Little v. Gray Media Grp.

• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas
• Writing for the Court: Daniel D. Crabtree, United States District Judge
• Citation: Little v. Gray Media Grp., 790 F.Supp.3d 1195 (D. Kan. 2025)
• Docket Number: Case No. 23-2394-DDC
• Decision Date: 02 July 2025
• Parties: Erin LITTLE, Plaintiff, v. GRAY MEDIA GROUP, INC., Defendant.

790 F.Supp.3d 1195

Erin LITTLE, Plaintiff, v. GRAY MEDIA GROUP, INC., Defendant.

Case No. 23-2394-DDC

United States District Court, D. Kansas

Signed July 2, 2025

Deborah J. Blakely, Gene P. Graham, Jr., White Graham Buckley & Carr, Independence, MO, Dennis E. Egan, The Popham Law Firm, PC, Kansas City, MO, Martin M. Meyers, The Meyers Law Firm, LC, Kansas City, MO, for Plaintiff.

Kelly M. Hayes, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, PC, St. Louis, MO, Michael L. Matula, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, PC, Kansas City, MO, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Daniel D. Crabtree, United States District Judge

A thread—once pulled—can unravel quickly. In August 2022, defendant Gray Media Group, Inc. intended to "build the brand" at KCTV5 around plaintiff Erin Little, KCTV5's Chief Meteorologist. Doc. 104-4 at 15 (Aug. 5 Meeting Tr. 14:4-16). Plaintiff's superiors considered her "part of the main talent team" and "one of the leaders[.]" Id.

But by November 2022, this plan had come apart at the seams. In just more than four months, plaintiff had lodged numerous complaints of discrimination and retaliation, elevating those complaints all the way to defendant's highest executive: the Chairman and CEO. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff took medical leave due—she contended—to the stress from her work environment. Plaintiff never returned on-air. When plaintiff's medical leave had ended, defendant exercised a "Pay, No Play" term in plaintiff's contract. That term required defendant to continue to pay plaintiff's salary but allowed it not to put her in front of the camera, or even have her present at the station. Defendant also notified plaintiff that it would terminate her contract altogether after a year's time.

Plaintiff filed this employment discrimination action on September 7, 2023. See Doc. 1. Plaintiff brings five claims, four under Title VII of the of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and one under the Family Medical Leave Act. Doc. 80 at 42-43 (Pretrial Order ¶ 4.a.). Plaintiff alleges a sex-based hostile work environment, sex discrimination, retaliation, and retaliatory harassment under Title VII. Id. (Pretrial Order ¶ 4.a.i.-ii.). And plaintiff alleges interference under the FMLA. Id. at 43 (Pretrial Order ¶ 4.a.iii.). Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 84). As the summary judgment briefing progressed, a dispute arose over a portion of plaintiff's affidavit. The parties were unable to resolve the dispute without the court, and defendant then filed a Motion to Strike (Doc. 103). This Order decides both motions.

The court grants defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 84). The court concludes that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of a sex-based hostile work environment. She never adduced evidence sufficient to create a triable issue of defendant's facially sex-based conduct. Plaintiff also failed to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination. Plaintiff never adduced evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer discrimination based on sex.

Plaintiff's retaliation and retaliatory harassment claims likewise fail on the prima facie prong. Plaintiff never demonstrated a causal connection between her protected activity and defendant's materially adverse actions sufficient to support a prima facie case of retaliation. And plaintiff's alleged protected opposition falls outside of Title VII protection. And so, plaintiff doesn't shoulder her prima facie burden on any of her Title VII claims. But even if she had, defendant still would have prevailed at summary judgment because plaintiff also fails to create a triable issue of pretext.

Finally, the court also grants defendant summary judgment against plaintiff's FMLA interference claim. Defendant demonstrates that it would have taken the same adverse actions against plaintiff regardless of whether she took FMLA leave—and no reasonable jury could find otherwise.

The court also grants in part and denies in part defendant's Motion to Strike (Doc. 103). To the extent defendant's motion requests that the court disregard one sentence in Paragraph 15 of plaintiff's affidavit, the court grants defendant's motion. The court doesn't consider the disputed sentence in reaching its conclusions here. The court denies defendant's motion to the extent that it asks the court to strike Paragraph 15 altogether and to the extent it requests sanctions and attorney fees. The court explains these rulings, below.

I. Background

The following facts are stipulated, uncontroverted or, where controverted, are identified as such and stated in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the party opposing summary judgment. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007).

Plaintiff's Contract

Defendant's predecessor, Meredith Corporation, first employed plaintiff on January 17, 2018, as a Digital Producer. Doc. 80 at 2 (Pretrial Order Stipulations ¶ 2.a.iii.). A little over a month later, Meredith executed an employment agreement with plaintiff as an AM meteorologist—effective March 1, 2018, to January 16, 2022. Id. (Pretrial Order Stipulations ¶ 2.a.v.). Meredith then executed a second employment agreement with plaintiff, this time as Chief Meteorologist, effective January 17, 2022, to January 16, 2025. Id. (Pretrial Order Stipulations ¶¶ 2.a.vi., viii.). The 2022 employment agreement provided plaintiff with four weeks vacation, thirteen personal days/holidays, and ten sick days each year. Id. (Pretrial Order ¶ 2.a.vii.). The 2022 agreement also included a "Pay, No Play" term. Doc. 9-3 at 8 (Def. Ex. C). That term relieved Meredith of any obligation to "use Employee's services on any program." Id. And it provided that Meredith fulfilled its contractual obligation simply by remitting to plaintiff compensation until her employment's termination. Id. In short, under the contract's "Pay, No Play" provision, Meredith didn't have to put plaintiff on air. But it did have to pay her.

Defendant Acquires Meredith

In December 2021, defendant acquired Meredith. Doc. 80 at 2 (Pretrial Order Stipulations ¶ 2.a.x.). Meredith merged into Gray Media Group, Inc., with defendant as the surviving entity. Id. Defendant owns and operates television stations and digital properties, including Kansas City's KCTV. Id. (Pretrial Order Stipulations ¶¶ 2.a.i.-ii.). At acquisition, defendant assumed all terms and conditions of plaintiff's 2022 employment contract with Meredith. Id. (Pretrial Order Stipulations ¶ 2.a.xi.). That same month, Andrew Stewart became the General Manager of KCTV5. Id. at 3 (Pretrial Order Stipulations ¶ 2.a.xii.). And a few months later, on February 7, 2022, Catherine (Kate) Glover started as KCTV5's News Director. Id. (Pretrial Order Stipulations ¶ 2.a.xiii.).

Plaintiff's Schedule Change

At the beginning of August 2022,¹ General Manager Stewart informed plaintiff that her workdays would shift from Monday through Friday to Sunday through Thursday. Id. (Pretrial Order Stipulations ¶ 2.a.xiv.).² Other anchors—men and women alike—also experienced this same schedule shift. Doc. 87-2 at 14 (Little Dep. 80:3-12) (identifying co-anchors Brad Stephens and Carolyn Long's schedule shift to Sundays); Doc. 94-48 at 6 (plaintiff explaining in investigative interview that "[e]veryone's schedule had changed, the directors, all evening talent"). The shift's purported aim was to increase the anchors' airtime on Sundays during the Chiefs' football season. Doc. 87-2 at 14 (Little Dep. 80:3-12). The schedule change displeased plaintiff, who didn't want to work on Sundays for family reasons. Doc. 80 at 3 (Pretrial Order Stipulations ¶ 2.a.xv.).

During these schedule change conversations, Stewart explained that—if she wanted to—plaintiff could discuss with defendant options for plaintiff to leave her contract early. Id. (Pretrial Order Stipulations ¶ 2.a.xvi.). Stewart testified that plaintiff had asserted that she didn't need the job, and she didn't need the money. Doc. 87-4 at 3 (Stewart Dep. 111:15-112:18). And so, in response, he offered to discuss her early departure. Id. Plaintiff disputes Stewart's version of the events. Doc. 94-82 at 3 (Little Aff. ¶ 6). Though she admits saying she didn't need the job, she attests that she continued with "I am choosing this job . . . because I love what I am doing as Chief Meteorologist." Id. And, she clarified, she "never told anyone at KCTV5 that [she] wanted to exit [her] contract." Id. She interpreted Stewart's end-the-contract discussion as a "threat not an 'offer.' " Id.

The schedule change conversations sparked other conflicts, as well. During one such meeting, Stewart held up pages of a research study containing plaintiff's ranking among Kansas City's meteorologists. Doc. 87-3 at 4 (Pl. Ex. 56A); Doc. 87-2 at 20 (Little Dep. 92:5-7). All the other KC meteorologists listed in the study ranked above plaintiff.³ Doc. 94-10 at 2 (Pl. Ex. 11); Doc. 87-2 at 20 (Little Dep. 92:5-7). Stewart then explained that the Sunday-Thursday schedule shift would help plaintiff improve that ranking. See Doc. 87-2 at 20 (Little Dep. 92:5-14). But Stewart never allowed plaintiff to review the study. Id.

Finally, in these schedule change conversations Stewart also commented unfavorably on plaintiff's contractual compensation and vacation terms—finding them both excessive. Id. at 10 (Little Dep. 52:3-11). Plaintiff testified that Stewart's manner while doing so was "completely inappropriate[.]" Id. (Little Dep. 52:3-21). She testified that he was "irate," "aggressive and hostile," "flailing his hands in the air," which she perceived as an inability to "conduct himself in a professional manner." Id. In the context of discussing plaintiff's allegedly excessive pay and time away from her children, Stewart also explained "how he [had] guided his wife through conversations about how to work." Id. at 9 (Little Dep. 46:1-11). Plaintiff interpreted Stewart's comments as communicating "how a woman should behave in the workplace[.]" Id.

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