Little v. State
Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
Citation | 302 So.3d 396 |
Docket Number | No. 4D18-3128,4D18-3128 |
Parties | Scott LITTLE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Decision Date | 19 August 2020 |
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Breanna Atwood, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Heidi L. Bettendorf, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
The circumstances presented in this case are familiar and of the "torn from the headlines" genre. The legal issues, on the other hand, are novel, due to two amendments to Florida statutes affecting self-defense claims: Chapter 2017-72, § 1, Laws of Florida ( ), and Chapter 2014-195 § 6, Laws of Florida ( ).
Scott Little ("Defendant") was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and battery. Following a SYG hearing, his motion to dismiss these charges was denied. A jury trial followed, and Defendant was convicted on both charges. He raises several issues on appeal. We write to address Defendant's arguments that: (1) his counsel was ineffective on the face of the record for failing to argue, at the pretrial SYG hearing on Defendant's motion to dismiss, that Defendant's actions constituted non-deadly force, as opposed to deadly force; (2) the trial court fundamentally erred in giving the deadly force jury instruction (in addition to the non-deadly force instruction) at trial because the instruction was not supported by the facts of this case; and (3) because the trial court improperly placed the burden of proof on Defendant at the SYG hearing pursuant to the pre-2017 version of section 776.032, Florida Statutes (2017)—which was in effect at the time of the incident and Defendant's arrest, rather than the amended statute, which became effective nine months before the SYG hearing—this case needs to be remanded for a new hearing notwithstanding an affirmance of the trial court with respect to the aforementioned arguments on appeal. On these and all other issues raised on appeal, we reject Defendant's arguments and affirm.
We reference both the SYG hearing which resulted in the denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss, and the subsequent trial which resulted in Defendant's convictions.
Defendant filed a pretrial motion to dismiss pursuant to section 776.032, Florida Statutes (2017), which provides for immunity from criminal prosecution for justifiable use or threatened use of force. At the SYG hearing on the motion to dismiss, the defense presented the testimony of Defendant and two neighbors (who did not observe the confrontation at issue). After the defense rested, the State requested a "ruling based on the insufficient evidence that has been provided by the defense."
Defense counsel argued "a person is justified in threatening to use deadly force if he or she reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to prevent the commission of a forceble [sic] felony, in this case, being the burglary of his car." Defense counsel also contended that, as a result of the Florida Legislature's 2017 amendment to section 776.032(4), Florida Statutes, the State was required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Defendant was not entitled to self-defense immunity. The trial court noted that the change to the statute became effective after the alleged crime but before the pretrial hearing, and it held that the amended statute did not apply to this case. Thus, the trial court determined that Defendant bore the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, to demonstrate entitlement to SYG immunity.
Having reached this decision regarding the burden of proof, the trial court made the following findings and conclusions:
After the trial court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss, the case proceeded to a jury trial.
At trial, the alleged victim testified that he was a seventeen-year-old high school senior at the time of the incident. On the night of the incident, he went on his normal evening jog around 10:30 p.m., after his mother got home from work. At the beginning of his run, he noticed that he had money in his pocket. Near the end of his run, several blocks from his apartment, he noticed the money was missing. At this point, he began to search for his money in the grassy areas along the route he had just run. After searching around several mailboxes, he crossed the street towards a white truck, which happened to belong to Defendant. Upon reaching the truck, he put his hand on the vehicle and bent down to look underneath it for his money. As he bent down, he heard a voice yell out—although he could not hear it clearly over the music playing through his headphones. When he turned toward the voice, Defendant was approaching him with a gun drawn, yelling for him to get on the ground while he called the police.
Pursuant to a pretrial ruling, the State was not permitted to introduce any evidence of Defendant's alleged racist statements in its case in chief. Defendant, however, advanced a theory of self-defense at trial, which allowed the State to put on a rebuttal case. On rebuttal, the State recalled the alleged victim, who testified that when Defendant approached, he said, "get on the f****** ground n*****." On cross-examination, the defense questioned the alleged victim about why he did not tell the police about this statement on the night of the incident. The alleged victim explained that he does not curse.
Two officers responded to Defendant's call that evening and both testified at trial. Officer #1 testified he arrived at the scene to find Defendant with a pistol in one hand and flagging him down with the other hand. When Officer #1 approached, Defendant immediately put down the pistol and indicated that he had called 911. Officer #1 noticed the alleged victim lying on the ground crying and shaking. The officer separated Defendant and the alleged victim and took their statements. Defendant complained to Officer #1 about insufficient police protection in the neighborhood and said he was tired of "these people" stealing.
Officer #2 testified the alleged victim was "petrified" at the scene. In contrast, Defendant appeared "completely nonchalant." Officer #2 also heard Defendant state he was tired of "these people" stealing.
Defendant testified in his own defense. He claimed he approached the alleged victim without his gun drawn while telling the victim—albeit in a loud tone—to get away from his truck. Only when the alleged victim "turned and came at [him]," motioning in an aggressive manner, did Defendant draw his gun and order the alleged victim onto the ground while he called the police. Defendant held the alleged victim at gunpoint and put his foot on his back to prevent him from turning over while waiting for the police to arrive, which took approximately...
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