Littlewind v. Rayl, 93-3759

• Decision Date: 04 October 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-3759,93-3759
• Parties: Eugene LITTLEWIND, Appellee, v. Richard RAYL, Director of Security, North Dakota State Penitentiary; Terry Haines, Warden of North Dakota State Penitentiary; Bob Coad, Director of Security, North Dakota State Penitentiary; Cordell Stromme, North Dakota State Penitentiary staff person; Daryle Fisher, North Dakota State Penitentiary staff person; Bill Wilz; Linda Leuwer, North Dakota State Penitentiary staff person; Stan Cadotte, North Dakota State Penitentiary staff person, Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 985

33 F.3d 985

Eugene LITTLEWIND, Appellee, v. Richard RAYL, Director of Security, North Dakota State

Penitentiary; Terry Haines, Warden of North Dakota State

Penitentiary; Bob Coad, Director of Security, North Dakota

State Penitentiary; Cordell Stromme, North Dakota State

Penitentiary staff person; Daryle Fisher, North Dakota

State Penitentiary staff person; Bill Wilz; Linda Leuwer,

North Dakota State Penitentiary staff person; Stan Cadotte,

North Dakota State Penitentiary staff person, Appellants.

No. 93-3759.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted June 16, 1994.

Decided Aug. 29, 1994.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 4, 1994.

William G. Peterson, Bismarck, ND, argued (JoAnn C. Toth, on the brief), for appellants.

Donald R. Becker, Fargo, ND, argued for appellee.

Before FAGG, Circuit Judge, ROSS, Senior Circuit Judge, and BEAM, Circuit Judge.

ROSS, Senior Circuit Judge.

On April 5, 1988, Eugene Littlewind and three other inmates at the North Dakota State Penitentiary assaulted a prison guard. Littlewind was thereafter restrained naked for approximately seven hours in four-point restraint, twenty-three hours in three-point restraint, and seven days in handcuffs and leg irons. During this time, Littlewind was denied clothing or a toothbrush for six days and was denied even a blanket for two days.

Littlewind filed a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action claiming, among other things, that the corrections officers caused him to suffer cruel and unusual punishment by restraining him and subjecting him to certain conditions in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. On April 20, 1992, an order was entered by the district court denying in part and granting in part the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. The order adopted the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge which concluded, among other things, that the defendants were not entitled to a qualified immunity defense on the Eighth Amendment claim. The defendants did not appeal this decision. Following trial, a jury found in favor of all the defendants. The district court, however, subsequently granted Littlewind's motion for judgment as a matter of law against all of the defendants and ordered a new trial on the issue of damages and a conditional new trial if the judgment as a matter of law is reversed on appeal. 839 F.Supp. 1369. An appeal was then taken to this court.

Under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291, courts of appeal have jurisdiction to hear appeals only from "final decisions" of the district courts. A final decision generally is "one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 633, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945); United States v. Pan American Mgt. Co., 789 F.2d 632, 636 (8th Cir.1986). There is a well recognized exception to the final decision requirement, however, when an interlocutory appeal is made by a public official on the basis of qualified immunity. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526-27, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815-16, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985); Jones v. Coonce, 7 F.3d 1359, 1365 (8th Cir.1993). Despite the absence of a final order, appellate jurisdiction is conferred in cases involving qualified immunity to protect government officials not only from liability for their actions but from the cost and inconvenience of having to defend an action through trial.

Here, following a full trial to a jury, the district court granted Littlewind's motion for judgment as a matter of law, but at the same time ordered a new trial on the issue of damages. It is well established and the parties herein agree that generally an order granting judgment as a matter of law on liability and ordering a new trial on the issue of damages is not a final, appealable order. See Herold v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 761 F.2d 1241,...