Little v. Bowers
| Citation | 10 S.Ct. 620,134 U.S. 547,33 L.Ed. 1016 |
| Parties | LITTLE v. BOWERS, Comptroller |
| Decision Date | 07 April 1890 |
| Court | United States Supreme Court |
This was a writ of certiorari issued out of the supreme court of the state of New Jersey on the 6th of November, 1882, at the instance of Henry S. Little, receiver of the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, a corporation of that state, commanding Samuel D. Bowers, comptroller of the city of Elizabeth, and the city of Elizabeth, to certify and send to that court their proceedings relative to an assessment of certain taxes made by that city upon real property of the company within the city limits, particularly described in the writ, for the year 1876. Upon the hearing of the case in that court, the investigation extended to like assessments made by the city for the years 1877 to 1882, inclusive; and the judgment of the court was, that the assessments should stand affirmed. That judgment having been affirmed by the court of errors and appeals of the state, this writ of error was prosecuted. The federal question involved is as to whether these assessments impaired the obligation of a contract which the company claimed existed between it and the state by virtue of an act of the state legislature approved March 17, 1854, and were therefore violative of section 10, art. 1, of the constitution of the United States.
After the argument of the case in this court upon its merits, the defendants in error were given leave to file briefs, a privilege of which they availed themselves; and they also filed a motion to dismiss the writ of error. This motion is based upon the followings grounds: First. Because the taxes levied on the property of the company in the city of Elizabeth in and for the years 1876 to 1882, inclusive, being the same taxes mentioned in the record in this cause, have been paid and satisfied in full since the writ of error was issued, together with the costs in the case. Second. Because the writ of error is being prosecuted by the plaintiff in error for the sole purpose of obtaining the opinion of this court as to the validity of an alleged contract on the subject of taxation between the state of New Jersey and the company, and the state is not a party in the form or sense in which a party in interest must be a party to a litigation in order to be bound by the judgment of the court. Third. Because the plaintiff in error does not owe any taxes to the city of Elizabeth, to Samuel D. Bowers, the former comptroller of the city, or to any existing officer of the city, nor does the company owe any sum of money to the city for taxes. Fourth. Because all claims for taxes heretofore made or held by the city of Elizabeth, or any officer thereof, against the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, or the property of the company, or any receiver of it, have been adjusted, compromised, and paid in full, voluntarily, by the railroad company or its appropriate officer or representative. The motion is supported by a number of affidavits of the tax officers of the city of Elizabeth, including the present comptroller and the commissioners of adjustment. From these affidavits it appears that during the year 1887, by virtue of a statute of the state, passed in 1886, the commissioners of adjustment for the city of Elizabeth readjusted and reduced to a considerable extent the taxes levied by the city upon the property of the railroad company for the years 1876 to 1882, inclusive, and also for the year 1883; that, during the progress of that revision and readjustment, H. W. Douty, real-estate agent of the company, appeared before the commissioners from time to time, and urged the reduction of the claims of the city for taxes against the property of the company; that after the adjustment had been completed the taxes were paid by the railroad company, before interest on them began to accrue under the act by virtue of which the adjustment was made; that no warrant was issued, or other step or proceeding taken, by or on the part of the city, for the collection of the taxes prior to the time of payment, nor could any proceedings have been taken to enforce their payment for several months thereafter; and that no protest against the payment, or objection thereto, was made by the company, or any person acting on its behalf. It appears that during the progress of the readjustment the commissioners committed an error by including therein certain taxes for the years 1884, 1885, and 1886. Douty requested them by letter to correct that error, saying: 'If this is done, I am satisfied the adjustment will be promptly paid after confirmation.' The correction was made as requested, and the taxes thus readjusted and reduced—the same taxes here in dispute—were paid by the company, as above set forth.
As regards the costs of the proceedings in the court below, it seems they were paid under the following circumstances: After the judgment of the court of errors and appeals had been rendered, an entry was made upon its record reciting the fact that the judgment of the supreme court had been affirmed at the costs of the plaintiff in error, and further ordering that the record and proceedings be remitted to the supreme court of the state, to be proceeded with in accordance with law and the practice of the court. As the counsel for the plaintiff in error supposed that that form of the judgment would preclude the taking of a writ of error from this court, by an arrangement between counsel for both parties the record was changed to its present form, and the costs in the case were then paid by the plaintiff in error.
R. W. De Forest and G. R. Kaercher, for plaintiff in error.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 550-552 intentionally omitted] Frank Bergen and F. C. Marsh, for defendant in error.
As opposed to this motion, there is no denial of the fact that the taxes in dispute have been paid. It is insisted, however, that such payment was not voluntary, but was made under duress, as the only means of avoiding execution, and that payments were made before suit brought only when imposed by the court as a condition for being permitted to bring suit, and after suit brought, only to save property from sale in the absence of any stay, or possibility of getting one. But an examination of the affidavit of the principal attorney for the railroad company, filed here, discloses the fact that the taxes which are referred to in this connection are the taxes assessed for the years 1884 to 1887, inclusive. In the case of those taxes, the proceeding for their collection were regulated by an act of the New Jersey legislature passed in 1884, which, in the sixteenth section, provided that, if any company should desire to contest the validity of any tax levied thereunder, such contest should be made by certiorari which might be granted 'on such terms as the justice or court granting the writ may impose.' But that act, and the proceedings for the collection of taxes under it, are in nowise before the court in this case. In the nature of things, the proceedings which the attorney describes could not have applied to the collection of the taxes for the years 1876 to 1882, inclusive; for this suit, which relates to them, was disposed of by the supreme court of the state long before the act of 1884 was passed. There is nothing in the record to show that the payment of the taxes in dispute was imposed by the court as a condition precedent to the company's right to bring suit to test their legality. In fact, no such condition was imposed, or could have been imposed, when this suit was brought; for there was no statute of the state at that time giving any such power to the court.
In respect to h e taxes here in dispute, it is claimed that they were also paid involuntarily, because, under the readjustment act of 1886, the readjustment made by the commissioners was 'final and conclusive upon all persons, became immediately due, was collectible by the comptroller without interest, if paid within sixty days, and, if not paid within six months, it was made the comptroller's mandatory duty to sell the lands assessed, at public auction, to the highest bidder, and the purchaser at such sale obtained title by fee-simple absolute.' We do not think the payment of the taxes under the circumstances detailed in the affidavits before referred to, and admitted, substantially, by plaintiff in...
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