Livingston Cnty. v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 31 May 1875
• Citation: 60 Mo. 516
• Parties: LIVINGSTON COUNTY, Plaintiff in Error, v. HANNIBAL & ST. JOSEPH RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant in Error.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

60 Mo. 516

LIVINGSTON COUNTY, Plaintiff in Error,

v.HANNIBAL & ST. JOSEPH RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant in Error.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

May Term, 1875.

Error to Livingston Circuit Court.

J. E. Wait, for Plaintiff in Error, contended that for back taxes in default, the only proper mode of determining the tax rate was to take an average of all the sub-districts, and cited Porter vs. Rock Island & St. Louis R. R., 63 or 64 Ill.

He also contended that the charter of September, 20th 1852 did not have in contemplation school taxes, which were not then in existence, and hence could not have provided against their levy; and that the legislature could undoubtedly establish a tax for the support of schools, which should be neither a State nor a county tax. (Sheehan vs. Good Sam. Hosp., 50 Mo., 155.)

He claimed that § 3 of the act of September, 1852 constituted no vested right in the respondent, such as would preclude the legislature from afterwards providing other modes of taxation, as was done by the act of March 10th, 1871. On this point he cited City of St. Joseph vs. Han. & St. Jo. R. R., 39 Mo. 477.

James Carr, for Defendant in Error.

I. The third section of the act is retrospective in its operation, and hence is in violation of the 28th section of the first article of the Constitution of this State. (Dash vs. VanKleek, 7 Johns., 477; Norris vs. Beyea, 13 N. Y., 273; Plum vs. Sawyer, 21 Conn., 351; Whitman vs. Hapgood, 13 Mass., 464; State ex rel. vs. Macon County Court, 41 Mo., 453.)

II. There are twelve congressional townships in the county of Caldwell. The Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad only runs through four of them--the northern tier of said townships. Each congressional township only composes one district for all purposes connected with the general interests of education in such township. And the “average rate of taxation” referred to in § 13 of the act of March 10th, 1871 is to be computed from those districts alone, not from them together with the eight other townships of Caldwell county. Hence the alleged assessment of school taxes made by the County Court of Caldwell county was, and is, null and void, under Art. I, § 30 of the State Constitution. (Cool. Const. Lim., 499, et seq.;Wells vs. City of Weston, 22 Mo., 385.)

III. There are three decisions of this court holding that the respondent is not taxable in any other way, or for any other tax than the one specified in the 3d section of the act of September 20th, 1852. (See 30 Mo., 550; 37 Mo., 265; 39 Mo., 476.) Large amounts of the stock of the respondent have been bought and are now held in the faith of these decisions. The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly held that when property has been bought and rights acquired on the faith of decisions of the highest court of a State, that property and those rights shall not be impaired by any subsequent decision. (Gelpcke vs. City of Dubuque, 1 Wal. 175; Dodge vs. Woolsey, 18 How., 331; Allcott vs. Supervisors, 16 Wal. 678.)

(Counsel also contended that the act of September 20th, 1852, was a contract between the road and the State, and that even if this were not so, that act was not repealed by the act of March 10th, 1871.--See brief of counsel in State vs. Han. & St. Jo. R. R. Co., 60 Mo. 143.)

NAPTON, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

This cause was decided on a demurrer to the petition, which was sustained. It would subserve no useful purpose to recite the petition or its numerous counts, which occupy twenty closely printed pages of the record.

The object of the petition is to recover the amount of the county tax and school tax, levied on the road under the act of March 11, 1871, the State auditor having assessed the road at $587,328 between the years 1861 and 1872.

The demurrer asserts that the charter of the road exempts the road from all county taxation; that the act of the General Assembly in 1852 is a contract, and exempts the defendant from taxation except as is specified in the 3rd section of said act, and that the school tax is in violation of the provision of the Constitution of Missouri, which requires all property to be taxed in proportion to its value.

This demurrer was sustained and the case is brought here by appeal.

The only important question presented is whether the Han. & St. Jo. R. R. is exempt from county taxes and from school taxes.

The case of Han. & St. Jo. vs. Shacklett, (30 Mo., 550); State vs. Han. & St. Jo. R. R. (37 Mo., 265); State to use of, etc. vs. Shacklett, (Id., 80) and City of St. Jo. vs. Han. & St. Jo. R. R. Co., (39 Mo., 476,) are referred to as conclusive of the questions presented by the demurrer.

We have no disposition to depart from the points decided in any of these cases. Whether decided properly or not, the corporation now sued had a right to assume that the construction therein given to their charter would be adhered to, and upon the faith of these decisions stock may have been purchased.

It was conceded in all these cases, that the legislature could levy a State tax on this road, after the act of September 20, 1852, which was accepted by the company. The form in which this tax might be ascertained and levied was not deemed material in the case of Bailey, Seligman, &c. vs. Pac. R. R. Co., (U. S. Sup. Ct.), nor was it considered essential by this court in the case of the State vs. Han. & St. Jo. R. R. Co., decided at the present term. And in the case of Han. & St. Jo. R. R. vs. City of St. Joseph, (39 Mo., 476), it was held that a city tax on the railroad was valid, on the ground that municipal taxation for local purposes was not within the exemption from county taxes.

The original exemption of this road from county taxes has never been rescinded by the acts of the parties. The demurrer, therefore, in regard to so much of the petition as related to county taxes, was properly sustained. In regard to school taxes, they may be considered as originating since the charter; and, therefore, nothing was said in it concerning them. Like the municipal taxes of St. Joseph, in 39 Mo., 476, they may be...