Littlefield v. Fithian
| Decision Date | 05 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 3:21-cv-05453-RSM-BAT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
| Parties | JOSEPH TYLER LITTLEFIELD, Plaintiff, v. THOMAS FITHIAN, et al., Defendant. |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 prisoner civil rights action. Plaintiff, Joseph Tyler Littlefield, is currently confined at Clallam Bay Corrections Center (CBCC). Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. Plaintiff alleges violation of his constitutional rights related to the alleged failure by Defendant DOC employees to provide him with a soft food substitute for hard carrots at lunchtime meals on the weekends for about a month. Dkt. 4-2. He alleges Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, and his right to be free from retaliation under the First Amendment. Id. Now, having reviewed the proposed complaint, the Court recommends this matter be DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C §§ 1915A(a) and 1915(e)(2).
The Court screens complaints filed by prisoners or detainees under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court shall “dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is: (1) frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” § 1915A(b); accord § 1915(e)(2); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193 1194 (9th Cir. 1998).
To avoid dismissal, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S 662, 664 (2009). The factual allegations must be “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The complaint may be dismissed if it lacks a cognizable legal theory or states insufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Zixiang v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir. 2013).
To sustain a § 1983 civil rights claim, plaintiff must show (1) he suffered a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, and (2) the violation was proximately caused by a person acting under color of state or federal law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). To satisfy the second prong, plaintiff must allege facts showing how individually named defendants caused or personally participated in causing the harm alleged in the complaint. Arnold v. IBM, 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981).
Plaintiff alleges his constitutional rights were violated when he was not provided a soft food substitute for uncooked carrots in his weekend lunches despite having been prescribed a “special medical soft diet” due to a dental issue. Dkt. 4-1, at 7-17. He indicates the lack of substitution first occurred on January 17, 2021, and continued to occur on weekends for the “remainder of the time Plaintiff was approved and ordered a medical soft diet.” Id., at 11. Plaintiff attaches a Health Status Report (HSR) which reflects he was prescribed a soft food diet by Health Services Provider Jacki L. Peterson from January 12, 2021, to February 12, 2021. Dkt. 4-1, at 1. Plaintiff alleges the failure to provide him with a soft food substitute for the uncooked carrots during weekend lunches during this period violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 7-17.
Plaintiff names the following Department of Corrections (DOC) employees as Defendants: Thomas Fithian, Deputy Director of Prisons; Tim Thrasher, DOC Administrator; Lori Lawson, Associate Superintendent; Christopher Gross, Custody Unit Supervisor (CUS); Eric Heuther, Correctional Sergeant; J. Echeita, Grievance Coordinator; David Granum, Correctional Officer (CO); Hallenbeck, Assistant Cook, and McCathy, Food Service Manager. Id., at 3-5.
Plaintiff alleges Mr. McCathy, authorized the serving of the uncooked carrots to WA DOC offenders on weekends instead of supplementing the foods with an approved soft diet substitute as was done on weekdays. Id., at 8. Plaintiff alleges that when he raised the issue with CO Granum who served him the meal with the uncooked carrots on January 17, 2021, CO Granum informed Plaintiff that no special diet trays were sent. Id. Plaintiff alleges that when he informed CO Granum that he should call the kitchen to arrange for a substitution, CO Granum “became hostile and aggressive with his words and posturing and hand gestures” and informed Plaintiff there was no dietary substitute for the meal. Id., at 8-9. Plaintiff indicates that when he informed CO Granum this was an “error” CO Granum “scream[ed]” at Plaintiff “I'm not going to fucking argue with you!” and slammed the cuff port of Plaintiff's cell with an “excessive” amount of force. Id. Plaintiff alleges CO Granum's actions also constituted retaliation. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that he grieved the fact that he was given a “regular mainline meal” when he had been placed on a special diet and CO Granum's “aggressive” response to his complaint. Id., at 12-16. Plaintiff's complaint was investigated by Sgt. Huether and Plaintiff received an initial response from grievance coordinator J. Echeita stating that Id.; Dkt. 4-2, at 3. Plaintiff appealed the response and it was investigated by CUS Gross and upheld on appeal by Associate Superintendent Lawson on behalf of Superintendent Boe. Id. Plaintiff appealed again and the response was upheld again by DOC Administrator Thrasher, and Deputy Director Fithian. Id. Plaintiff argues Defendants failed to properly investigate his grievance and argues Defendants were deliberately indifferent in denying and upholding the denial of his grievances. Id.
Inmates alleging Eighth Amendment violations based on prison conditions must demonstrate that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to their health or safety by subjecting them to a substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994); Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1995). Prison officials display a deliberate indifference to an inmate's well-being when they consciously disregard an excessive risk of harm to the inmate's health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838-40, 114 S.Ct. 1970; Wallis, 70 F.3d at 1077.
The Eighth Amendment standard requires proof of both the objective and subjective component. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992). First, the deprivation alleged must objectively be sufficiently serious, resulting in a denial of the “minimal civilized measures of life's necessities.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981)). To prove the objective component, an inmate must establish that there was both some degree of actual or potential injury, and that society considers the risk that the plaintiff complains of to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976).
The subjective component requires proof that the prison official possesses a “sufficiently culpable state of mind” which is a state of mind constituting “deliberate indifference to inmate health and safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834-36, 114 S.Ct. 1970. With regard to deliberate indifference, a prison official is not liable “unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id., at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970. Thus, the subjective component requires proof of three elements, that the official was (1) aware of the facts that would lead a reasonable person to infer the substantial risk of serious harm; (2) actually made the inference that the substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff existed; and (3) knowingly disregarded the risk. Id. As the Court in Farmer stated:
[p]rison officials charged with deliberate indifference might show, for example, that they did not know of the underlying facts indicating a sufficiently substantial danger and that they were therefore unaware of a danger, or that they knew the underlying facts but believed (albeit unsoundly) that the risk to which the facts gave rise was insubstantial or nonexistent. In addition, prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844, 114 S.Ct. 1970. If either the objective or subjective component is not established, the court need not address the other component. Helling, 509 U.S. at 35, 113 S.Ct. 2475.
“[T]he State must provide an inmate with a ‘healthy habilitative environment[, ]' [that] includes providing nutritionally adequate food that is prepared and served under conditions which do not present an immediate danger to the health and well being of the inmates who consume it.” Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 570-71 (10th Cir.1980). “The Eighth Amendment requires only that prisoners receive food that is adequate to maintain health; it need not...
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