Madden Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 6-13; Def. Bigger Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 4-17.) The County also argues that plaintiff's damages should be limited to nominal or punitive damages because he has failed to make the showing of physical injury required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (the "PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). (Def. County Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 34-36.)
For the reasons set forth herein, we grant defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing all claims contained in the Complaint, except for the retaliatory transfer claim. We deny the County's motion for summary judgment on the retaliatory transfer claim. We dismiss as redundant the retaliatory transfer claim against the individual defendants in their official capacities. We grant the motions for summary judgment of individual defendants Bigger and Madden dismissing the retaliatory transfer claim against them in their personal capacities. We deny the motion of defendant Catletti dismissing the retaliatory transfer claim against him in his personal capacity. Finally, we conclude that plaintiff may recover compensatory, nominal and/or punitive damages on the retaliatory transfer claim from defendant Catletti, and nominal and compensatory damages from the County.
The record and the parties' submissions reveal the following facts.3 Plaintiff is a 57 year-old resident of Newburgh, New York, a city that is located within the County. (Def. County Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 2.) Plaintiff is currently employed as a part-time college boxing instructor,4 but worked for various law enforcement agencies in New York and New Jersey as a police officer and prosecutor's investigator from 1968 until 1987. (Id.; Lipton 7/23/03 Dep. at 35-51, 73.) Plaintiff has long been publicly critical, in the media and the courts, of the actions of numerous law enforcement agencies in the County and surrounding areas. (Complt.¶ 10.)
One such example of plaintiff's public criticism of local law enforcement was his lawsuit against the Walden Police Department ("Walden"), a village police department located in the County that had employed him for six months in 1986-1987. (Lipton 7/23/03 Dep. at 63-64.) Plaintiff, a Jewish man, left Walden because he discovered that another officer had drawn swastikas on plaintiff's ticket book and because he did not want to continue covering for the sheriff while the sheriff was having extramarital relations. (Id. at 64, 66-67.) Plaintiff stated that the Walden administration retaliated against him for his failure to assist in the sheriff's infidelities by not giving him work, and by not providing him with assistance in the field when he called for it. (Id. at 67-68.) In 1996, plaintiff brought a federal lawsuit against the village of Walden and its police department alleging police misconduct, harassment and anti-Semitism, which suit was resolved by a confidential settlement. (Id. at 97-98.) Plaintiff has brought numerous other actions against local entities that include pending suits against the Woodstock Police Department, another former employer, for false arrest and malicious prosecution, and the owner of the City of Newburgh's website for publication of allegedly defamatory statements. (Id. at 97, 99-100, 130.)
In August 1996, plaintiff complained about the hiring practices of the Village of Montgomery Police Department to a reporter who incorporated the complaints in an article published in the Middletown Times-Herald. (Complt.¶ 10.) The article discussed members of that police department who had also worked for the County Sheriff's department, and criticized a Montgomery practice that allegedly required its police officers to work for a private security company owned by Jack Byrnes, a Montgomery officer and Major in the County Sheriff's department. (Id.; see also Lipton 7/23/03 Dep. at 137-39.) Plaintiff learned of this requirement during a meeting with Byrnes prior to applying for a Montgomery police position, and testified at his deposition that he had informed Byrnes of his objection to that requirement as illegal. (Id. at 140.)
Thereafter, in November 1996, Larry Catletti, who is the son of defendant Catletti, a deputy in the County Sheriff's department and a part-time police officer for the Village of Montgomery, stopped plaintiff for speeding on Route 17-K in the Town of Montgomery. (Complt. ¶ 11; Lipton 7/23/03 Dep. at 143-46.) This traffic stop occurred shortly before plaintiff was to testify in his federal lawsuit against the Village of Walden. (Lipton 7/23/03 Dep. at 147-48.) Plaintiff testified that he asked Larry Catletti why he had been stopped, and Catletti answered that it was "for testifying against my friends, asshole." (Id.; see also Lipton 7/25/03 Dep. at 11.) When plaintiff realized who Larry Catletti was, he said "[y]our father works for a jail," to which Catletti replied that plaintiff "better never wind up there." (Lipton 7/23/03 Dep. at 148.) Larry Catletti then issued plaintiff a speeding ticket, and left the speed box blank. (Id.) The Montgomery Village Court subsequently dismissed the speeding ticket. (Id. at 150.)
Shortly thereafter, plaintiff both sent a letter to and called defendant Bigger expressing his concerns about the ticket and what Larry Catletti had said to him about what would happen if plaintiff came to the County jail.5 (Id. at 161.) Bigger stated that he would talk to Larry Catletti, and mentioned that defendant Ted Catletti was the jail administrator and was in the room with him. (Id. at 162.) Plaintiff also met alone with Bigger in person, and again expressed his concerns. (Id. at 163.) Bigger promised plaintiff that he would check into the allegations. (Id. at 164.) In a subsequent follow-up conversation, Bigger told plaintiff that he thought the...
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