Littell v. State

• Decision Date: 16 February 1893
• Citation: 133 Ind. 577,33 N.E. 417
• Parties: LITTELL v. STATE.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

133 Ind. 577

33 N.E. 417

LITTELL

v.STATE.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Feb. 16, 1893.

Appeal from circuit court, Decatur county; John W. Study, Judge.

William Littell, who was indicted for murder in the second degree, was convicted of manslaughter, and appeals. Reversed.W. A. Moore and Ewing & Ewing, for appellant. David A. Myers, for the State.

McCABE, J.

The appellant was tried in the court below on a charge of murder in the second degree. Verdict of guilty of manslaughter, and fixing his punishment at imprisonment in the state prison for 10 years. Judgment on the verdict over a motion for a new trial. Overruling appellant's motions to quash the indictment, and for a new trial, are assigned for error.

The charging part of the indictment is as follows: “That on or about the 8th day of August, 1892, at and in the county of Decatur, and state of Indiana, William Littell did then and there unlawfully, feloniously, purposely, maliciously, but without premeditation, and in a rude, insolent, and angry manner, kill and murder one Samuel Littell; and the said William Littell did then and there unlawfully, feloniously, purposely, maliciously, but without premeditation, and in a rude, insolent, and angry manner, touch, strike, cut, wound, and wield a knife, which he, the said William Littell, in his hand then and there had and held, at, against, and into the body of the said Samuel Littell, from which mortal wound said Samuel Littell did then and there and thereby languish and die, contrary to the form of the statute,” etc. That part of the indictment which charges that the defendant “did * * * unlawfully, feloniously, purposely, maliciously, but without premeditation, and in a rude, insolent, and angry manner, kill and murder one Samuel Littell,” at the time and place mentioned, the state's attorney does not contend contains a sufficient statement of facts to constitute an offense. The statute requires, among other things, that the indictment shall contain “a statement of the facts constituting the offense, in plain and concise language, without unnecessary repetition.” Rev. St. 1881, § 1731. The section defining murder in the second degree reads as follows: “Whoever purposely and maliciously, but without premeditation, kills any human being, is guilty of murder in the second degree, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the state prison during life.” Rev. St. 1881, § 1907. That for manslaughter reads as follows: “Whoever unlawfully kills any human being without malice, express or implied, either voluntarily, upon a sudden heat, or involuntarily, but in the commission of some unlawful act, is guilty of manslaughter, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the state prison not more than twenty-one years nor less than two years.” Rev. St. 1881, § 1908. Counsel calls our attention to another section of the statute, from which it may be implied they claim it makes the first part of the indictment good. It reads as follows: “In an indictment or information for murder in the second degree or for manslaughter it shall not be necessary to set forth the manner in which, or the means by which, the death was * * * caused, but shall * * * be sufficient, in an indictment or information for murder in the second degree, to charge that the defendant did purposely and maliciously, but without premeditation, and in an indictment or information for manslaughter that the defendant did unlawfully, kill the deceased.” Rev. St. 1881, § 1746. This section must be construed along with the part of section 1731, above quoted, requiring a statement of the facts in the indictment constituting the offense. Indeed, if section 1746 stood alone, and that part of section 1731 above quoted was out of the statute, we should feel impelled to so construe section 1746 as to not dispense with a statement of the facts in the indictment constituting the offense, because this court has held that the legislature has no power to do so. McLaughlin v. State, 45 Ind. 338. The section, however, only dispenses with the statement of the “manner in and means by which the death was caused.” “Manner” signifies “mode of action; way of performing or effecting anything; method; style,”-that is, it is unnecessary to state how he held his gun, or what particular style he had in holding or wielding the knife or other weapon with which the offense is committed; nor need it be stated whether his manner was vicious, cruel, savage, or otherwise, and the like. “Means” is defined as “that through or by the help of which an end is attained; an intermediate agency or measure.” That intermediate agency or measure, such as what the gun was loaded with, whether with leaden ball or iron slugs, or something else, or that the revolver was loaded with cartridges or something else, what particular kind of a gun, revolver, or knife was used, or how long, how deep, how wide the wound was, or other description thereof, need not be stated in the indictment. Dukes v. State, 11 Ind. 557. But that does not mean that the facts constituting the offense need not be stated in the indictment. “But,” says the concluding clause, “it shall be * * * sufficient in an indictment or information for murder in the second degree to charge that the defendant did purposely and maliciously, but without premeditation, and in an indictment or information for manslaughter that the defendant did unlawfully, kill the deceased.” This part of the section points out what shall constitute a sufficient charge of the offenses therein mentioned, but does not provide what facts shall be stated in the indictment to make the charge of the offenses sufficient. That had already been provided by that part of section 1731 above quoted. So that we conclude that the indictment must state the facts constituting the offense. Does that part of the indictment under consideration do so?

This court has decided that “it is not sufficient to state in an indictment that the defendant has committed a certain specified crime. It must be stated how he committed the crime, by stating the facts and circumstances constituting the offense. Although as great certainty is not required, in many respects, in the mere description of criminal offenses, as formerly, yet all the substantial allegations necessary to make an indictment good at common law are still required.” State v. Record, 56 Ind. 107; 10 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 522; 1 Bish. Crim. Proc. §§ 599, 600. The following adjudged cases in this court require that the facts constituting the offense must be stated in the indictment, and they are in point here: Shepherd v. State, 54 Ind. 25; McLaughlin v. State, supra; Dukes v. State, supra; Howard v. State, 67 Ind. 401. We therefore hold that that part of the indictment under consideration does not state facts sufficient to constitute an offense. The other part of the indictment follows, and is separated from the first part by a semicolon. The sense or meaning of either part is in no way aided by considering them together. Therefore, if the last part does not state facts sufficient, the whole indictment must fall to the ground. The natural and only legitimate meaning of the language employed in the last part of the indictment is that the defendant did, at the time and place mentioned, “unlawfully, feloniously, purposely, maliciously,” etc., “and in a rude, insolent, and angry manner, touch, strike, cut, wound, and wield a knife, which he, the said William Littell, in his hand then and there had and held, at, against, and into the body of the said Samuel Littell, from which mortal wound said Samuel Littell did then and there and thereby languish and die;” that is, it means that the defendant, at the time and place, and in the way, specified, did touch a knife, did strike a knife, did cut a knife, did wound a knife, and did wield a knife, which he, the said William Littell, in his hand then and there had and held, at, against, and into the body of the Samuel Littell, from which mortal wound he died, etc. That is, after charging defendant with having touched, struck, cut, wounded, and wielded a knife, it charges that he held the knife at, against, and into the body of the deceased. At least that is one construction of which the language employed is susceptible; and, though the language may be construed to mean that the knife was wielded at, against, and into the body of the deceased, yet, as all reasonable doubts are to be solved in favor of a person accused of crime, an indictment ought to be most strongly construed against the state where its language admits of more than one construction, is uncertain, or ambiguous. State v. Locke, 35 Ind. 419; Howard v. State, supra; Shaffer v. State, 82 Ind. 221;Walker v. State, 23 Ind. 61;Keller v. State, 51 Ind. 111;Nichols v. State, 127 Ind. 406, 26 N. E. Rep. 839; Smith v. State, 125 Ind. 440, 25 N. E. Rep. 598; State v. Casteel, 110 Ind. 174, 11 N. E. Rep. 219; Pond v. Sweetser, 85 Ind. 144. But if we adopt the construction most favorable to the state, still the indictment would be insufficient, because it fails to state with any degree of certainty that the death of the deceased was caused, either directly or remotely, by the acts charged against the accused. The statute requires that “the offense charged must be stated with such a degree of certainty that the court may pronounce...