Lirette v. Sonic Drive-In Corp.
| Decision Date | 26 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 22-3594 DIV. (2) |
| Parties | CYNTHIA LIRETTE v. SONIC DRIVE-IN CORPORATION, ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
ORDER AND REASONS
This matter was referred for all proceedings including entry of judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) upon the written consent of all parties. ECF No. 26.
Before me are a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Defendant Sonic Franchising, LLC (ECF No. 10), which was scheduled for submission on February 15, 2023, a Motion to Dismiss by Defendant Theodore Kergan (ECF No. 24), which was scheduled for submission on April 12, 2023, and a Motion to Dismiss by Defendant Gary Wilkerson (ECF No. 27), which was scheduled for submission on April 26, 2023. No party requested oral argument, and the Court agrees that oral argument is unnecessary.
Plaintiff failed to file an Opposition Memorandum in response to any of the motions by the applicable deadlines set forth by Local Rule 7.5 (). Considering the record, the submission and arguments of counsel, and the applicable law the Court finds that the motions are not only unopposed but have merit. Accordingly, the Defendants' motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 10, 24, and 27) are GRANTED, with leave to amend as stated herein.
Defendant Sonic Drive-In Corporation (properly identified as Sonic Franchising LLC[1]) (“Sonic”) issued a franchise license to Defendant Kergan Brothers, Inc. (“Kergan Brothers”) to operate a Sonic Drive-In restaurant in Louisiana. ECF No. 1 ¶ 5. Plaintiff Cynthia Lirette worked as a supervisor of a Sonic Drive-In restaurant in New Orleans owned by Kergan Brothers from October 2014 through October 2020. Id. ¶¶ 17, 21, 74.
Plaintiff asserts claims under Title VII () and the Equal Pay Act against Sonic, Kergan Brothers, Theodore Kergan II (owner and CEO of Kergan Brothers) and Gary Wilkerson (supervisor employed by Kergan Brothers). Id. at ¶¶ 1-2, 9-10, 47-75. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that male supervisors were assigned more desirable and manageable territories and stores, that she was assigned low-performing and problem stores based on her sex and gender. Id. ¶¶ 18-19, She further asserts that Defendant Wilkerson routinely subjected her to a hostile work environment based on derogatory remarks based on her sex and gender and Defendant Kergan humiliated and berated her in front of her peers while male supervisors were not subject to similar treatment. Id. ¶¶ 21-27. She also alleges that she was denied training opportunities granted to male supervisors, paid less than her male counterparts for equal work, and received smaller bonuses than male supervisors. Id. ¶¶ 28-42.
Defendant Sonic now moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against it because Plaintiff's Complaint does not allege that Sonic was her employer and concedes Sonic simply issued a franchise license to her employer Kergan Brothers, Inc. It also argues that Plaintiff's Complaint fails to set forth any facts to support an inference that Sonic was her “employer” under either Title VII or the Equal Pay Act nor that Sonic and Kergan Brothers are “joint employers” or an “integrated enterprise.” ECF No. 10-1 at 1-2, 3-6, 6-7.
Defendant Kergan (individually) moves to dismiss the claims asserted against him on the basis that he is not a Title VII employer and there is no individual liability under Title VII. ECF No. 24-1 at 2-3. Likewise, Kergan argues that he is not liable under the EPA simply based on his status as the owner of Kergan Brothers, and the complaint lacks any allegations suggesting that he hired Plaintiff, supervised or controlled her schedule or conditions of employment, or otherwise exercised authority over her employment, and the limited allegations direct to Kergan reflect, at most, occasional job-related interactions. Id. at 3-4.
Similarly, Defendant Wilkerson moves to dismiss the claims asserted against him on the basis that he is a co-employee rather than an “employer” under Title VII and there is no individual liability under Title VII. ECF No. 27-1 at 2-3. Wilkerson also asserts that he is not liable under the EPA because he was not Plaintiff's “employer,” the complaint lacks any allegations suggesting that he determined Plaintiff's pay, set her work schedule, controlled the conditions of employment, or maintained employment records, and that the complaint's reference to multiple “Defendants” is not sufficient to establish that any individual engaged in the alleged activity. Id. at 3-5.
The complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it must offer more than labels, legal conclusions, or formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action.[8] The complaint must include enough factual matter to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence as to each element of the asserted claims.[9] Although all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true and the complaint is considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Court should not accept as true “conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.”[10] Although Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the court to treat the motion as a Rule 56 motion when matters outside of the pleadings are presented and not excluded by the court, the Court may consider documents attached to the complaint, referenced documents that are central to the claim, and documents that are part of the public record or subject to judicial notice in the Rule 12 analysis without converting the motion to a Rule 56 motion.[11] In addition, the court may consider any documents attached to either the motion to dismiss or an opposition to that motion when the documents are referenced in the pleadings and are central to a plaintiff's claims.[12] Significantly, when an allegation is contradicted by the contents of an attached exhibit, the exhibit (not the allegation) controls.[13]
The purpose of Title VII is to protect employees from their employers' unlawful actions.[14]A Title VII employer is defined as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person ....” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
Two steps are required to determine whether a defendant is an employer: (1) the defendant must fall within the statutory definition, and (2) there must be an employment relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.[15] As Title VII only protects “the interests of those in employment relationships,” a plaintiff cannot state a Title VII claim against a non-employer.[16]
Although Title VII's statutory definition of employer includes “any agent” of an employer, the Fifth Circuit does not interpret that language as imposing individual liability on agents.[17]Rather, the Fifth Circuit has held that Congress's purpose in extending the definition of employer to include an agent was simply to incorporate respondeat superior liability into Title VII such that a Title VII suit against an employee is actually a suit against the corporation.[18]
The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held that individuals simply cannot be held liable under Title VII in either their individual or official capacities.[19]
Case law recognizes that a defendant that is not plaintiff's direct employer may nonetheless be considered an employer under Title VII when that entity is either part of an integrated enterprise[20] with her employer or a “joint employer.”[21] These doctrines are similar, with the single employer doctrine focused on the interrelatedness of separate corporate entities while the joint employer doctrine is focused on whether separate entities jointly control each other's employees, including...
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