Little v. Borman Food Stores, Inc., Docket No. 9999

• Decision Date: 20 May 1971
• Docket Number: Docket No. 9999,No. 2,2
• Citation: 33 Mich.App. 609,190 N.W.2d 269
• Parties: Douglas R. LITTLE and Dorothy Little, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. BORMAN FOOD STORES, INC., a Michigan corporation, Defendant-Appellant
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 269

190 N.W.2d 269

33 Mich.App. 609

Douglas R. LITTLE and Dorothy Little, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. BORMAN FOOD STORES, INC., a Michigan corporation, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 9999.

Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 2.

May 20, 1971.

Released for Publication Oct. 11, 1971.

C. Bruce Taylor, Alexander, Buchanan & Conklin, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

Sidney E. Pollick, Southfield, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Before DANHOF, P.J., and McGREGOR and LEVIN, JJ.

DANHOF, Judge.

On March 2, 1968, the plaintiff, Dorothy Little, went to one of the defendant's supermarkets to return a defective jar of peanut butter. She parked her car in the store's parking lot and entered the store. Once within the store she was told by an unidentified woman that a tire on her car was going flat. Mrs. Little then went to the parking lot to observe her car. Upon returning to the store she slipped and fell in the store's entranceway.

Mrs. Little testified that she had not observed any ice before she fell. She stated that she knew she had slipped on ice because she felt it when she slipped. The plaintiff's mother-in-law testified that when she washed the plaintiff's slacks they were muddy.

The manager and assistant manager of defendant's store testified that there was no precipitation on the day of the accident. They also stated that on their several trips in and out of the store they saw no ice in the entranceway. These witnesses also said that on the day of the fall the entranceway was not salted and that ordinarily when there was ice in the entranceway it would be salted.

Plaintiff Douglas Little testified over objection that one-half hour after the accident he saw ice chips and a wet sidewalk around the entranceway. Mr. Little also testified over objection that 2 hours after the accident he observed rock salt around the entranceway.

The jury found for the plaintiffs and the defendant has appealed contending that the trial court erred in not granting his motion for judgment Non obstante veredicto or in the alternative a new trial.

The standard of review we must apply was set forth in Sparks v. Luplow (1963), 372 Mich. 198, 202, 125 N.W.2d 304, 306, as follows:

'It is a well-settled principle of law that on review of a trial court's refusal to grant a motion for a directed verdict or judgment Non obstante veredicto, the facts are reviewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Tacie v. White Motor Co. (1962), 368 Mich. 521, 527, 118 N.W.2d 479. The test used is whether from the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, reasonable men could honestly reach a different conclusion. If the answer to this is 'yes,' the question is for the jury. Anderson v. Gene Deming Motor Sales, Inc. (1963), 371 Mich. 223, 123 N.W.2d 768.'

The defendant contends that the plaintiffs did not establish that the defendant's premises were in a hazardous or unsafe condition. When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff the following findings are possible. The weather was cold. Mrs. Little slipped on something that felt like ice. Mr. Little saw ice at the scene of the fall one-half hour after the accident. The plaintiff's slacks were found to be muddy after the accident. On the basis of this evidence we cannot say that a reasonable man could not conclude that the defendant's premises were in a hazardous condition.

The defendant contends that even if it is established that the entranceway was icy there was no evidence to support a finding that the...