Little v. Jacobs
| Decision Date | 01 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | 33,215. |
| Citation | 336 P.3d 398 |
| Parties | S. Louis LITTLE, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Paulette JACOBS, Defendant, and Thomas R. Baigas, Defendant–Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
The Herrera Firm, P.C., Samuel M. Herrera, Taos, NM, for Appellant.
New Mexico Legal Center, P.C., Lee Boothby, Taos, NM, for Appellee.
{1} Plaintiff–Appellant S. Louis Little appeals from the district court's order granting Defendant–Appellee Thomas Baigas' motion to dismiss based on the ten-year limitation period contained in NMSA 1978, Section 37–1–27 (1967), a statute of repose. Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in finding that Section 37–1–27 applied to an unlicensed contractor. We agree. Given the strong public policy against unlicensed contractors in New Mexico, allowing an unlicensed contractor the benefit of the ten-year statute of repose would be contrary to the intent of the Legislature. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
{2} In April 2000 Defendant constructed a deck for Paulette Jacobs (Jacobs) at her rental property in Arroyo Seco, New Mexico. In 2009, Plaintiff stayed at Jacobs' rental property and was injured when he fell off of the deck and into a ditch. Plaintiff filed an action against Jacobs in August 2011. In January 2013 Jacobs identified Defendant as the individual who constructed the deck. Plaintiff then filed a second amended complaint adding Defendant as a party to the suit.
{3} In the amended complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant is a licensed contractor in the State of New Mexico. In his answer, Defendant denied that he was licensed at the time that he built the deck. Defendant also asserted, as an affirmative defense, that Plaintiff's claim was time barred by Section 37–1–27. Defendant then filed a motion to dismiss arguing that, because Plaintiff's action was filed more than ten years after the date of substantial completion of the deck in April 2000, the claim should be dismissed.
{4} In response, Plaintiff argued, that because Defendant was an unlicensed contractor at the time that he built the deck, he was not entitled to the benefit of the limitation period in Section 37–1–27. However, the district court disagreed with Plaintiff that Section 37–1–27 only applied to licensed contractors and therefore granted Defendant's motion to dismiss. On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in finding that Section 37–1–27 could be invoked by an unlicensed contractor.
{5} Although the parties characterize the motion before the district court as a motion to dismiss, when a party submits material outside the pleadings, and the material is not excluded by the district court, “the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 1–056 [NMRA].” Rule 1–012(B) NMRA. We therefore construe the district court's decision in this case as an order granting summary judgment.
{6} “Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Self v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 1998–NMSC–046, ¶ 6, 126 N.M. 396, 970 P.2d 582. “We review these legal questions de novo.” Id. This case presents no disputed issue of fact. The sole issue presented on appeal is whether Section 37–1–27 applies to unlicensed contractors.
{7} Whether Section 37–1–27 applies to unlicensed contractors is a matter of first impression and requires this Court to engage in statutory interpretation. “Statutory interpretation is an issue of law that we review de novo.” Moongate Water Co., Inc. v. City of Las Cruces, 2013–NMSC–018, ¶ 6, 302 P.3d 405. When construing statutes, “our charge is to determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{8} There are two approaches “relating to how a court performs the task of applying a statute when the parties to a case disagree over the statute's meaning”—the “plain meaning” rule and the “rejection-of-literal-language” approach. State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 1994–NMSC–023, ¶¶ 1–3, 117 N.M. 346, 871 P.2d 1352. The plain meaning rule, which Defendant relies on in this case, provides that “statutes are to be given effect as written and, where they are free from ambiguity, there is no room for construction.” Id. ¶ 2 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The other approach, relied on by Plaintiff, was summarized in Helman as follows:
Courts will not add words except where necessary to make the statute conform to the obvious intent of the [L]egislature, or to prevent its being absurd. But where the language of the legislative act is doubtful or an adherence to the literal use of words would lead to injustice, absurdity or contradiction, the statute will be construed according to its obvious spirit or reason, even though this requires the rejection of words or the substitution of others.
Id. ¶ 3 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Helman, 1994–NMSC–023, ¶ 23, 117 N.M. 346, 871 P.2d 1352. Therefore, “when the literal wording of the language ... creates consequences that the [L]egislature could not have desired, or when the literal meaning leads to conclusions that are unjust or nonsensical, then the Court must look beyond the four corners of the statute.” Inv. Co. of the Sw. v. Reese, 1994–NMSC–051, ¶ 13, 117 N.M. 655, 875 P.2d 1086 (citations omitted). With these principles in mind, we turn to the statute at issue in this case.
{10} Section 37–1–27 provides, inter alia, that “[n]o action ... against any person performing or furnishing the construction or the design, planning, supervision, inspection or administration of construction ... shall be brought after ten years from the date of substantial completion.” “[U]nlike a statute of limitations, this [s]tatute begins to run from a specific date unrelated to the date of injury and thus may abrogate a cause of action before it accrues.”Saiz v. Belen Sch. Dist., 1992–NMSC–018, ¶ 41 n. 12, 113 N.M. 387, 827 P.2d 102. A statute of limitations, on the other hand, “begins to run when a plaintiff's cause of action accrues or is discovered.” Id. This distinction makes Section 37–1–27 a statute of repose. Id. ¶ 41.
{11} Section 37–1–27 and its predecessor were enacted “in the wake of judicial decisions exposing those involved in the construction industry to greater liability.” Coleman v. United Eng'rs & Constructors, Inc., 1994–NMSC–074, ¶ 10, 118 N.M. 47, 878 P.2d 996. Prior to the enactment of the statute, “exposure came when the cause of action accrued[,]” which typically does not happen until an injury occurs. Howell v. Burk, 1977–NMCA–077, ¶ 17, 90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214. Because an injury could arise years after a construction project was completed, licensed contractors continued to be exposed to liability long after relinquishing control over a project. Id. The Legislature responded by limiting liability to those in the construction industry to ten years after substantial completion of a project. In this case, we must decide whether the Legislature intended for unlicensed contractors to benefit from this statute of repose. To make this determination, we first examine the Legislature's treatment of unlicensed contractors in New Mexico. See Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Diamond D Constr. Co., 2001–NMCA–082, ¶ 50, 131 N.M. 100, 33 P.3d 651 .
{12} New Mexico statutes and case law interpreting those statutes clearly reflect a strong public policy against unlicensed contractors. The Construction Industries Licensing Act (CILA), NMSA 1978, §§ 60–13–1 to –59 (1967, as amended through 2013), was enacted to “promote the general welfare of the people of New Mexico by providing for the protection of life and property by adopting and enforcing codes and standards for construction ... work.” Section 60–13–1.1. In Mascarenas v. Jaramillo, 1991–NMSC–014, ¶ 14, 111 N.M. 410, 806 P.2d 59, our Supreme Court discussed the purpose of CILA and emphasized:
The object sought to be accomplished by the Act is a healthy, ordered market in which consumers may contract with competent, reliable construction contractors who have passed the scrutiny of a licensing division. The wrong to be remedied is the exploitation of the public by incompetent and unscrupulous contractors who are unable or unwilling to obtain a license. In effect, the wrongs to be remedied are circumstances which permit unlicensed contractors to flourish and profit at the expense of the public.
Id. To that end, Section 60–13–12(A) provides that “[n]o person shall act as a contractor without a license.” This prohibition has significant consequences for those who choose to disregard it. Indeed, “[a]ny person who acts in the capacity as a contractor within the meaning of [CILA] without a license” faces criminal charges, which could result in fines and imprisonment. Section 60–13–52(A) ; see State v. Jenkins, 1989–NMCA–044, ¶¶ 1, 3, 108 N.M. 669, 777 P.2d 908...
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