Liverpool, Brazil River Plate Steam Nav Co v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal

• Citation: 64 L.Ed. 130,251 U.S. 48,40 S.Ct. 66
• Decision Date: 08 December 1919
• Docket Number: No. 81,81
• Parties: LIVERPOOL, BRAZIL & RIVER PLATE STEAM NAV. CO. v. BROOKLYN EASTERN DISTRICT TERMINAL
• Court: United States Supreme Court

251 U.S. 48

40 S.Ct. 66

64 L.Ed. 130

LIVERPOOL, BRAZIL & RIVER PLATE STEAM NAV. CO.

v BROOKLYN EASTERN DISTRICT TERMINAL.

No. 81.

Argued Nov. 14, 1919.

Decided Dec. 8, 1919.

Messrs. Van Vechten Veeder and Roscoe H. Hupper, both of New York City, for petitioner.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 49-51 intentionally omitted] Messrs. Samuel Park and Henry E. Mattison, both of New York City, for respondent.

Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a libel in admiralty brought by the petitioner against the respondent for a collision with the petitioner's steamship Vauban while it was moored at a pier in Brooklyn. The respondent does not deny liability but claims the right to limit it under Rev. Stats. §§ 4283, 4284 and 4285 (Comp. St. §§ 8023-8025), to the value of the vessel that caused the damage. The moving cause was the respondent's steam tug Intrepid which was proceeding up the East, River, with a car flat loaded with railroad cars lashed to its port side and on its starboard side a disabled tug, both belonging to the respondent. By a stipulation dated August 3, 1917, it was agreed that the damage sustained was $28,036.98 with $5,539.84 interest. The value of the tug Intrepid was found to be $5,750, and the liability of the respondent was limited by the District Court to that sum with interest. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decree without an opinion. 250 Fed. 1021, 162 C. C. A. 664. The case is brought here on the question whether the value of the whole flotilla should not have been in cluded in the decree.

The car float was the vessel that came into contact with the Vauban, but as it was a passive instrument in the hands of the Intrepid that fact does not affect the question of responsibility. The James Gray v. The John Fraser, 21 How. 184, 16 L. Ed. 106; The J. P. Donaldson, 167 U. S. 599, 603, 604, 17 Sup. Ct. 951, 42 L. Ed. 292; The Eugene F. Moran, 212 U. S. 466, 474, 475, 29 Sup. Ct. 339, 53 L. Ed. 600; Union Steamship Co. v. Owners of the Aracan, L. R. 6 P. C. 127. The rule is not changed by the ownership of the vessels. The John G. Stevens, 170 U. S. 113, 123, 18 Sup. Ct. 544, 42 L. Ed. 969; The W. G. Mason, 142 Fed. 913, 917, 74 C. C. A. 83; The Eugene F. Moran, 212 U. S. 466, 475, 29 Sup. Ct. 339, 53 L. Ed. 600; L. R. 6 P. C. 127, 133. There cases show that for the purposes of liability the passive instrument of the harm does not become one with the actively responsible vessel by being attached to it. If this were a proceeding in rem it may be assumed that the car float and disabled tug would escape, and none the less that they were lashed to the Intrepid and so were more helplessly under its control than in the ordinary case of a tow.

It is said, however, that when you come to limiting liability the foregoing authorities are not controlling—that the object of the statute is 'to limit the liability of vessel owners to their interest in the adventure,' The Main v. Williams, 152 U. S. 122, 131, 14 Sup. Ct. 486, 488 (38 L. Ed. 381), and that the same reason that requires the surrender of boats and apparel requires the surrender of the other instrumentalities by means of which the tug was rendering the services for which it was paid. It can make no difference, it is argued, whether the cargo is carried in the hold of the tug or is towed in another vessel. But that is the question, and it is not answered by putting it. The respondent answers the argument with the suggestion that if sound it applies a different rule in actions in personam from that which as we have said, governs suits in rem. Without dwelling upon that, we are of opinion that the statute does not warrant the distinction for which the appellant contends.

The statute follows the lead of European countries, as stated in The Main v. Williams, 152 U. S. 122, 126, 127, 14 Sup. Ct. 486, 38 L. Ed. 381. Whatever may be the doubts as to the original grounds for limiting liability to the ship or with regard to the historic starting point for holding the ship responsible as a moving cause, The Blackheath, 195 U. S. 361, 366, 367, 25 Sup. Ct. 46, 49 L. Ed. 236, it seems a...