Little v. Fairchild

• Decision Date: 07 May 1900
• Docket Number: 235
• Citation: 46 A. 133,195 Pa. 614
• Parties: Little v. Fairchild
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

46 A. 133

195 Pa. 614

Little v. Fairchild

No. 235

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

May 7, 1900

Argued March 12, 1900

Appeal, No. 235, Jan. T., 1899, by defendant, from judgment of Superior Court, Jan. T., 1899, No. 17, affirming judgment of C.P. Bradford Co., Dec. T., 1893, No. 172, on verdict for plaintiff in case of William Little, administrator of George S. Barker, deceased, v. A. C. Fairchild and George Grace. Affirmed.

Appeal from Superior Court.

From the record it appears that this was an action of assumpsit brought by George S. Barker on September 29, 1893, to recover for certain onions sold to the firm of Fairchild, Grace &amp Company. Service was made upon but two members of the firm A. C. Fairchild and George Grace. Judgment was originally entered for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense, which judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court. See Barker v. Fairchild, 168 Pa. 246. George S. Barker having died, his death was suggested and William Little, administrator, substituted as plaintiff. The administrator obtained leave and amended the statement of claim filed as follows:

Now, February 2, 1897, the plaintiff is permitted to amend his statement of claim in the above case by adding after the words "on the 31st day of October, A.D. 1891," the words "or within six years before bringing this suit."

Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $250.72. From this judgment the defendants appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the judgment. See 10 Pa.Super. 211. A motion for a reargument was refused and subsequently an appeal was allowed by the Supreme Court.

The judgment is affirmed.

Rodney A. Mercur, for appellants, cited Royse v. May, 93 Pa. 454, and Transit Co. v. Pipe Line Co., 180 Pa. 224.

S. W. & Wm. Little, for appellee.

Before McCOLLUM, MITCHELL, DEAN, FELL and BROWN, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE FELL:

The objection made to the amendment of the plaintiff's statement that by it a new and independent cause of action was introduced was not well founded. The only effect of the amendment was to relieve the plaintiff of the necessity of proving that the sale had been made on a particular day. The cause of action remained the same. The allegation as to the time of sale which the defendants were required to meet was very general, but not more so than if it had been stated under a videlicet. Of this they had ample notice, six months before the trial, and objection on that ground...