Little v. Mackel
| Decision Date | 24 July 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 11384,11384 |
| Citation | 151 Mont. 421,443 P.2d 891 |
| Parties | George LITTLE, Plaintiff, and Respondent, v. Joseph MACKEL, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Wade Dahood and Conde F. Mackay, argued, Anacnda, for appellant.
Chester L. Jones, argued, Virginia City, for respondent.
This appeal results from a judgment of the district court of the fifth judicial district, the Honorable Philip C. Duncan sitting without a jury.
Certain procedural matters must be set forth in order to understand the appellant's issue of error. This case went to trial on the amended complaint of respondent which sought specific performance of the option provision of a lease and option agreement between respondent and appellant. The answer and cross-complaint of appellant originally filed claimed (1) no proper claim was stated; (2) the opinion was unenforceable because it was represented to the defendant to be effective only upon his (defendant's) death; and (3) failure of consideration. The cross-complaint alleged purported fraudulent representations concerning the effectiveness of the option and seeks damages for such fraud. To this document was appended a demand for a jury trial.
The respondent moved to dismiss the answer and cross-complaint on the grounds of failure to state a claim for relief. Respondent also moved to strike the demand for a jury trial. The court struck from the cross-complaint the allegations referring to punishment by means of punitive damages and the demand for a jury trial.
The case went before the court, after the court's order, as a case of specific performance with the defense that the fraud of plaintiff (respondent) had brought about the inclusion of an incomplete option provision in the lease and option agreement. It should be noted that no objection was made to the court's orders on the pleadings, except to the denial of jury trial.
The sole issue before this Court is whether or not the trial court was correct in its ruling denying appellant's request for a jury trial.
The facts of this case are simple. The respondent, George Little, and his wife became acquainted with Joe Mackel, the appellant, shortly after the end of World War II. The Littles had been raised on a farm in Arkansas and had come to Montana to do farm work. Mr. Little had a seventh grade education. Joe Mackel owned a small ranch of 1,020 acres which came to him by inheritance from his parents; it had been in the family for some 50 years. Over the years the ranch had supported a cattle herd of from 50 to 100 head. Joe Mackel had lived some 50 years on the ranch and had attended school through the first year of high school. The Littles worked on a ranch adjoining the Mackel ranch and had become friends of Joe. After his parents' death, Joe hired the Littles to work for him which resulted in a strong friendship between the parties. In 1953 Joe leased the ranch to the Littles, who after some six months had to give up the lease due to a health condition of Mrs. Little, but there was no difficulty arising from this fact. When Joe Mackel learned of the Littles' problem, he voluntarily cancelled the lease and re-leased to another party. The Littles moved to Butte; Joe Mackel found work in that area and their friendship continued. In 1955 or 1956, Joe drew a will leaving the ranch property to the Littles. In 1959, when the lease ran out, Joe Mackel talked the Littles into returning to the ranch on a lease-option. At that time he was dissatisfied with the prior tenants who had let the property run down and expressed a desire to the Littles to have someone on the ranch who would look after it.
The 1959 lease, for a period of 10 years, covered the 1,020 acres of land, plus 45 head of cows and 2 bulls. The lease also contained an option to purchase the real property for $25,000. The respondent Little testified that the option to purchase was his idea and the only discussion he had with Mackel was over the amount. He, Little, wanted it for $20,000 and Mackel wanted $25,000, which amount was put into the lease. The rental was for one-third share of the increase of the livestock to the lessor.
The 1959 lease remained in full force and effect until 1964, at which time Mackel sold the cattle necessitating a reconsideration of rental payments. The testimony reveals that during this period, from 1959 to 1964, Joe Mackel became enamored with a woman whose fiscal demands caused a considerable decrease in his bank account bringing about the necessity to dispose of the cattle. Perhaps because of this rather costly affair, the friendship of the Littles and Mackel cooled.
At the time of the sale of the cattle in 1964, the parties to the lease discussed a new rental arrangement and Little went to an attorney who made a new lease; it contained two variations, one concerned the maintenance of certain old buildings, the other the rental which was set at $1,000 per...
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Gray v. City of Billings
...P.2d 432; Downs v. Smyk (Mont.1982), 651 P.2d 1238, 39 St.Rep. 1786 (trying purely equitable actions without jury); Little v. Mackel (1968), 151 Mont. 421, 443 P.2d 891 (denying jury trial of a fraud defense to an action for specific performance); Citizens State Bank v. Duus (1969), 154 Mon......
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Downs v. Smyk
...Court in the matter of right to jury trial in equity cases under the 1889 Constitution was clearly set forth in Little v. Mackel (1968), 151 Mont. 421, 425, 443 P.2d 891, 893-894: "This action is one of specific performance and is one that our Court handles under its equitable jurisdiction.......
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Supola v. Montana Dept. of Justice, Drivers License Bureau, 95-508
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