Lisy Corp. v. McCormick & Co.

• Citation: 445 Md. 213,126 A.3d 55
• Decision Date: 23 November 2015
• Docket Number: No. 8, Sept. Term, 2015.,8, Sept. Term, 2015.
• Parties: LISY CORP. v. McCORMICK & CO., INC., et al.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

445 Md. 213
126 A.3d 55

LISY CORP.
v.
McCORMICK & CO., INC., et al.

No. 8, Sept. Term, 2015.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Nov. 23, 2015.

126 A.3d 57

Steven M. Hecht (Thomas E. Redburn, Jr., Lowenstein Sandler, LLP, Roseland, NJ; Albert J. Mezzanotte, Jr., Whiteford, Taylor & Preston, L.L.P., Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Petitioner.

David H. Bamberger (Edward S. Scheideman, Paul D. Schmitt, DLA Piper LLP (US), Washington, DC), on brief, for Respondents.

Argued before: BARBERA, C.J., BATTAGLIA, GREENE, ADKINS, McDONALD, WATTS, and GLENN T. HARRELL, JR. (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

GREENE, J.

445 Md. 216

In this case, we address whether a completed Case Information Report ("CIR")¹ served on the opposing parties to a civil lawsuit is a proper vehicle for demanding a jury trial under Maryland Rule 2–325(a).

445 Md. 217

Lisy Corp. ("Petitioner") filed suit against McCormick & Co., Inc., Mojave Foods Corp. ("Respondents"), and Barry A. Adams ("Adams")² in the Circuit Court for Howard County, alleging tort and contract claims. Petitioner served all defendants with its complaint along with a completed CIR. In the CIR, Petitioner checked the "yes" box to indicate a jury trial had been demanded. This checkmark

126 A.3d 58

was the only reference to a jury demand. No pleadings or papers filed in the case by Petitioner asserted the right to a trial by jury. As the trial date neared, the Circuit Court's Office of Calendar Management notified the parties that it was scheduling the trial before a jury. Respondents objected and moved to confirm a bench trial arguing that the manner in which the alleged jury demand had been elected by reference—in the CIR solely—was procedurally defective. The motions judge, relying on our decision in Duckett v. Riley, 428 Md. 471, 52 A.3d 84 (2012), granted the motion. Because Petitioner did not comply with the requirements of Rule 2–325(a), the judge determined that Petitioner's right to trial by jury had been waived.

Rule 2–325(a) specifies the procedure for invoking a jury trial in civil cases, and explicitly states that jury demands are to be made in a "pleading" or separate "paper." In the Circuit Court, Petitioner argued in its response to the motion to confirm a bench trial that Duckett was distinguishable. According to Petitioner, this Court held in Duckett that an unserved CIR will not satisfy the notice requirements of Rule 2–325(a). Therefore, because the opposing parties were served with a CIR containing a reference to a jury demand, Petitioner maintained, in the present case, it was entitled to a trial by jury. The Circuit Court disagreed. That court found, consistent with Duckett, that the CIR was neither a "pleading" nor a separate "paper" within the meaning of Rule 2–325, and that failure to comply with the Rule resulted in the waiver of

445 Md. 218

Petitioner's right to a jury trial. The case proceeded to a bench trial and a final judgment was entered.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. The intermediate appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling. For the reasons explained below, we hold that a CIR, whether served or unserved, does not constitute a separate "paper" within the meaning of Rule 2–325, and that ordinarily failure to comply timely with the Rule will result in a waiver of the right to a jury trial in a civil case.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner and Respondent McCormick & Co., Inc. are direct competitors in the Hispanic marketplace with each manufacturing and distributing consumer food products. Respondent Mojave Foods Corp. is a subsidiary of McCormick and also competes against Petitioner. Petitioner filed suit against its former employee Adams and Respondents alleging, among other things, that Adams violated the terms of his employment contract by working with Respondent McCormick, a direct competitor, and both misappropriated Petitioner's confidential trade secrets and tortiously interfered with Petitioner's contracts and business relations.

On February 28, 2011, Petitioner filed its complaint, including a request for a temporary restraining order, and a completed CIR in the Circuit Court for Howard County. Petitioner checked "yes" in the Jury Demand section of the CIR. All parties were served.

On April 11, 2012, Petitioner filed an Amended Complaint adding an additional claim. Neither the complaint nor the amended complaint asserted a jury demand. Notwithstanding the omission, on July 25, 2012, the Office of Calendar Management notified the parties that it was scheduling a trial date and ordering a jury

126 A.3d 59

trial.³

445 Md. 219

In early September, Respondents and Adams objected to the scheduling of a trial by jury, and moved separately to confirm a bench trial in lieu of a jury trial. In their motions, Respondents and Adams argued that Petitioner did not properly demand a jury trial, because the only reference to a jury demand was in the CIR, which, by itself, was insufficient to satisfy the procedural requirements of Rule 2–325. In ruling on the pending motions, the Circuit Court determined that our opinion in Duckett held that a completed CIR is neither a "pleading" nor a separate "paper" within the meaning of Rule 2–325(a), and therefore Petitioner did not comply with the Rule. Acknowledging that the issue in Duckett involved an unserved CIR containing a reference to a jury demand, and the instant case involved a CIR where the Jury Demand box was similarly checked "yes," but was served on the Defendants, the motions judge, in the present case, explained:

I don't read Duckett to infer or to stand for the proposition that if the Case Management Information sheet had been served upon the Defendant that that would constitute a proper election for a jury trial .... I find that the failure of the Plaintiff to file an election for jury trial as contemplated by the rule, not withstanding service upon [t]he Defendant of the civil Case Information Report contemporaneous with service on the Plaintiff, constitutes a waiver by the Plaintiff of a right to a jury trial.

Finding that no valid jury demand existed, the motions judge ordered that the case proceed as a bench trial. Petitioner filed a motion to postpone the trial and requested time to obtain appellate review.⁴ The acting Administrative Judge granted the motion and, thus, allowed Petitioner time to file a petition for a writ of mandamus. This Court denied the

445 Md. 220

petition, and the bench trial commenced on April 15, 2013. At its conclusion, judgment was entered in favor of the corporate defendants, herein Respondents, and against Petitioner.⁵ Petitioner then appealed the ruling to the Court of Special Appeals on the sole question of whether Petitioner was entitled to a jury trial. The intermediate appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling and held that Petitioner did not properly elect a trial by jury. Lisy Corp. v. McCormick & Co., Inc., 219 Md.App. 592, 604, 101 A.3d 530, 537 (2014). Additionally, the intermediate appellate court rejected Petitioner's arguments that Maryland courts should defer to an analogy to the federal courts' interpretations of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38. It found the Federal Rule and the Maryland Rule were not analogous, and that the Maryland Rule is narrower in scope. Lisy Corp., 219 Md.App. at 602, 101 A.3d at 536.

We granted certiorari,

126 A.3d 60

Lisy Corp. v. McCormick & Co., 441 Md. 217, 107 A.3d 1141 (2015), to answer the following questions, which we have rephrased:⁶

1. Does a completed CIR referencing a jury demand satisfy the definition of a separate "paper" within the meaning of Md. Rule 2–325 ?

2. By not asserting its constitutional right to a jury demand in a "pleading" or separate "paper" within the meaning

445 Md. 221

of Md. Rule 2–325, did Petitioner waive its right to a jury trial in a civil case?

For the reasons stated below, we shall answer the first question in the negative and the second question in the affirmative. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals is affirmed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court revisits the issue of what constitutes a separate "paper" under Rule 2–325, and whether a served CIR meets the definition. In doing so, we rely on the principles of statutory interpretation:

[T]he principles applied to statutory interpretation are also used to interpret the Maryland Rules. Like construing a statute, to ascertain the meaning of a ... rule of procedure we first look to the normal, plain meaning of the language. If that language is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the provision's terms to inform our analysis; however, the goal of our examination is

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