Llort v. BMW of N. Am., LLC
| Decision Date | 02 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:20-CV-94-LY |
| Parties | DIEGO LLORT, Plaintiff v. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC, Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12 (b)(6), filed April 9, 2020 (Dkt. 9); Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, filed April 22, 2020 (Dkt. 10); and Defendant's Reply, filed April 29, 2020 (Dkt. 11). On May 4, 2020, the District Court referred the motion to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, and Rule 1 of Appendix C of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. Dkt. 12.
Bavarian Motor Works, commonly referred to as "BMW," is a German multinational company which produces luxury vehicles and motorcycles. Defendant BMW of North America, LLC ("BMW NA" or "Defendant"), a privately held Delaware limited liability company with its principle place of business Woodcliff Lake, New Jersey, is the wholesale importer and distributer of BMW vehicles in North America.
On April 11, 2015, Plaintiff Diego Llort, a Texas resident, purchased a pre-owned 2013 BMW X5 (the "Vehicle") from a BMW authorized dealer in Westmont, Illinois. The total sales price of the Vehicle was $56,168.20, and it came with a New Vehicle Limited Warranty and a Certified Pre-Owned Limited Warranty (collectively, "Warranty"). The Vehicle was equipped with a V8 twin-turbocharged engine known as the "N63 engine." Dkt. 7 ¶ 35. After Plaintiff purchased the Vehicle, he alleges, he discovered that the N63 engine contains a manufacturing defect "which causes the subject vehicle to consume engine oil at an extremely rapid rate." Id. ¶ 33. As a result, Plaintiff alleges that he was required to regularly add engine oil to the Vehicle in between the Defendant's recommended oil change intervals "in order to prevent his vehicle's engine from failing and suffering from other related damage." Id. ¶ 34. Plaintiff alleges that he complained to two BMW authorized dealers (in Illinois and Texas) during the warranty period about the Vehicle's excessive amount of oil usage, but both dealers refused to repair the engine.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has been aware of the manufacturing defect in the N63 engines since 2008, but has failed to disclose the issue to consumers. Plaintiff contends that he has spent approximately $7,500 in out-of-pocket costs associated with the Vehicle's excessive engine oil consumption, and that replacing the engine in the Vehicle would cost from $12,500 to $15,000. Plaintiff also alleges that the defective engine has the potential for a life-threatening accident caused by engine failure. Plaintiff further contends that he relied on Defendant's representations in the Warranty, including the representation that Defendant would repair the Vehicle's engine. Plaintiff alleges that he would not have purchased the Vehicle had he been made aware of its defective engine.
On January 27, 2020, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against Defendant, seeking damages related to the Vehicle's excessive consumption of engine oil and Defendant's failure to honor the terms ofits warranty.1 Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges (1) breach of warranty, pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 ("MMWA"); (2) breach of implied warranty of merchantability, pursuant to the MMWA and TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 2.314; (3) breach of express warranty, under TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 2.313; (4) violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("TDTPA"); (5) violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act ("ICFA"); (6) fraudulent concealment; and (7) unjust enrichment. Plaintiff seeks the following damages: an order approving revocation of acceptance of the Vehicle; monetary damages in the form of a refund of the full contract price, including trade-in allowance, taxes, fees, insurance premiums, interest, and costs, and a refund of all payments made by Plaintiff on the contract; equitable relief including, but not limited to, replacement of the Vehicle with a new vehicle or repair of the Vehicle with an extension of the applicable express and implied warranties and service contracts, in the event that Plaintiff is not found to be entitled to revocation; incidental and consequential damages; treble and punitive damages; reasonable attorneys' fees; and such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
Defendant argues in its Motion to Dismiss that Plaintiff's lawsuit should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or, alternatively, for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may only exercise such jurisdiction as is expressly conferred by the Constitution and federal statutes. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over civil cases "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States," and over civil cases in which the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and in which diversity of citizenship exists between the parties. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a party to assert lack of subject matter jurisdiction as a defense to suit. A federal court properly dismisses a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when it lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case. Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). "The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction." Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). "Ultimately, a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be granted only if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle plaintiff to relief." Id.
In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court may consider any of the following: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint plus undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint, undisputed facts, and the court's resolution of disputed facts. Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 557 (5th Cir. 2008).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to move to dismiss an action for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court "accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the [nonmovant]." In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has explained that a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the [nonmovant] pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the [movant] is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (cleaned up). The court's review is limited to the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint. Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010).
Defendant argues that this case should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the amount in controversy satisfies the jurisdictional minimum, and alternatively, that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The Court addresses Defendant's jurisdictional arguments first. See Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161 ().
Plaintiff filed this suit in federal court, invoking both diversity and federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges in his Amended Complaint that the Court has (1) diversity jurisdiction under § 1332, "in that there is complete diversity of citizenship between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00," and (2) federalquestion jurisdiction under § 1331 "pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1)(B), in that the Plaintiff claims more than $50,000.00 in damages, exclusive of interest and costs, and under the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1367." Dkt. 7 ¶¶ 8-9. Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to "demonstrate that he satisfies the jurisdictional minimum under either § 1332 or Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act." Dkt. 9 at 2. The Court first addresses whether Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to meet the jurisdictional...
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