Little v. Warren

• Decision Date: 16 October 2015
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 2:14-CV-10166
• Parties: HENRETTA LITTLE, #827259, Petitioner, v. MILLICENT WARREN, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

HENRETTA LITTLE, #827259, Petitioner, v. MILLICENT WARREN, Respondent.

CASE NO. 2:14-CV-10166

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

October 16, 2015

HONORABLE GERALD E. ROSEN

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL

I. Introduction

This is a habeas case brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Michigan prisoner Henretta Little ("Petitioner") was convicted of torture, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.85, kidnapping, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.349, and assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.84, following a jury trial in the Saginaw County Circuit Court. She was sentenced to concurrent terms of 18 years 9 months to 41 years 8 months on the torture and kidnapping convictions and a concurrent term of 2 to 10 years imprisonment on the assault conviction in 2012. In her pleadings, she raises claims concerning a limitation on the cross-examination of her testifying co-defendant, the jury instructions, and the scoring of the state sentencing guidelines. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that those claims lack merit and denies the habeas petition. The Court also denies a certificate of appealability and denies leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.

II. Facts and Procedural History

Petitioner's convictions arise from her and her co-defendant's abuse of a developmentally disabled young man at their shared residence in Saginaw County, Michigan in 2009 and 2010. The Michigan Court of Appeals described the relevant facts, which are presumed correct on federal habeas review, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2009), as follows:

The victim lived with Little and Little's cousin and co-defendant, Laprinces Jones, from late 2009 until January 2010. He testified that, during this time, he was not allowed to leave the house and that Little injured his legs and feet by striking him with a hammer on multiple occasions. She also forced him to sleep in a chest-like bench that was locked shut at the end of her bed and she locked him in a closet.

Little also deprived the victim of food and water and hit him with her hands, a brush, and an extension cord. Little scratched his face and burned him too. The victim said that Jones would hold him down while Little abused him, but that Jones burned him once and hit him with the hammer once. The victim was able to escape the house and walk to a nearby hospital in January 2010.

Dr. Anjanette Kemp treated the victim and noted that he had scratches on his face with some bruising, as well as marks on his chest that were consistent with burns. Kemp also saw multiple linear scars on the victim's chest, back, and upper arms, which the victim said were from being whipped. Kemp indicated that the linear injuries were in various stages of healing, but did not opine as to their cause. Kemp also noted that he had injuries to his feet that were consistent with damage from a hammer and were partially healed. According to Kemp, the victim also appeared dehydrated and very thin. She testified that he had internal bleeding in the brain, which was consistent with head trauma.

Jones testified at trial and verified much of the victim's version of events. Jones stated that she was originally charged with torture, kidnapping, and assault with intent to do great bodily harm, but took a plea deal. As part of the deal, she agreed to testify against Little and the prosecutor agreed to dismiss the torture and kidnapping charges. She pleaded guilty to assault with intent to do great bodily harm and unlawful imprisonment and was sentenced to serve a minimum of seven years in prison.

Little's trial lawyer attempted to question Jones about the possible sentences associated with torture and kidnapping, but the prosecutor objected. The trial courtsustained the objection and noted that the judge, not the jury, was responsible for sentencing and, because Little was charged with the same crimes, the jury should not be exposed to the potential sentences.

Little's lawyer also requested an instruction on Jones' plea deal, which included the potential penalties. The trial court denied the potential penalty portion of the request and clarified again that it was the judge's job to sentence, not the jury's. The trial court said that the jury should not have sympathy or prejudice in making their decision because of the possible penalties. The trial court then instructed the jury with the standard witness instruction and an accomplice instruction. The jury found Little guilty of torture, kidnapping, and assault with intent to do great bodily harm.

People v. Little, No. 308962, 2013 WL 1137183, *1 (Mich. Ct. App. March 19, 2013) (unpublished)

Following her convictions and sentencing, Petitioner filed an appeal of right with the Michigan Court of Appeals raising the same claims contained in her current petition. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed her convictions and sentences. Id. Petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, which was denied. People v. Little, 495 Mich. 853, 835 N.W.2d 580 (2013).

Petitioner thereafter filed her federal habeas petition raising the following claims:

I. The trial court denied [Petitioner] her state and federal constitutional rights to confrontation and due process where it refused to allow defense counsel to question co-defendant Laprinces Latoya Jones regarding the full extent of the leniency given to her in return for her testimony against [Petitioner].

II. The trial court reversibly erred in violation of [Petitioner's] due process right to a properly instructed jury by refusing to instruct the jury regarding the full extent of the leniency given to Laprinces Latoya Jones in return for her testimony against [Petitioner].

III. The trial court erroneously assessed [Petitioner] 50 points under OV 7 where this assessment did not reflect aggravating factors for torture as compared to others in its class and 15 points under OV 8 where the sentencing offense includes the kidnapping charge, making her 225 minimum sentence a departure above her 108-180 month minimum sentence guideline range.

Respondent has filed an answer to the petition contending that it should be denied for lack of merit.

III. Standard of Review

Federal law imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

"A state court's decision is 'contrary to' . . . clearly established law if it 'applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]' or if it 'confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent.'" Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002).

"[T]he 'unreasonable application' prong of § 2254(d)(1) permits a federal habeas court to 'grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of petitioner's case." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413); see also Bell, 535 U.S. at 694. However, "[i]n order for a federal court find a state court's application of [Supreme Court] precedent 'unreasonable,' the state court's decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous. The state court's application must have been 'objectively unreasonable.'" Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21(citations omitted); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. "AEDPA thus imposes a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,' and 'demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333, n. 7; Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)).

The United States Supreme Court has held that "a state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court emphasized "that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). Pursuant to § 2254(d), "a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision" of the Supreme Court. Id. Thus, in order to obtain federal habeas relief, a state prisoner must show that the state court's rejection of his claim "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id.; see also White v. Woodall, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014). "When reviewing state criminal convictions on collateral review, federal judges are required to afford ...