Livingston v. Naylor, No. 12, September Term, 2005.

• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
• Writing for the Court: Meredith
• Citation: 173 Md. App. 488,920 A.2d 34
• Docket Number: No. 12, September Term, 2005.
• Decision Date: 30 March 2007
• Parties: George M. LIVINGSTON, IV v. Thomas O. NAYLOR.

920 A.2d 34 173 Md. App. 488 George M. LIVINGSTON, IV
v.
Thomas O. NAYLOR. No. 12, September Term, 2005. Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. March 30, 2007.

[920 A.2d 35]

Paige E. Harris, Alexandria, VA, Timothy J. McGary, Fairfax, VA, for appellant.

David H. Martin, Arlington, VA, for appellee.

Panel DAVIS, EYLER, JAMES R., MEREDITH, JJ.

MEREDITH, J.

George M. Livingston, IV, appeals an order of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County that denied his motion to dismiss a writ of garnishment of his wages. The garnishment had been issued in an effort to collect monies owed by Livingston to Thomas Naylor, appellee. Naylor had obtained

920 A.2d 36

a money judgment against Livingston in North Carolina and then enrolled that judgment in Maryland pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act ("UEFJA"), Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl.Vol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article ("CJ"), §§ 11-801 et seq. Livingston is a resident of North Carolina. He argues that the Maryland court did not have an adequate basis to exercise personal jurisdiction over him, and was, therefore, without power to (a) enroll the judgment from another state, and (b) order the garnishment of wages he earned as an employee of Marriott International, Inc. ("Marriott").

We hold that there were sufficient contacts between Livingston and this State for Maryland to enroll a judgment from another state pursuant to the UEFJA. We further hold that the Maryland courts may garnish Livingston's property in Maryland, including compensation he earned from Marriott for services Livingston rendered in Maryland. But we also hold that due process does not permit the garnishment in Maryland of compensation Livingston earned for services rendered wholly outside the State of Maryland when such garnishment order is based solely upon the fact that Livingston's employer, Marriott, does business in this State that subjects Marriott to the jurisdiction of the Maryland courts. We vacate the circuit court's judgment that denied Livingston's motion to dismiss the writ of garnishment and remand for further proceedings.

Facts and Procedural Background

In June 1995, in North Carolina, Livingston broke into the home of Thomas Naylor, who was then asleep. Livingston battered Naylor and inflicted serious bodily injuries. Livingston was subsequently convicted in North Carolina of assault with a deadly weapon and second degree burglary.

Seeking money damages, Naylor filed suit against Livingston in state court in North Carolina, and Livingston was properly served. Livingston failed to answer the complaint, and an "Entry of Default" was entered against him. After the Entry of Default, Livingston failed to appear for a hearing, and, as a consequence, a default judgment was entered against Livingston in favor of Naylor in the amount of $50,000. Naylor contends that Livingston was afforded all appropriate substantive and procedural rights under the laws of North Carolina, and Livingston does not dispute that contention. The judgment has not been satisfied.

Livingston is a North Carolina resident who has been employed by Marriott since 1996 at various locations in North Carolina, Virginia, and Maryland. After the default judgment was entered, Livingston moved from North Carolina to Virginia, where Naylor successfully instituted garnishment proceedings against Marriott.

Livingston next moved back to North Carolina, and Naylor initiated garnishment proceedings there as well. Naylor's attempt to garnish Livingston's wages in North Carolina failed, however, because wages are apparently exempt from garnishment in that state. See Harris v. Hinson, 87 N.C.App. 148, 151, 360 S.E.2d 118, 120-21 (1987) (citing General Statutes of North Carolina, § 1-362, as exempting from attachment "the earnings of the debtor for his personal services, at any time within 60 days next preceding the order," and also noting that "the courts of North Carolina have held that wages for personal services to be earned constitute neither property nor debt"). See also Wierse v. Thomas, 145 N.C. 261, 59 S.E. 58 (1907).

In 2004, Livingston was assigned to work temporarily in Maryland, where he served as a "bench manager," i.e., a manager

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who works in a relief role for short periods of time at various Marriott hotels. Livingston concedes that he stayed in Maryland and worked as a bench manager for approximately one month to one-and-a-half months. But Livingston contends he never changed his residence from North Carolina. He proffered that even when he worked at Marriott locations in Maryland, his pay was processed by a Marriott payroll facility in Kentucky, and his compensation, reduced by withholdings for North Carolina income tax, was directly deposited via electronic transfer into his North Carolina bank account.

Pursuant to the UEFJA, the North Carolina judgment was enrolled in the judgment records of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland, on September 20, 2004. On October 13, 2004, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County issued a Writ of Garnishment of Wages that was served upon Marriott in Bethesda, Maryland. Both Livingston and Marriott filed motions to dismiss the writ of garnishment on jurisdictional grounds. On March 3, 2005, the circuit court entered an order denying both of the motions to dismiss. Livingston timely appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss the writ of garnishment.

Livingston raises the following two issues:

1. Whether the trial court was without proper personal jurisdiction over [Livingston] to enter a judgment in this matter as required by the U.S. Supreme Court decision of International Shoe v. Washington [, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)].

2. Whether the trial court was without proper personal jurisdiction over [Livingston] to entertain a garnishment of [Livingston's] wages in this matter as required by the U.S. Supreme Court decision of International Shoe v. Washington as applied to garnishment or execution proceedings in Shaffer v. Heitner [, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977)].

Both questions attack the personal jurisdiction of the circuit court. Our standard of review for such questions is de novo. See Bond v. Messerman, 391 Md. 706, 718, 895 A.2d 990 (2006) ("The defense of lack of personal jurisdiction ordinarily is collateral to the merits and raises questions of law.").

Analysis

1. Enrollment of judgment from another state

The circuit court followed the procedure required by the UEFJA when it enrolled the judgment that had been previously rendered in North Carolina. But Livingston contends that, under the due process requirement set forth in International Shoe, the Maryland court could not enroll the North Carolina judgment unless the State of Maryland had sufficient minimum contacts with Livingston in order to exercise personal jurisdiction over him.

Livingston has cited no case that has held that a judgment from another state may not be enrolled pursuant to the UEFJA unless the receiving state has sufficient contact with the judgment debtor to assert personal jurisdiction in accordance with the requirements of International Shoe. Nevertheless, he posits the following syllogism. Before the UEFJA was adopted, a judgment creditor who wished to enroll a judgment that had been rendered in another state was required to file a new action in the receiving state, and such a suit could not be prosecuted unless the receiving state could obtain personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor. See

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Mike Smith Pontiac, GMC, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 356 Md. 542, 552, 741 A.2d 462 (1999) ("Historically, the party seeking to enforce a judgment in a sister state had to bring a separate court action in that state.").¹ When the UEFJA was adopted, it purported to make no substantive changes in the law, but merely provide for a streamlined procedure. Id. at 555, 741 A.2d 462 ("[B]ecause the UEFJA is intended `merely to streamline the procedure' of filing a new suit, and not to alter substantive rights, whatever rights or defenses a party may have had with respect to an independent action in the enforcement state, that party also has with respect to the judgment filed under UEFJA."); Weiner v. Blue Cross of Maryland, Inc., 730 F.Supp. 674, 677 (D.Md.1990) ("the [UEFJA] . . . does not purport to alter any substantive rights or defenses that otherwise would be available either to the judgment creditor or the judgment debtor if suit were filed to enforce that foreign judgment."), aff'd, 925 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 816, 112 S.Ct. 69, 116 L.Ed.2d 43 (1991). Therefore, Livingston argues, because the receiving state needed personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor before the enactment of UEFJA, and the uniform act made no substantive changes in the law, then the receiving state must have the same basis for exercising personal jurisdiction now, even though that is not one of the express requirements of UEFJA.

We need not decide the constitutional question raised by Livingston in order to conclude that Naylor's North Carolina judgment was properly enrolled in Maryland pursuant to the UEFJA. See Burch v. United Cable Television of Baltimore Ltd. P'ship, 391 Md. 687, 695, 895 A.2d 980 (2006) ("Even when a constitutional issue is properly raised at trial and on appeal, ... this Court will not reach the constitutional issue unless it is necessary to do so."). Even if we assume without deciding that Livingston is correct in his assertion that the receiving state must have sufficient minimum contacts to take action against the judgment debtor, we conclude that there were sufficient contacts with Livingston for the Maryland court to enroll a judgment against him.

Livingston concedes the validity of the underlying North Carolina judgment, stating in his reply brief:

To be clear[,] the Defendant in this matter[, Livingston,] contests neither the...