Little v. Clodfelter

• Decision Date: 20 February 2001
• Docket Number: No. 2000-CA-00010-COA.,2000-CA-00010-COA.
• Citation: 782 So.2d 175
• Parties: Ronald Wade LITTLE and Shirley L. Little, Appellants, v. Asa R. CLODFELTER, Appellee.
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

782 So.2d 175

Ronald Wade LITTLE and Shirley L. Little, Appellants, v.Asa R. CLODFELTER, Appellee.

No. 2000-CA-00010-COA.

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

February 20, 2001.

Rehearing Denied April 17, 2001.

William Waller Sr., Jackson, Attorney for Appellant.

John C. Henegan, Leslie Joyner Bobo, Jackson, Attorneys for Appellee.

Before McMILLIN, C.J., PAYNE, and LEE, JJ.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

PAYNE, J., for the Court:

¶ 1.The Circuit Court for the First Judicial District of Hinds County granted summary judgment in this case, ruling that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution barred this action.The Littles filed a motion to reconsider and were given thirty days to supplement their motion with other documents.Such motion was denied, though, after the new evidence was submitted.The Littles now appeal to this Court, aggrieved of the circuit court's dismissal of their action.

FACTS

¶ 2.The appellants in this case, Ronald and Shirley Little, each had individual life insurance policies through American Public Life Insurance (American).Each respective policy provided $25,000 coverage for each person.According to the policy agreement, each party paid fifty dollars per month via bank draft, and after sixteen years the payments would cease while the coverage continued.In 1998, this sixteen years concluded, and the Littles decided to purchase more insurance.They contacted American and asked that a salesperson be sent to their home to discuss increasing their coverage with American.AppelleeAsa R. Clodfelter, a salesman, went to the Littles' home to discuss an insurance plan with them, as requested.The Littles claim that they asked Clodfelter to issue them duplicate policies to those which they had each already individually purchased years before and that Clodfelter understood this and assured them their new polices would be issued by American on the same terms as their previous policies.

¶ 3.The Littles were not aware that they had not actually purchased an American policy, but that their policy was issued by Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Company(TOLIC).Further, the Littles showed that they did not pay fifty dollars per month, but that their premiums rose over time.Ronald Little actually purchased a $50,000 whole life policy that rose over time from fifty dollars per month to nearly ninety-six dollars per month.The insurance company took the liberty of deducting the excess amount from Ronald's bank account (since he made his payments via bank draft), and reduced his cash value of his policy to compensate for the extra expense.Shirley Little purchased a $75,000 whole life policy from TOLIC, and her fifty dollar per month premium rose over time to fifty-five dollars per month.Now, Ronald's cash value on his policy is only $810.72.Shirley's cash value is $5,569.11.Meanwhile, a group of plaintiffs had filed a class action suit in California, and in 1997 a California court found that TOLIC had defrauded the plaintiffs and awarded a settlement to these plaintiffs.¹

¶ 4.With this appeal, the Littles claim they were not made aware of any class action in California against TOLIC for fraudulently inducing persons to buy insurance policies.The Littles also claim that since Clodfelter was not a party to the California suit, nor were they notified of their option to join the suit, that full faith and credit need not be given to the California judgment as res judicata does not preclude the Littles from finding relief in a Mississippi court.

ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 5.With this appeal, appellants Ronald and Shirley Little claim that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee and in finding that full faith and credit was due the California judgment in which neither the appellants nor the appellee were parties.

Our standard of review for appeals brought to this Court on the denial or grant of a motion for summary judgment is well settled: The standard for reviewing the granting or denying of summary judgment is the same standard as is employed by the trial court under Rule 56(c).This Court conducts de novo review of orders granting or denying summary judgment and looks at all the evidentiary matters before it— admissions in pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, affidavits, etc.The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been made.If, in this view, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment should forthwith be entered in his favor.Otherwise, the motion should be denied.Issues of fact sufficient to require denial of a motion for summary judgment obviously are present where one party swears to one version of the matter in issue and another says the opposite.In addition, the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of fact exists is on the moving party.That is, the non-movant would be given the benefit of the doubt.

Wininger v. Ameristar Casino, Inc., 760 So.2d 1 (¶ 5)(Miss.Ct.App.1999)(citations omitted).

DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES

¶ 6.The sole issue in this case is whether or not the trial court properly granted summary judgment.The Littles argue that the four-prong test for res judicata questions precludes a Mississippi court from giving full faith and credit to the California judgment to which neither they nor the appellee were parties.That test states:

For the doctrine of res judicata to apply, four identities must be present: identity of the subject matter, identity of the cause of action, identity of the parties and identity of the quality or character of a person against whom a complaint is made.Absent any of those identities, the defense of res judicata must fail.When all four identities are in place, the parties may not relitigate any issues that were previously litigated or which should have raised in the previous litigation.

Stewart v. Merchants Nat'l Bank,700 So.2d 255, 260-62(Miss.1997)(citations omitted).The Littles argue that they were not parties to the California suit, that Clodfelter was not a party, that they were never served process on the suit but merely received notice of the final judgment, and that the same issues are not up for debate in the present case as were litigated at the California level.The Littles claim that their suit is not against the insurance company but is solely against Clodfelter for intentional fraudulent misrepresentation in his capacity as an independent contractor working for American, not as a salesperson representing TOLIC.Clodfelter points out in his brief that the Littles indeed were served in the California Natal proceeding, that they chose not to opt out of the Natal class action, and that they failed to submit a damages claim in connection with the court-approved class action settlement.

¶ 7.Looking to the appellee's motion for summary judgment, attached to this motion is the affidavit of Ronald G. Hazelrigg.Hazelrigg was a TOLIC employee acting as manager in the customer service department.His affidavit affirms that he was responsible for mailing court-ordered notices to members of the class certified by the California court in connection with the Natal court-ordered settlement.Also, Hazelrigg affirms that he sent a "Notice of Class Action, Proposed Settlement, Fairness Hearing, and Right to Appear" to the Littles.A sample of this notice appears as an exhibit, as well.Hazelrigg attested that the mailing log kept at TOLIC indicated that on two separate occasions the Littles were sent notice of approval of settlement and opportunity to elect.This notice explained to the Littles their rights as class members and specifically gave the Littles the following options: (1) remain members in the class and become eligible for relief upon settlement approval, (2) remain in the class and object to the proposed settlement, or (3) take affirmative steps to exclude themselves from the class.Though the TOLIC records show that the Littles and their attorney's office contacted TOLIC on a few different occasions, no proof exists to show that the Littles ever took any action to participate in the settlement, to object to the settlement or to exclude either of themselves.Without such evidence, the court was left with no alternative but to conclude that no such evidence existed and that the Littles opted to do (1) above—to remain members in the class and become eligible for relief upon settlement approval.In further support of this conclusion is the Littles' response to the appellee's motion for summary judgment.In that response, the Littles state, "Plaintiffs would show that they were offered a share of the settlement after the fact.The settlement was so minuscule as to be insulting regarding the Plaintiffs' damages and they refused to...