LLOYD v. BOWERSOX
| Decision Date | 30 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:07CV2 0 60 FRB,4:07CV2 0 60 FRB |
| Parties | EUBERT GAYLE LLOYD, JR., Petitioner, v. MICHAEL BOWERSOX, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Presently before the Court is the pro se petition of Missouri state prisoner Eubert Gayle Lloyd ("Petitioner") for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. All matters are pending before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge, with consent of the parties, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
On August 26, 2002, Petitioner was charged by Information in Crawford County, Missouri with manufacture of a controlled substance; specifically, producing more than five grams of marijuana. (Respondent's Exhibit ( ) 3 at 19). The Information was subsequently amended to include the allegation that Petitioner was a prior offender. (Id. at 24). On August 26, 2004, following a jury trial, the jury found Petitioner guilty of producing a controlled substance. (Id. at 25, 42). The trial court sentenced Petitioner to a 30-year term of imprisonment.
Petitioner filed an appeal in the Missouri Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court erred when it: (1) ruled that Petitioner could not offer evidence regarding his arguments with his former wife and her son regarding marijuana, and regarding evidence that marijuana was discovered at his residence after his arrest; (2) failed to sua sponte remedy alleged prosecutorial misconduct during cross-examination and closing argument; (3) excluded evidence that other marijuana was discovered on Petitioner's property five months after he was arrested; and (4) denied petitioner's pre-trial motion to suppress all evidence seized by officers during the search of petitioner's property on June 21, 2002. (Resp. Exh. 4, 6; State v. Lloyd, 205 S.W.3d 893, 898 (Mo.Ct.App. 2006)). The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction and sentence, (Id.),1 and issued its mandate on December 13, 2006. (Resp. Exh. 8).
Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief in the trial court, which the court dismissed as untimely. (Resp. Exh. 9 at 11). Petitioner subsequently filed a notice of appeal, which the Missouri Court of Appeals denied as untimely. (Id. at 2).
In the instant Petition, Petitioner alleges four grounds for relief, and specifically,
1. The trial court erred in (a) precluding Petitioner from testifying regarding the most significant information in his testimony about his ex-wife, and (b) preventing him from testifying about reporting marijuana at his home;
2. Petitioner was denied a fair trial because of "extreme misconduct" that was allowed by the trial court, inasmuch as the prosecutor was allowed to imply that Petitioner committed a crime he did not commit;
3. The trial court erred when it precluded petitioner from submitting evidence related to Petitioner's discovery of additional marijuana at his residence after he was arrested; and
4. The trial court erred in denying petitioner's motion to suppress evidence obtained during an alleged illegal search upon his property.
(Id.)
Petitioner subsequently filed an amendment to his Petition. (Docket No. 4/filed January 2, 2008) ("Amendment"). Applying the prison mailbox rule, and giving Petitioner the benefit of the doubt, the undersigned determines that the Amendment was filed on December 26, 2007, the day Petitioner indicated that he placed it into the prison mail system. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988).
In the Amendment, Petitioner alleges that:1. He is actually innocent of the charge of which he was convicted, and the state used illegally obtained evidence against him;
2. The state failed to show sufficient evidence indicating that petitioner had any control or knowledge of the marijuana plants other than to show that petitioner had a criminal propensity based upon his prior convictions; and
3. The fraudulent actions of the trial judge and prosecutor, and the ineffective assistance and fraudulent actions of Petitioner's trial and appellate counsel, resulted in the wrongful denial of Petitioner's post-conviction motion.
Petitioner also asks that this Court liberally construe his Petition; notes the date on which the Missouri Court of Appeals issued the mandate dismissing his post-conviction appeal; and states that the relief he seeks is necessary and proper. (Id. at 1-6).
Respondent alleges that the Amendment is untimely, inasmuch as it was placed in the prison mail system more than one year after the Missouri Court of Appeals issued its mandate in Petitioner's direct appeal proceedings.2
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") requires a federal habeas petition to be filed within one year after the petitioner's state conviction becomes final. 28U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The triggering date for the statute of limitations that is relevant to the case at bar is the later of the date when the judgment became final by the "conclusion of direct review" or "the expiration of the time for seeking such review." Id.
The Eighth Circuit has recognized that, in situations in which the U.S. Supreme Court would have had jurisdiction to review the petitioner's direct appeal, the "direct review" contemplated by §2244(d)(1)(A) encompasses review of a state conviction by the United States Supreme Court. Riddle v. Kemna, 523 F.3d 850, 853 (8th Cir. 2008); see also Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 347-48 (8th Cir. 1998). In such cases, if the petitioner did not file a petition for writ of certiorari, his conviction becomes final when the time for filing that petition expires. Riddle, 523 F.3d at 855. If, however, the Supreme Court would have lacked jurisdiction to review the petitioner's direct appeal, the statute of limitations begins to run immediately following the conclusion of the petitioner's direct appeal. Id. In Missouri cases, the U.S. Supreme Court would lack jurisdiction over the petitioner's case if the petitioner failed to file a motion for discretionary review in the Missouri Supreme Court. See Id.
In the case at bar, review of the docket sheet in Petitioner's direct appeal reveals that he did not seek review in the Missouri Supreme Court. Therefore, because the United States Supreme Court would have lacked jurisdiction to review Petitioner'sdirect appeal, the AEDPA statute of limitations began to run on the date the Missouri Court of Appeals issued its mandate in Petitioner's direct appeal on December 13, 2007. See Riddle, 523 F.3d at 855. Because Petitioner filed his amendment more than one year later, it is untimely under the AEDPA. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
However, claims made in an untimely-filed amendment may be deemed timely if they relate back to a timely-filed motion (in this case, the original Petition) as allowed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 664 (2005) (); see also Dodd v. U.S., 614 F.3d 512, 515 (8th Cir. 2010). Claims made in an amended motion relate back to the original motion when the amendment asserts a claim that arose out of the same "conduct, transaction or occurrence set out . . . in the original" motion. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1)(B). In the habeas context, in order for a claim to arise out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence, the claims must be "tied to a common core of operative facts." Mayle, 545 U.S. at 664; see also Dodd, 614 F.3d at 515.
In the case at bar, Petitioner's claim related to the sufficiency of the evidence does not relate back to the original Petition because it is fully distinct from any of the claims Petitioner alleged in that original Petition. In his original Petition, Petitioner raised no claims related to the sufficiency of the evidence. Furthermore, in the Amendment, Petitioner does notallege a core of operative facts to support this claim that is common to any of the claims he brought in his original Petition. Instead, the claim Petitioner makes in his Amendment alleges, in conclusory fashion, that the state failed to show sufficient evidence that Petitioner had control or knowledge of the marijuana plants, other than to show his past criminal propensity. There is no link between the claim in the Amendment and any of the claims in the original Petition sufficient to allow the undersigned to confidently say that the claim in the Amendment is tied to any claim in the original Petition by a "common core of operative facts." Mayle, 545 U.S. at 664. The undersigned therefore determines that the claim in the Amendment challenging the sufficiency of the evidence does not relate back to the original Petition, and it is therefore barred by the statute of limitations.
Nor does Petitioner's claim that the fraudulent actions of the trial judge and prosecutor, and the fraudulent actions and ineffective assistance of his trial and appellate counsel, caused his post-conviction proceedings to be wrongfully dismissed relate back to the original Petition. Again, there is no link between this claim and any of the claims from the original Petition sufficient to allow the undersigned to conclude that the claim relates back to the original Petition. The undersigned initially notes that Petitioner made no such claim in his original Petition. Furthermore, in his Amendment, Petitioner presents the claim in a conclusory fashion, offering no detailed facts in support, leavingit entirely unclear exactly how Petitioner is suggesting he was precluded from timely filing his post-conviction proceedings by the allegedly fraudulent behavior and ineffective assistance of the individuals he implicates. Absent Petitioner's presentation of the operative facts supporting his claim, the undersigned cannot say with any confidence that the claim in the Amendment is tied to any claim in the original Petition by a "common core of operative facts." Id. The undersigned...
To continue reading
Request your trial