Lively v. Ballard

• Decision Date: 21 September 2017
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:15-cv-07458
• Parties: CHARLES JASON LIVELY, Petitioner, v. DAVID BALLARD, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia

CHARLES JASON LIVELY, Petitioner, v. DAVID BALLARD, Respondent.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:15-cv-07458

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA CHARLESTON DIVISION

September 21, 2017

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 36), and Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment,¹ (ECF No. 40), on Petitioner's Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("the § 2254 Petition").² This matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Omar J. Aboulhosn for submission of proposed findings and a recommendation for disposition ("PF&R"). (See ECF No. 31.) On July 12, 2017, Magistrate Judge Aboulhosn submitted a PF&R recommending that the Court grant Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and deny Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 44.) Petitioner filed timely objections to the PF&R on July 31, 2017. (ECF No. 48.) For the reasons that follow, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner's objections, and DISMISSES the § 2254 Petition.

I. BACKGROUND

On November 21, 2006, Petitioner was convicted upon a jury verdict of first degree murder with recommendation for mercy³ and first degree arson. (See ECF No. 23-12 at 7.) Petitioner had previously pled guilty to petit larceny in exchange for the dismissal of burglary and grand larceny counts. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to life in prison with mercy and a consecutive one-year term of imprisonment for the petit larceny conviction. (See ECF No. 23-13 at 18.)

The complete factual and procedural history of Petitioner's direct appeal and habeas proceeding in state court, as well as a review of Petitioner's claims in his federal habeas petition, are set forth in detail in the PF&R and need not be repeated here.⁴ The Court will provide a discussion of any relevant facts from Petitioner's original criminal case as necessary throughout this opinion to resolve Petitioner's objections. The § 2254 Petition claims the following grounds for relief:

1. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals erred in holding that trial counsel was effective despite a comprehensive failure to safeguard the petitioner's rights or to subject the State's case to adversarial testing.

2. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals erred in holding that appellate counsel was effective despite explicitly noted failures which foreclosed multiple grounds for relief entirely.

3. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals erred in holding that the intimidation of a witness by an officer of the trial court does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation and did not deprive the petitioner of due process.

4. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals erred in holding that the prosecuting attorney's suborning of the intimidation of a witness by an officer of the trial court does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation and did not deprive the petitioner of due process.

5. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals erred in holding that the prosecuting attorney's refusal to disclose the identity of an informant was not a breach of his affirmative duties under Brady v. Maryland.

6. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals erred in holding that the failure of the trial judge to recuse himself from the proceedings, despite his longstanding personal and political relationships with the alleged victim, did not deprive the petitioner of due process.

7. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals erred in holding that the admission into evidence of testimony regarding the statement of an unidentified, unavailable informant was not a violation of the Confrontation Clause.

(ECF No. 20 at 6.) The PF&R thoroughly analyzes each of Petitioner's claims as argued in the motions for summary judgment, and it recommends that this Court grant Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 36), deny Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 40), and dismiss this matter from the Court's docket.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Review of Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3), the Court must determine de novo any part of a magistrate judge's disposition to which a proper objection has been made. The Court is not required to review, under a de novo or any other standard, the factual or legal conclusions of the magistrate judge as to those portions of the findings or recommendation to which no objections are addressed. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). Failure to file timely objections constitutes a waiver of de novo review and the petitioner's right to appeal this Court's order. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363, 1366 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 (4th Cir. 1984). In addition, this Court need not conduct a de novo review when a party "makes general and conclusory objections that do not direct the Court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations." Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982).

B. Habeas Corpus Standard of Review

A federal court may grant habeas relief for a state prisoner "only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). "Therefore, when a petitioner's claim rests solely upon an interpretation of state case law and statutes, it is not cognizable on federal habeas review." Weeks v. Angelone, 176 F.3d 249, 262 (4th Cir. 1999), aff'd, 528 U.S. 225 (2000).

Section 2254(d), as modified by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), provides for a deferential standard of review to be applied to any claim that was "adjudicated on the merits" in state court proceedings. In such a case, a federal court may grant habeas relief only if the adjudication of the claim in state court

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Section 2254(d)(1) describes the standard of review to be applied to claims challenging how the state courts applied federal law. "A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the 'contrary to' clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases, or if it decides a case differently than we have done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). "The court may grant relief under the 'unreasonable application' clause if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from our decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case." Id. The latter inquiry focuses on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was "unreasonable," as distinguished from whether it was "correct." See Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010); Bell, 535 U.S. at 694; Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000).

Section 2254(d)(2) describes the standard to be applied to claims challenging how the state courts determined the facts. "[A] determination of a factual issue made by a State court [is] presumed to be correct," and the petitioner has "the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). "The phrase 'adjudication on the merits' in section 2254(d) excludes only claims that were not raised in state court, and not claims that were decided in state court, albeit in a summary fashion." Thomas v. Taylor, 170 F.3d 466, 475 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011) (recognizing that § 2254(d) applies even if the state court issued a summary decision unaccompanied by an explanation). The state court determination will be upheld so long as "fairminded jurists could disagree" on its correctness. Yarbrough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004).

C. Summary Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs motions for summary judgment. That rule provides, in relevant part, that summary judgment should be granted if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Summary judgment is inappropriate, however, if there exist factual issues that reasonably may be resolved in favor of either party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). "Facts are 'material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a 'genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." News & Observer Publ. Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010). When construing such factual issues, the Court must view the evidence "in the light most favorable to the [party opposing summary judgment]." Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). "When faced with cross-motions for summary judgment, the court must review each motion separately on its own merits to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law." Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). The court will consider each motion individually, "tak[ing] care to resolve all factual disputes and any competing rational inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing that motion." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). The nonmoving party may not rest on the pleadings alone and must show that specific material facts exist by offering more than a mere "scintilla of evidence" in support of his position. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

III. DISCUSSION

Beyond the general objection to the PF&R's "recommendation that a grant of summary judgment be awarded to the Respondent," (ECF No. 48 at 2-3), Petitione...