Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Arkansas
| Decision Date | 26 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | 11–2304,11–2336.,11–2305,Nos. 11–2130,s. 11–2130 |
| Citation | 674 F.3d 990,279 Ed. Law Rep. 56 |
| Parties | LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant, v. State of ARKANSAS; Arkansas Department of Education, Appellees.Lorene Joshua; Leslie Joshua; Stacy Joshua; Wayne Joshua, Appellees, v. Pulaski County Special School District, Appellant,Arkansas Department of Education, Appellee.Alexa Armstrong; Karlos Armstrong; Khayyam Davis; Alvin Hudson; Tatia Hudson; Lorene Joshua; Leslie Joshua; Stacy Joshua; Wayne Joshua; Sara Matthews; Derrick Miles; Janice Miles; John M. Miles; NAACP; Brian Taylor; Hilton Taylor; Parsha Taylor; Robert Willingham; Donna Stone, as class representative on behalf of minor children, Denise, Dennis and Danielle Stone; Dennis Stone, Appellees, v. North Little Rock School District, Appellant,Arkansas Department of Education, Appellee.North Little Rock Classroom Teachers Association; Pulaski Association of Classroom Teachers; Little Rock Classroom Teachers Association; Pulaski Association of Support Staff; Katherine Knight, Appellants, v. State of Arkansas; Arkansas Department of Education, Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Christopher Heller, argued and on the brief, Clay Fendley, Jr., on the brief, Little Rock, AR, for appellant Little Rock School District in 11–2130.
M. Samuel Jones, III, argued and on the brief, Little Rock, AR, for appellant Pulaski County Special School District in 11–2304
Stephen W. Jones, argued and on the brief, Debby A. Linton, Mika Shadid Tucker, on the brief, Little Rock, AR, for appellant North Little Rock School District in 11–2305.Scott Paris Richardson, argued and on the brief, Ali M. Brady, on the brief, Little Rock, AR, for appellees State of Arkansas (11–2130 and 11–2336) and Arkansas Department of Education (11–2130, 11–2304, 11–2305, 11–2336).Damon T. Hewitt, argued and on the brief, New York, NY, John Payton, Debo P. Adegbile, Elise C. Boddie, Rachel M. Kleinman, New York, NY, John Walker, Austin Porter, Little Rock, AR, Robert Pressman, Lexington, MA, on the brief, for appellees Lesli Joshua, Stacy Joshua, Lorene Joshua and Wayne Joshua (11–2130, 11–2304, 11–2305, 11–2336), appellees Tatia Hudson, Alvin Hudson, Hilton Taylor, Alexa Armstrong, Sara Matthews, John M. Miles, Janice Miles, Brian Taylor, Derrick Miles, Robert Willingham, Khayyam Davis, NAACP, Parsha Taylor, Karlos Armstrong, Donna Stone and Dennis Stone (11–2305).
Before WOLLMAN, MELLOY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.
In our most recent encounter with the ongoing school desegregation process in the Little Rock, Arkansas metropolitan area, Pulaski County Special School District (“PCSSD”) appealed the district court's partial denial of its petition for a declaration of unitary status, opposed by appellee intervenors representing the class of black children harmed by segregation (“Joshua Intervenors”), while Little Rock School District (“LRSD”) appealed the district court's decision to terminate certain funding obligations of the State of Arkansas through its Department of Education (collectively, “the State”). We affirmed the partial denial of PCSSD's petition for unitary status and vacated the portion of the order terminating the State's funding obligations due to the lack of notice and a hearing on that issue. See Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Arkansas, 664 F.3d 738 (8th Cir.2011). In the matter now before us, the Joshua Intervenors and LRSD each seek attorney's fees and costs associated with those appeals as prevailing parties under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 28 U.S.C. § 1920. For the reasons discussed below, we grant in part the motions for costs and attorney's fees, subject to certain modifications.
LRSD seeks attorney's fees for the two attorneys who prosecuted its appeal of the termination of state funding. According to LRSD's detailed affidavits, attorney Christopher Heller devoted 228.5 hours to the appeal. LRSD seeks compensation for those hours at Mr. Heller's typical billing rate of $300 per hour, although “it has long been [his] practice” to represent LRSD at a reduced rate and, in fact, he charged LRSD $200 per hour for his work in this case. In addition, attorney Clay Fendley devoted 151.3 hours to the appeal. LRSD seeks compensation for those hours at Mr. Fendley's typical billing rate of $160 per hour, although he customarily represents public entities at a reduced rate and, in fact, charged LRSD $120 per hour for his work in this case. Finally, LRSD also seeks $1,421.66 in copying costs, filing fees, and expenses associated with Mr. Heller's attendance at oral argument plus $152.50 in expenses associated with Mr. Fendley's attendance at oral argument. LRSD thus seeks $94,332 in total fees and costs.
In opposition, the State first contends that the award of attorney's fees should be reduced by a large percentage because LRSD achieved only partial or limited success. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (). The State suggests that LRSD prevailed only in a limited fashion on appeal because we held solely that funding from the State could not be terminated without notice and a formal hearing. See Little Rock Sch. Dist., 664 F.3d at 758. We agree that some reduction is warranted because LRSD did not obtain its sought-after result, a holding on the merits that continued funding from the State is justified under current circumstances. Nevertheless, our stay and then vacatur of an order that would have eliminated about $38 million from LRSD's funding for the current school year is a significant result. We hold that a reduction of twenty-five percent from the product of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate is appropriate in these circumstances. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436, 103 S.Ct. 1933.
In a related argument, the State contends that LRSD should not receive fees for billed hours attributable to arguing the merits of terminating the funding because we did not reach the merits. However, Id. at 435, 103 S.Ct. 1933. Accordingly, we hold that no additional reduction on this ground is necessary.
The State next argues that the 380–hour total billed is excessive for this appeal and implies duplicative or unnecessary work. While it is a large total, we note that, in order to argue the merits of continued state funding, LRSD had to research and brief the State's history of performance of its desegregation obligations throughout this entire thirty-year case. Although we did not reach the merits in our opinion, LRSD could not assume with certainty that we would not. Thus, we cannot say it was unreasonable for LRSD's attorneys to bill 380 hours of work for this appeal.
The State also contends in particular that the ten hours billed and $152.50 in expenses associated with Mr. Fendley's travel to attend oral argument are unreasonable because he did not present oral argument. We disagree. In a case of this complexity and magnitude, it was not unreasonable for LRSD to send two attorneys to attend oral argument.
In its penultimate challenge, the State notes that LRSD is attempting to recover fees for work associated with LRSD's motion in the district court for a stay pending appeal. We typically determine fees only for services rendered in this Court and allow the district court to determine the proper compensation for services rendered before it. Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson, 689 F.2d 137, 138 (8th Cir.1982) (en banc). Although the individual billing records are not entirely clear as to the number of hours attributable solely to the attempt to obtain a stay in the district court, it appears reasonable to delete six hours from Mr. Fendley's billing total and two hours from Mr. Heller's billing total as representing services not performed in this Court.
Finally, the State argues that LRSD should receive fees at the hourly rate actually charged by its attorneys, rather than at their nominal billing rate. LRSD counters, accurately, that we have in the past awarded fees at the full nominal billing rate despite the attorneys' reduced fee arrangement with LRSD. See Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Arkansas, 127 F.3d 693, 697–98 (8th Cir.1997). Neither the actual fee arrangement nor our past practice controls the award in this case, however. As the Supreme Court has explained:
[Section 1988] contemplates reasonable compensation, in light of all of the circumstances, for the time and effort expended by the attorney for the prevailing plaintiff, no more and no less. Should a fee agreement provide less than a reasonable fee calculated in this manner, the defendant should nevertheless be required to pay the higher amount.
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 93, 109 S.Ct. 939, 103 L.Ed.2d 67 (1989). A reasonable hourly rate generally means “the ordinary fee ‘for similar work in the community.’ ” Avalon Cinema, 689 F.2d at 140 (quoting Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir.1974)).
LRSD's affidavits state that Mr. Heller's and Mr. Fendley's nominal rates are reasonable for the Little Rock area in light of their respective experience and the type of services rendered. The State does not challenge this representation, but instead attempts to characterize any award beyond the rates actually charged as an “enhanced” award, disfavored under Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 1662, 176 L.Ed.2d 494 (2010):
Section 1988 serves an important public purpose by making it possible for persons without means to bring suit to vindicate...
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