Livick v. Gillette Co.
| Decision Date | 12 June 2007 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 05-11094-JLT. |
| Citation | 492 F.Supp.2d 1 |
| Parties | John W. LIVICK, Plaintiff, v. The GILLETTE COMPANY and The Gillette Company Retirement Plan, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Ian O. Smith, Thomas G. Moukawsher, Moukawsher & Walsh, LLC, Hartford, CT, Mala M. Rafik, Rosenfeld & Rafik, P.C., Boston, MA, for Plaintiff.
Richard P. Ward, Anthony D. Rizzotti, David C. Potter, Ropes & Gray LLP, Boston, MA, for Defendants.
In this case Plaintiff, John W. Livick, seeks to use the provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") to recover the benefits incorrectly promised to him when Defendant Gillette Company's ("Gillette") Human Resources Department gave him repeated mistaken pension estimates.
The following facts are drawn from the Parties' statements of facts. Except where noted, the facts presented here are undisputed. Plaintiff is a former employee of Parker Pen Company, which was acquired by Gillette's Stationary Products Group ("SPG") in 1996. Plaintiff accumulated seventeen years and three months of service with Parker Pen at its Janesville, Wisconsin location before the facility was acquired by Gillette in 1996. Upon becoming a Gillette employee, Plaintiff received a letter informing him that his prior Parker Pen Company service would not count when computing his separate and distinct Gillette pension benefit.
In January 1999, Gillette SPG announced it was closing the Janesville facility. In July 1999, Plaintiff accepted a position with Gillette SPG in Boston, which he began in September 1999. In August 2000, Gillette announced that it had agreed to sell SPG to Newell Rubbermaid, Inc.
On October 16, 2000, Gillette held a SPG benefits meeting for terminated SPG employees to explain applicable benefits. Plaintiff attended that meeting, where a company official told him that his eligibility would be determined by calculating his years of service including his time at Parker Pen. The company official also told Plaintiff to seek further information about his benefits from Wayne Brundige ("Brundige"), a Gillette benefits counselor in the Human Resources Department.
On October 25, 2000, Plaintiff met with Brundige to obtain specific termination settlement and pension benefits information. At that meeting, Plaintiff asked Brundige about the pension benefits, and Brundige gave Plaintiff a pension retirement calculation based on twenty-eight years of service (which included Plaintiff's time at Parker Pen), totaling $2,832.04 a month. Plaintiff told Brundige that the numbers looked too good to be true, and asked Brundige if the figure factored in that he spent many years as a Parker Pen employee. Brundige noted that while the number was an estimate, it was essentially correct.
On December 5, 2000, Plaintiff used the Gillete Pension Estimator website, which contained a disclaimer that it was just an estimate, but which represented a similar number. Plaintiff told Brundige about the estimate and Brundige made a minor change to his own estimate. Plaintiff left his job with Gillette on January 12, 2001.
Plaintiff suggests that he left voluntarily. While it may be true that he could have looked for another job with Gillette if not for his belief that he would get a good pension benefit, the facts plainly show that he was involuntarily terminated from his existing position. Plaintiff asserts that in reliance on the figures he had been presented, he did not seek further employment from Gillette and subsequently turned down a lucrative job offer believing that his monthly pension would support him. Defendants dispute whether Plaintiff actually relied on this information, or if other factors drove Plaintiffs subsequent employment decisions. As will be shown below, this question of reliance is not material to the court's ruling.
In the Spring of 2002, Plaintiff checked the Pension Estimator website again, which calculated a monthly benefit that was $300 greater than Brundige's estimate. When Plaintiff spoke to the Human Resources Center to determine which figure was correct, he was told that the website calculator was more accurate. The Center also told him that they would send him a new estimate.
On June 28, 2002, Plaintiff received a new pension estimate that was calculated using only the years of service at Gillette (eight years) rather than the combined time at Gillette and Parker Pen. The new monthly estimate was $2,042.57 less than the estimate from Brundige. When Plaintiff inquired, he was told that Brundige's original estimate was incorrect and that the new amount was accurate. Plaintiff requested the original benefit figure and brought this suit. On May 31, 2006, after the commencement of litigation, Ned Guillet, plan administrator, and Vice President of Human Resources, wrote Plaintiff to formally deny his request under the plan for the older benefits estimate.
Plaintiff charges that Brundige was the manager of the food services department before he was promoted to Human Resources. Plaintiff further asserts that Defendant Gillette negligently provided Brundige with no real job specific training. Defendants dispute these charges, adducing evidence that Brundige learned on the job. Again, as subsequent analysis will show, this dispute is not material.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' negligence amounted to a breach of their fiduciary duty to Plaintiff. Plaintiff asks this court to remedy this alleged breach under ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) by using its equitable power to issue an injunction ordering Defendants to pay Plaintiff the benefits that Human Resources Department initially represented. Although not explicitly raised in his complaint, Plaintiff also suggests that, in the alternative, the court should equitably estop the Defendants from paying benefits in a manner inconsistent with their previous representations.
Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit from Peter Miller, who was the Human Resources Manager for Gillette in Janesville, Wisconsin from 1993 to 1999. In ¶ 5 of his affidavit, Miller states that "Gillette corporate" effectively exercised control over the administration of the pension system. He states that "Gillette corporate" made it clear to him that they would make decisions that he would communicate to employees. Plaintiff argues that these facts show that Gillette was in fact acting as plan fiduciary.
Defendants move to strike, claiming that Miller's affidavit did not show an adequate basis in personal knowledge and that he was merely speculating as to how the central Human Resources department operated. Plaintiff amended the declaration to provide greater detail laying out Miller's basis of knowledge. This amendment reveals the basis for Miller's statements, but does not make those statements relevant to this litigation. Miller did not work in the Boston office with Brundige, and Miller was not employed at the time Plaintiff was terminated. The affidavit is not probative of the practices and procedures used in determining Plaintiff's benefits. Defendants' Motion to Strike is ALLOWED.
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.1 The question is not whether there is some factual dispute, but rather whether there is a genuine question of material fact.2 As noted above and explained below, there is no dispute as to any material fact. Because this case can be resolved as matter of law by clarifying and applying the requirements of ERISA without reference to any disputed fact, summary judgment is appropriate.
ERISA expressly provides plan participants and beneficiaries with standing to sue for benefits due under the terms of an employee benefit plan.3 But, if a plaintiff can pursue benefits under the plan pursuant to § 502(a)(1), an adequate remedy under the plan exists which bars a further remedy under § 502(a)(3) for breach of fiduciary duty.4 A plaintiff need not elect his remedy before filing a complaint, but rather is prohibited from receiving equitable relief under § 502(a)(3) in addition to some other form of relief.5 Therefore, if "Congress elsewhere provided adequate relief far a beneficiary's injury, there will likely be no need for further equitable relief, in which case such relief normally would not be appropriate."6
Defendants argue that since Plaintiff is a "participant" for purposes of § 502(a)(1), he "is barred from seeking `appropriate, equitable relief under ERISA § 502(a)(3)."7 But Defendants' argument fails in this case. Plaintiff is not tying to recover "benefits due to him under the terms of his plan."8 All parties agree that the terms of the Gillette plan never mandated the compounding of Plaintiff's service with Gillette and his service with Parker Pen. Accordingly, Plaintiff could never recover the benefits he seeks under the plan pursuant to 502(a)(1). He has no adequate remedy by this route. Rather, Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants breached their fiduciary duty by communicating incorrect information about Plaintiff's benefits under the plan. While Plaintiff's claim does not ultimately succeed, it does not fail for lack of standing.9
Plaintiff charges that Defendants negligently hired Brundige and also that Brundige's negligence in computing Plaintiff's benefits estimates can be imputed to Defendants. Plaintiff argues these negligent acts constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. Defendants counter that negligence cannot be a basis for finding a breach of fiduciary duty, but precedent indicates otherwise.10
Defendants next argue that Brundige worked only...
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Livick v. The Gillette Co.
...and Parker Pen. The defendants moved for summary judgment, which the District Court granted on June 12, 2007. Livick v. Gillette Co., 492 F.Supp.2d 1, 15 (D.Mass.2007). This appeal A. Motion To Strike Affidavit We turn first to Livick's appeal of an evidentiary matter. On defendants' motion......
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Smith v. Medical Benefit Administrators Group, Inc.
...unjust enrichment. Smith is not entitled to restitution because he is not entitled to benefits under the Plan. See Livick v. Gillette Co., 492 F.Supp.2d 1, 11 (D.Mass.2007) (restitution unavailable because errors were "errors in estimation and reporting, not representations that unjustly en......