Little v. United States
| Decision Date | 04 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 19-2866 (RC) |
| Parties | MARVIN C. LITTLE, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Marvin C. Little (“Petitioner”), who is serving a prison sentence imposed by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, appears to have raised every conceivable claim in his years-long effort to overturn his criminal convictions. This matter is before the Court on Petitioner's Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (ECF No. 1, “Pet.”), as supplemented and amended (ECF Nos. 4 (“Supp Pet.”), 9 (“Mot. Am. Pet.”), 15 (“Am Pet.”), 18, 20, 24, 33 and 40), Respondent's Opposition to Petitioner's Pro Se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus ), and Petitioner's Motion to Reply to the Government's Response to Petitioner's Motion to Vacate[,] [and] Set Aside His Conviction and Sentence 28 U.S.C. 2254 and Motion to Amends [sic] and Exhibits (ECF No 38, “Reply”).[1]For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES the petition.
Ordinarily, a person convicted in and sentenced by the Superior Court would seek postconviction relief by motion under D.C. Code § 23-110, which in part provides:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of the Superior Court claiming the right to be released upon the ground that (1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the laws of the District of Columbia, (2) the court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence, (3) the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence.
D.C. Code § 23-110(a). “Section 23-110 . . . gives the [S]uperior [C]ourt exclusive jurisdiction of virtually all collateral challenges,” Head v. Wilson, 792 F.3d 102, 104 (D.C. Cir. 2015), and only under limited circumstances may a D.C. Code offender obtain habeas relief in federal court:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section shall not be entertained by the Superior Court or by any Federal or State court if it appears that the applicant has failed to make a motion for relief under this section or that the Superior Court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
D.C. Code § 23-110(g); see Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722, 727 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 993 (1986).
Matters such as trial court errors and ineffective assistance of trial counsel are proper fodder for a § 23-110 motion. See, e.g., McNair v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, No. 17-CV-0404, 2019 WL 1082160, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2019) ( claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and trial court error, which petitioner could have brought under § 23-110); Rahim v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 77 F.Supp.3d 140, 146 (D.D.C. 2015) (). And “if an appellant does not raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the pendency of the direct appeal, when at that time appellant demonstrably knew or should have known of the grounds for alleging counsel's ineffectiveness, that procedural default will be a barrier to [the Court of Appeals'] consideration of appellant's claim.” Shepard v. United States, 533 A.2d 1278, 1280 (D.C. 1987).
An ineffective assistance of appellate counsel (“IAAC”) claim is beyond the scope of § 23-110. Streater v. United States, 429 A.2d 173, 174 (D.C. 1980) (). Rather, an IAAC claim is presented directly to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals by motion to recall the mandate. Watson v. United States, 536 A.2d 1056, 1060 (D.C. 1987) (en banc). And “D.C. prisoners who challenge the effectiveness of appellate counsel through a motion to recall the mandate in the D.C. Court of Appeals will get a second bite at the apple in federal court.” Williams v. Martinez, 586 F.3d 995, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
A State prisoner may seek habeas relief in federal court if “he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Section 2254 provides:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). For purposes of Section 2254, District of Columbia courts are State courts. See Head, 792 F.3d at 106 n.3.
The statute contemplates that a petitioner would have raised his claims in State court before resorting to a federal court for relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). Section 2254 further provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim- (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). It is no easy task to satisfy Section 2254(d). See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011) (). The federal district court's review is highly deferential, see Waters v. Lockett, 896 F.3d 559, 566 (D.C. Cir. 2018), and “state-court decisions [are] given the benefit of the doubt,” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Even if the State court sets forth no explanation for its ruling, a petitioner still must “show[] there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 98.
To prevail on an IAAC claim, a petitioner must show that appellate counsel's performance not only was deficient but also prejudiced his case on appeal. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000) (). The former element requires a petitioner to “show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. To this end, a petitioner must show “that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687. The latter element requires a petitioner to “show . . . there is a reasonable probability that, but for [appellate] counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” of the proceedings. Id. The Court need not address both elements of the Strickland inquiry if a petitioner makes an insufficient showing on either element. See id. at 697.
The Court presumes that the parties are familiar with Petitioner's criminal offenses, which the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has described in detail. See generally Resp. Opp'n, Ex. 3 (Mandate, Little v. United States, No. 06-CF-000140 (D.C. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2010)) at 4-8.[2] For purposes of this Memorandum Opinion, it suffices to say that, on February 4, 2004, Petitioner and three accomplices entered the residence of Michael Richardson without invitation, robbed and assaulted Richardson and his guest Slavko Totev, and in the course of the encounter, an accomplice shot Richardson in the face and Petitioner cut Totev's throat. See Mandate at 4-6. Petitioner, who claimed to have been Richardson's guest and a third victim of the incident, was arrested on February 26, 2004. Id. at 8. His accomplices were not arrested or prosecuted. See Supp. Pet. at 9.
A jury found Petitioner guilty of the following offenses:
See Resp. Opp'n, Ex. 2 (Judgment in a Criminal Case (Amended), United States v. Little, No. F-1292-04 (D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 24, 2006)) at 1. The Superior Court imposed an aggregate prison term of 83 years and two months. See id., Ex. 2 at 1.
Petitioner then represented by appointed counsel, filed a direct appeal raising three claims: (1) the statutes underpinning the firearms offenses (CPWL, UF and UA) violated Petitioner's Second Amendment rights; (2) the trial court gave the jury an aiding and abetting instruction contrary to the Court of Appeals ruling in Wilson-Bey v....
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