Little v. Crawford

• Decision Date: 13 February 1907
• Citation: 88 P. 974,13 Idaho 146
• Parties: JAMES LITTLE, Respondent, v. LOUIS CRAWFORD et al., Appellants
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

88 P. 974

13 Idaho 146

JAMES LITTLE, Respondent, v. LOUIS CRAWFORD et al., Appellants

Supreme Court of Idaho

February 13, 1907

ACTION TO QUIET TITLE-OPEN, NOTORIOUS AND ADVERSE POSSESSION-TITLE BY PRESCRIPTION-COLOR OF TITLE.

1. Where C. was in the possession of real estate, and conveyed same by quitclaim deed to L., and L. took possession thereof under claim and color of title, and held open, notorious and adverse possession under such claim of title, and made valuable improvements thereon, and paid all taxes assessed against said property for a period of more than five years he secured title thereto by adverse possession or prescription.

2. "Color of title" is that which in appearance is title, but which in reality is not title.

(Syllabus by the court.)

APPEAL from District Court of Seventh Judicial District for Canyon County. Hon. Frank J. Smith, Judge.

Action to quiet title to one hundred and sixty acres of land. Judgment for the plaintiff confirming title in him. Affirmed.

Judgment affirmed and costs awarded to respondent.

Griffiths & Griffiths and H. E. Wallace, for Appellants.

The tax sale certificate and the tax deed issued by the assessor and tax collector to Basye were void, for the reason that the property was assessed to J. C. Crawford and not to the heirs of Joseph Crawford, deceased, or to the administrator of the decedent's estate, as required by the laws of Idaho (Rev. Stats., sec. 1443; Cooley on Taxation, 3d ed., pp. 734 913, 914, and cases cited; Carithers v. Weaver, 7 Kan. 110.)

No additional or different right of title could be acquired by Basye, who had the place rented, or by the administrator, or any heir, or by any agreement between any of them, in permitting the taxes to become delinquent and the property sold for taxes and purchased by either of them. The tax deed to Basye and the quitclaim deed to E. J. Crawford by Basye, under their agreement, were wholly void, and operated only as a payment of the taxes. (Delashmutt v. Parrent, 39 Kan. 548, 18 P. 712.) One standing in the relationship of co-owner will not be permitted to procure the title through a delinquent tax sale and thereby defeat the title of his co-owners.

The heir, E. J. Crawford, entered into possession in 1895, as one of the co-owners of this land, and held it jointly for himself and all the other heirs of Joseph Crawford.

The respondent, James Little, acquired whatever right he had through a quitclaim deed from E. J. Crawford, and therefore stands in the same position as his grantor; that is, he acquired one heir's interest, and holds the possession for himself and all the other heirs.

"A purchaser of real estate who takes a quitclaim deed from his grantor is presumed to have notice of any defects in his grantor's title; and he purchases at his own risk." (Leland v. Isenbeck, 1 Idaho 469; City and County of San Francisco v. Lawton, 18 Cal. 465, 79 Am. Dec. 187; Carpenter v. Williamson, 25 Cal. 154; Graff v. Middleton, 43 Cal. 341; Cadiz v. Major, 33 Cal. 288.)

One co-owner in possession cannot claim adversely to the other co-owners, and the statute of limitations will not run in favor of the one co-owner as against the other co-owners. The statute could not begin to run in favor of any claim respondent might have made, in any event, until he brought home to the other heirs a knowledge of the nature and extent of his adverse claim. (Ballard v. Golob (Colo.), 83 P. 376; McMahon v. McGraw, 26 Wis. 614; Holloway v. Clark, 27 Ill. 484; Gilman v. Riopelle, 18 Mich. 145; McGee v. Holmes, 63 Miss. 50; Poole v. Ellis, 64 Miss. 555, 1 So. 725; Krutz v. Fisher, 8 Kan. 90; Baker v. Whiting, F. Cas. No, 787, 3 Sum. 475; Millett v. Lagomarsino (Cal.), 36 P. 308; Richards v. Richards, 75 Mich. 408, 42 N.W. 954; 1 Ency. of Law, 794, and notes.)

Ira E. Barber, for Respondent.

The entry of E. J. Crawford and wife under their deed from Basye was within itself, taken with the exclusive character of his occupancy, an effective ouster, and started running the statutes of limitation.

A tenant in common will be presumed to have notice of the adverse holding of a cotenant where the hostile character of the possession is so openly manifested that a man of reasonable diligence would discover it. (Van Gunden v. Virginia, C. & I. Co., 52 F. 838, 3 C. C. A. 294.)

If one tenant in common has been in possession a great many years without any accounting to his fellow-commoners. this is proper evidence from which the jury may infer an adverse possession. (Freeman on Cotenancy, 242; Bryan v. Atwater, 5 Day, 181, 5 Am. Dec. 136; Robidoux v. Cassilege, 10 Mo.App. 516; Warfield v. Lindell, 38 Mo. 561, 90 Am. Dec. 443.)

The entry of plaintiff under his purchase was effective as an ouster of defendants, started the statutes to running on the initiation of his title, and having been maintained for the prescriptive period, and the other requisites of an adverse possession having been by him complied with, ripened his claim into a title absolute. (Packard v. Moss, 68 Cal. 123, 8 P. 819; Spect v. Hagar, 65 Cal. 443, 4 P. 420; Frick v. Sinon, 75 Cal. 337, 17 P. 439; Unger v. Mooney, 63 Cal. 586, 49 Am. Rep. 100; Armijo v. Neher, 11 N. Mex. 645, 72 P. 12; Winterburn v. Chambers, 91 Cal. 170, 27 P. 658; Tiedeman on Real Property, 251.)

Where a tenant in common is in exclusive possession, and conveys to another by deed purporting to convey the whole estate, and puts the grantee in possession, it is such a disseisin as will set the statutes of limitation to running in grantee's favor. (Bath v. Valdez, 70 Cal. 350, 11 P. 727; Frick v. Sinon, 75 Cal. 337, 17 P. 439; Unger v. Mooney, 63 Cal. 586, 49 Am. Rep. 100.)

Possession under color of title for the period of statutory limitation confers upon the holder a perfect title in law. (1 Warvelle on Vendors, 50.)

A quitclaim deed is as effectual to pass title as a grant or bargain and sale. Such a deed, therefore, gives color of right. (Packard v. Johnson (Cal.), 4 P. 636.)

A void tax deed is sufficient color of title to sustain the bar of the statute of limitation. (Winterburn v. Chambers, 91 Cal. 170, 27 P. 658; Ward v. Huggins, 7 Wash. 617, 32 P. 740, 1015, 36 P. 285.)

However incompetent may have been the power of the grantor in a conveyance to pass title to the subject thereof, yet a claim asserted under the provisions of such a deed is strictly a claim under color of title, and one which will draw to the possession of the grantee the protection of the statutes of limitation, other requisites being complied with. (Wright v. Madison, 18 How. (U.S.) 50, 15 L.Ed. 280; Hall v. Law, 102 U.S. 461, 26 L.Ed. 617; Swift v. Mulkey, 17 Or. 532, 21 P. 871; Weber v. Clarke, 75 Cal. 11, 15 P. 432.)

As to the defendants, the doctrine of estoppel lies. One cannot stand by idly and silent, permit another to expend money, time and effort in the acquisition and betterment of lands, participate in the profits, and proceeds of transaction, and then be heard to say that grantor had not all the title. (2 Pomeroy Eq. Jur., 1905 ed., 807.)

SULLIVAN, J. Ailshie, C. J., concurs.

OPINION

SULLIVAN, J.

This is an action to quiet title to the south half of the southwest quarter of section 2, and the south half of the southeast quarter of section 3, township 6 north, range 2 west, B. M.

On August 21, 1885, one Joseph Crawford died, unmarried and intestate, seised of an unperfected homestead claimant's possessory right to said lands. Administration was begun on his estate in Ada county shortly after his death and has not yet been closed up. On June 27, 1899, the United States government issued patent conveying said land to the heirs of Joseph Crawford, deceased.

Pursuant to an undertaking between the administrator and one Basye, the taxes on said land were allowed to become delinquent for the year 1893, and sold by the assessor to said Basye on February 5, 1894. By the terms of said agreement or...