Lisiecki v. Detroit-Wayne Joint Bldg. Authority, DETROIT-WAYNE

Decision Date30 November 1961
Docket NumberDETROIT-WAYNE,No. 29,29
Citation111 N.W.2d 803,364 Mich. 565
PartiesIrene E. LISIECKI, Plaintiff and Appellant, v.JOINT BUILDING AUTHORITY, a Michigan corporation, Defendant and Appellee.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

Maile, Leach & Silver, Detroit (Judson L. Levin, Detroit, of counsel), for plaintiff and appellant.

Alexander, Buchanan & Conklin, Detroit (Donald E. Miller, Detroit, of counsel), for defendant and appellee.

Before the Entire Bench.

KAVANAGH, Justice.

Plaintiff sued defendant building authority for damages arising out of personal injuries sustained from a fall while on defendant's premises. It is alleged the fall resulted from a slippery and hazardous condition created by reason of foreign substances being situated on the steps of a staircase running from the main floor to the basement level defendant's building. The usual allegations with reference to negligence growing out of the failure to provide adequate and sufficient warning and to keep the flooring and staircase clean of foreign substances which would create an extremely slippery condition are set forth in the declaration.

Defendant moved to dismiss the declaration, claiming it is a governmental agency, and that there exists the defense of governmental immunity by such agency or authority to actions of this kind.

Subsequent to the filing of the motion to dismiss, plaintiff moved to amend her declaration. An order allowing plaintiff's amended declaration, except as to paragraph 12 thereof, was entered by the trial judge. It was the court's opinion that paragraph 12 was immaterial to the issues involved in the case and was prejudicial to the defendant. The court further stated stated that paragraph 12 was in contravention of C.L.S.1956, § 500.3030 (Stat.Ann.1957 Rev. § 24.13030).* Paragraph 12 of the amended declaration was as follows:

'Plaintiff further avers that the defendant herein is covered by a policy of liability insurance in an amount sufficient to pay any money judgment which plaintiff may recover.'

After the amended declaration was filed and allowed, the motion to dismiss was brought on for hearing and oral argument. The trial judge granted the motion with the following statement:

'And the court being of the opinion that the defendant is a municipal or quasi-municipal corporation and was acting in furtherance of its governmental functions at the time and place and under the circumstances alleged in plaintiff's amended declaration and as such enjoys governmental immunity from liability for the purported cause of action as stated in plaintiff's amended declaration,

'It Is Hereby Ordered that the above entitled cause be and is hereby dismissed with prejudice.'

Plaintiff appeals, submitting 2 points of error:

1. The trial court erred in entering an order for dismissal with prejudice, said order being based upon the court's opinion that the defendant was acting in furtherance of governmental functions at the time and place and under the circumstances alleged in plaintiff's amended declaration and, therefore, enjoyed governmental immunity.

2. The trial court erred in ordering that paragraph 12 of plaintiff's amended declaration be stricken.

Plaintiff argues that in choosing to create the authority, the city and county created a corporation which undertook work that a private corporation could have undertaken and did so in the business world in competition with private business. Plaintiff asserts the rule of law that where a municipality chooses to involve itself in nongovernmental functions in competition with private corporations, no special privilege or immunities should be granted. Plaintiff further contends that immunity embraces only State governmental functions and that municipalities and counties are exempt only when a local unit of government is performing a part of the State governmental function as agent of the State.

Paragraph 3 of the amended declaration reads in part as follows:

'That said building was operated for various governmental agencies, both in connection with the city of Detroit, as well as the county of Wayne. That numerous offices and agencies in said building were engaged in activities proprietary in nature, and of local or corporate benefit to the inhabitants of the city of Detroit and the county of Wayne only; and in addition thereto, numerous activities were engaged in by the defendant for purposes of pecuniary profit. That plaintiff's injuries arose out of the proprietary corporate and pecuniary activities of the defendant as is hereinafter more specifically set forth.'

Defendant admits the proofs would show that certain private businesses are housed on the premises, such as a privately leased basement restaurant, a cigar store, and the offices of a company which prints Supreme Court briefs. The defendant further admits that the proofs would show that the plaintiff was on her way to the premises of one of these private businesses when she was injured. However, defendant contends that any income derived from nongovernmental functions would be of no significance when compared with the total overall operating and depreciation costs of the whole building.

If the operation can be characterized as a proprietary function, then the defense of governmental immunity is not available to defendant building authority. Proofs should have been taken to determine the nature of the function involved and plaintiff given an opportunity to establish her contention that the operation of the authority was a proprietary one.

Justice Carr, writing in Dohm v. Township of Acme, 354 Mich. 447, pp. 449, 450, 93 N.W.2d 323, pp. 325, 326, said:

'Generally speaking, the nature of the function involved and the particular facts attending its exercise have been deemed of controlling significance. Thus in Stevens v. City of Muskegon, 111 Mich. 72,...

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6 cases
  • Rohrabaugh v. Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Authority Corp.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • May 17, 1977
    ...there was involved a dual use of property. Matthews v. Detroit, 291 Mich. 161, 289 N.W. 115 (1939); Lisiecki v. Detroit-Wayne Joint Building Authority, 364 Mich. 565, 111 N.W.2d 803 (1961); Munson v. County of Menominee, 371 Mich. 504, 124 N.W.2d 246 (1963). The rule from these cases is tha......
  • Bofysil v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • December 6, 1972
    ...there was involved a dual use of property. Matthews v. Detroit, 291 Mich. 161, 289 N.W. 115 (1939); Lisiecki v. Detroit-Wayne Joint Bldg. Authority, 364 Mich. 565, 111 N.W.2d 803 (1961); Munson v. County of Menominee, 371 Mich. 504, 124 N.W.2d 246 (1963). The rule from these cases is that i......
  • Knight v. City of Tecumseh
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • August 12, 1975
    ...services were provided for a fee.' 63 Mich.App. at 190, 234 N.W.2d at 444. Plaintiff relies upon Lisiecki v. Detroit-Wayne Joint Building Authority, 364 Mich. 565, 111 N.W.2d 803 (1961), where the Supreme Court remanded the suit to the trial court to take proofs on whether a county building......
  • Carlisi v. City of Marysville, s. 38
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • June 1, 1964
    ...where there was involved a dual use of property. Matthews v. Detroit, 291 Mich. 161, 289 N.W. 115; Lisiecki v. Detroit-Wayne Joint Building Authority, 364 Mich. 565, 111 N.W.2d 803; Munson v. County of Menominee, 371 Mich. 504, 124 N.W.2d 246. The rule from these cases is that if the object......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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