Lizzie J. Currier v. J. R. Richardson
| Decision Date | 01 February 1891 |
| Citation | 22 A. 625,63 Vt. 617 |
| Parties | LIZZIE J. CURRIER v. J. R. RICHARDSON |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
FEBRUARY TERM, 1891.
Action for slander. Plea, the general issue with notice of justification. Trial by jury at the December term, 1890 Thompson, J., presiding. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant excepts.
Judgment, reversed and cause remanded.
Geo L. Fletcher and William E. Johnson, for the defendant.
Present ROSS, CH. J., TYLER, MUNSON AND START, JJ.
The plaintiff's evidence tended to show that the defendant, on several occasions and to different persons, stated that she had stolen property belonging to him. The defendant claimed, and his testimony tended to show, that the plaintiff had stolen some sheets and handkerchiefs. To meet this claim, and as bearing upon the probability of the truthfulness of the defendant, the plaintiff was allowed to show that, subsequent to the time the defendant claimed he learned the plaintiff had stolen from him, the defendant promised to marry her, made her presents, and visited her frequently.
1. These facts, if proven, rendered the defendant's claim that the plaintiff had stolen his property less probable, and that of the plaintiff that she had not more probable; and the plaintiff had a right to establish these facts by evidence legal in its character. Armstrong v. Noble, 55 Vt. 428.
2. To establish the fact that the defendant had agreed to marry the plaintiff, the plaintiff was permitted, against the exception of the defendant, to read to the jury a record of a judgment in an action between the same parties in the same court, from which it appeared that the plaintiff recovered a judgment against the defendant on account of a breach of the claimed contract of marriage. It appeared, from the record of this judgment, that the plaintiff claimed in that suit that she had been seduced by the defendant, and that heavy terms were imposed upon the defendant on account of a continuance of the cause on his motion; also, the amount of damages recovered appeared from the record. These facts were not material to any issue on trial, and, disconnected from the record were not legally admissible; and we think the fact that they appeared as a part of the record did not render them admissible. There is no more occasion for reading to the jury inadmissible parts of a record which is produced to establish a single fact evidenced by such record, than for reading inadmissible parts of a deposition; and the court should have excluded from the jury such parts of the record as were immaterial to the issue on trial.
This being a record of the court trying the cause, there was no occasion for reading it to the jury, or allowing them to inspect it. Facts shown by record should be ascertained by the court upon an inspection of the record, and not submitted to the jury for their decision. Such records import absolute verity and cannot be contradicted. There were no questions of fact to be submitted to the jury in respect to the record; it was for the court to inspect the record and instruct the jury that the fact that the defendant promised to marry the plaintiff was established. State v....
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