Littel v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.

Citation259 F.Supp.2d 1016
Decision Date08 January 2003
Docket NumberNo. CV-02-08836 CAS.,CV-02-08836 CAS.
PartiesRoger LITTEL, Louann Pleasant, on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE, INC., Bridgestone Corp., Does 1 through 100, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Central District of California

Gail M. Lisoni, Joseph L. Lisoni, Lisoni & Lisoni, Pasadena, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Richard T. Williams, Marrian Seyean Chang, Holland & Knight, Stephen T. Owens, Michael T. Purleski, Adam Randall Fox, Squire Sanders & Dempsey, Los Angeles, CA, Thomas S. Kilbane, Joseph C. Weinstein, Roger M. Gold, Squire Sanders & Dempsey, Cleveland, OH, for Defendants.

ORDER REMANDING ACTION TO SPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE

SNYDER, District Judge.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The instant action arises out of the alleged manufacture and sale of defectively designed automobile tires. On August 12, 2002, plaintiffs Roger Littel and Louann Pleasant, both California residents, commenced this action in Riverside County Superior Court against defendants Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Bridgestone Corporation, Inc., and Does 1 through 100 (collectively "defendants"). Plaintiffs allege that the Steeltex R4S, R4SII and A/T brands of automobile tires ("Steelex tires") sold by defendants suffer from a variety of defects that may lead to failure of the tires during operation. See Complaint ("Compl.") (attached as Exhibit A to Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.'s Notice of Removal) ¶ 7. Plaintiffs have filed a putative class action on behalf of all persons residing in the United States who own tires manufactured by Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., from 1990 through the present. Id. ¶¶17-21.

Plaintiffs allege the following claims for relief arising out of the design, manufacture, and sale of the Steelex tires: (1) fraudulent concealment; (2) deceptive practices in violation of California Consumer Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA");1 (3) unfair business practices in violation of the California Unfair Practices Act ("CUPA");2 (4) strict liability; and (5) negligence. Id. ¶¶ 31-56. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that

At all times herein mentioned Bridgestone/Firestone was required by law to report safety-related defects to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") and to respond truthfully and accurately to all inquiries from that agency during the course of any investigation(s). On September 29, 2000 NHTSA opened an investigation ("Preliminary Evaluation—PE00-040") into the Steeltex R4S, R4II and A/T tire brands. Said investigation was prompted by the hundreds of consumer complaints of tire tread separations, some of which resulted in accidents, injuries and death. In response to NHTSA's inquires in connection with those investigations Bridgestone/Firestone concealed the truth about the.Steelex R4S, R4II and A/T tire brand defects and falsely represented to NHTSA that it knew of no common cause of the failure problem. Beginning with the first reports of failures and their own internal investigative efforts, Bridgestone/Firestone began a campaign of falsely labeling defect related failures as having been caused by impact damage, road hazards, under-inflation and a myriad of other causes not relating to their own defective design. On April 15, 2002, as a result of Bridgestone/Firestone's false and fraudulent representations, and NHTSA's reliance thereon, NHTSA closed their investigation. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that by concealing Steelex R4S, R4II and A/T tire brand defects Bridgestone/Firestone intended to, and did, avoid a government-mandated recall of all Steelex R4S, R4SII and A/T tire brands. The failure rates of the Steelex R4S, R4SII and A/T tire brands are as great as those experiences by the Wilderness A/T, and ATX brand of tires that were recalled by Firestone and Ford Motor Company.

Id. ¶ 10. Further, plaintiffs allege that

As a direct result of Bridgestone/Firestone's systematic concealment of the Steelex R4S, R4SII and A/T tire brand defects from the public, Plaintiffs and the Plaintiffs' class members had no opportunity to consider or weigh the risks posed by the Steelex R4S, R4SII and A/T tire brand defects when they purchased these tires or vehicles equipped with these tires, which pose a grave and ever-increasing danger risk to their personal safety and that of their families, and to anyone who may be in the vicinity of the defective tire(s).

Id. 1114.

Plaintiffs seek the following monetary and injunctive relief: (1) an order certifying that the action may be maintained as a class action; (2) an award of compensatory damages; (3) an order imposing "an asset freeze and a constructive trust over all moneys unlawfully obtained through Bridgestone/Firestone, [Inc's] unfair, unlawful, fraudulent and deceptive acts and practices, which, if allowed to be retained, would unjustly enrich Bridgestone/Firestone, [Inc.] and/ or would be dissipated beyond the jurisdiction of this Court"; (4) an award of actual damages pursuant to the CLRA; (5) an order requiring Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., to notify the consuming public of the scope of the defects with the Steelex tires; (6) an order requiring Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., to recall and replace the Steelex tires; (7) an award of attorneys' fees; (8) an award of punitive damages; (9) an award of costs; and (10) an award of pre- and post-judgment interest.

On September 11, 2002, defendants timely removed this action to the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Eastern Division, where the case was assigned to the Honorable Virginia A. Phillips. On November 19, 2002, the action was transferred as a related case to this Court. Defendants contend that there exists federal removal jurisdiction over the instant action because plaintiffs' claims for fraudulent concealment, and violations of CLRA and CUPA are artfully pled as state law claims, but that they should be recharacterized as federal claims. See Notice of Removal ¶¶ 6-19; Opposition of Defendant Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. to Motion to Remand ("Opp.") at 8-12.3 Defendants argue that "behind the Complaint lie individuals dissatisfied with NHTSA's handling and subsequent closure of its investigation into the Steelex tires and attempt to circumvent NHTSA's authority and assessments by disguising their claims as state law causes of action." Id. at 8. Defendants claim that the Court thus has supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims for strict liability and negligence. See Notice of Removal ¶ 6-19.

The three motions presently before the Court are: (1) plaintiffs' motion to remand the action to state court; (2) defendant Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.'s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim; and (3) defendant Bridgestone Corp.'s motion to dismiss the complaint for insufficiency of process, lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.

II. MOTION TO REMAND

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, any civil action over which a federal district court has original jurisdiction, which action was originally brought in a state court, may be removed by the defendant or defendants to the appropriate district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and (b). The removal statute is strictly construed. See Gaus v. Miles, 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.1992). A defendant seeking to remove an action to federal court bears the burden of establishing that the federal court properly may exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the action. See id. ("The `strong presumption' against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.").

In their motion to remand, plaintiffs contend that there exists no ground upon which this Court may exercise subject matter jurisdiction over this action because their complaint alleges only state statutory and common law tort and fraud causes of action and because while the parties may be diverse in citizenship, "each plaintiff['s] and class members' claims do not meet the minimum federal jurisdictional amounts in controversy." Motion to Remand ("Mot.") at 3, 4. Further, plaintiffs argue that defendants failed to establish in their Notice of Removal the existence of any basis for this Court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Thus, plaintiffs seek an order remanding the action to the Riverside County Superior Court. Id. at 5.

A. Diversity Jurisdiction

Federal district courts have original jurisdiction where a civil action is between citizens of different states, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Accordingly, a claim filed in state court may be removed to federal court if it meets these two requirements. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

In their complaint, plaintiffs allege that they are citizens of California, that defendant Bridgestone Corp. is a citizen of Japan, and that defendant Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. is a corporate citizen of Ohio and Tennessee. See Compl. ¶¶1-3. In their Notice of Removal, defendants do not contradict this allegation. Thus, it appears that the parties to this case are diverse.

As to the amount in controversy, plaintiffs' complaint does not set forth the actual amount of damages sought. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶50, 56 (seeking damages "according to proof). Where a defendant seeks to remove a case from state court and the amount of damages sought by the plaintiff is unclear, "the defendant bears the burden of actually proving the facts to support jurisdiction, including the jurisdictional amount." Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566-67. If the plaintiffs complaint does not allege a specific amount of damages, the removing defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 95 F.3d 856, 862 (9th Cir.1996). The defendant must set forth evidence establishing that it is more likely than not...

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