Lloyd v. Bowles, 217

• Decision Date: 03 February 1971
• Docket Number: No. 217,217
• Citation: 273 A.2d 193,260 Md. 568
• Parties: Velma E. LLOYD v. William BOWLES et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 568

260 Md. 568

273 A.2d 193

Velma E. LLOYD v. William BOWLES et al.

No. 217.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Feb. 3, 1971.

Norman R. Lilly, Baltimore, for appellant.

Edward P. Murphy (Matthew Swerdloff and Swerdloff, Albert & Lasover, Baltimore, on the brief) for appellee William Bowles.

Thomas G. Andrew, Baltimore (Rollins, Smalkin, Weston & Andrew, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee Ruby Sokolowski.

Argued before HAMMOND, C. J., and BARNES, McWILLIAMS, FINAN, SMITH and DIGGES, JJ.

FINAN, Judge.

The action giving rise to this appeal was a suit filed by the appellant Velma Lloyd for injuries sustained by her while leaving a beauty parlor owned by the appellee Ruby Sokolowski which was being remodeled by appellee William Bowles. A jury verdict for $7,500 was returned in Baltimore City Court in favor of the appellant. On March 12, 1970, Judge J. Harold Grady entered judgment n. o. v. in favor of both appellees. We must decide in this appeal whether that ruling was correct.

The facts behind the lawsuit are somewhat lengthy, but not involved. Before proceeding to a consideration of those facts, we note that in reviewing on appeal a defendant's motion for judgment n. o. v., the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be taken from that evidence must be reviewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. I. O. A. Leasing Corp. v. Merle Thomas Corp., 260 Md. 243, 272 A.2d 1 (1971) (September Term, 1970, decided January 5, 1971); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Bolton, 229 Md. 321, 326, 182 A.2d 828 (1962). If the defendant introduces any evidence which is undisputed, that evidence may be considered on appeal; however, if the truth of the defendant's evidence is controverted in any way, even if not contradicted, then that evidence may not be considered. Smith v. Bernfeld, 226 Md. 400, 405, 174 A.2d 53 (1961). Therefore, we set forth the facts which were before the jury in the light most favorable to the appellant.

Mrs. Lloyd was a long-time weekly customer at Mrs. Sokolowski's beauty parlor. The approach to the beauty parlor had for some time consisted of a ramp leading from the sidewalk, between two display windows, to the front door, which was recessed some fifteen feet from the building line. Within a week prior to the day of the accident, remodeling of the entrance had taken place. This remodeling, undertaken to enlarge the working area of the beauty parlor, had progressed to the point that the incline or ramp had been replaced with two concrete steps (consisting of two risers and one tread) leading to a new storm door which was almost flush with the front of the building. The doorsill of the new door was flush with the riser of the top step. The former outside door was now an interior door at the end of a hallway. This remodeling was being performed by appellee Bowles.

The appellant arrived for her appointment at approximately 4:00 P.M. on April 7, 1965, and entered the beauty parlor by was of the new steps. She was leaving the shop at approximately 6:00 P.M. when the accident occurred. She had finished her appointment, proceeded through the interior door which was propped open, opened the new door by pulling it toward her (which placed her one or two feet from the top riser), and took one or two steps before coming to the top riser. Mrs. Lloyd testified that she was wearing her glasses at the time (she had had a cataract removal about six or seven years before, and could see almost nothing without them), that it was 'pretty nearly dark' outside, that she looked down to see what was in front of her when she opened the door, but that the steps and sidewalk 'blended together' and 'looked all like sidewalk.' She further stated that there was no lighting on the steps, that the only out side light came from across the street, and that a large canopy or awning covered the entrance to the beauty parlor. She also noted that there was a light in the ceiling behind her, but 'no lights on the door.' For whatever reason, when Mrs. Lloyd passed through the doorway she thought that she was stepping directly onto the sidewalk and stepped out instead of down. She then fell and broke her hip. On cross-examination Mrs. Lloyd stated that she 'saw the street and steps both,' but reiterated in the same sentence that 'they all looked alike.' ¹ The appellees, through the testimony of Mrs. Sokolowski, introduced evidence that in each of the front windows there were two spotlights which were designed to 'show what was being displayed in the window,' two 70 watt bulbs between the spotlights in each window, and two other bulbs on the side of each window-'enough light to make it really bright.' This is the only evidence relative to the condition of the lighting in the store which the appellant could not be said to have challenged unless one were to regard her general statements concerning outside lights as precluding the possibility that the front windows were illuminated. We do not regard her statemens as controverting the appellee's evidence, and assume for the purpose of this opinion that the front windows were illuminated as Mrs. Sokolowski testified. Indeed, in all fairness, it may be said that this statement of Mrs. Sokolowski's concerning the front window illumination is corroborated by the signed statement which Mrs. Lloyd gave the day following the accident in which she recalled: 'It was still daylight outside and there are lights lit in the new room being built on the shop. * * *'

This Court, not infrequently, has had occasion to repeat the general statement of the law governing the duty owed by the proprietor of a commercial establishment to a business invitee, to the effect that the shopkeeper must take care to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition and give warning of latent or concealed perils. Mondawmin Corporation v. Kres, 258 Md. 307, 315, 266 A.2d 8 (1970), Tie Bar Inc. v. Shartzer, 249 Md. 711, 715, 241 A.2d 582 (1968); Gast, Inc. v. Kitchner, 247 Md. 677, 682, 234 A.2d 127 (1967). This does not mean that the storeowner is an insurer of the safety of his business invitees. Honolulu Ltd. v. Cain, 244 Md. 590, 595, 224 A.2d 433 (1966). If the injured person knew or should have known of the dangerous condition, there is no right to recovery. Finzel v. Mazzarella, 248 Md. 227, 230, 235 A.2d 726 (1967), the reason for the latter ruling being that the storeowner's liability is based on a presumption that he has greater knowledge concerning the dangerous condition than the invitee. Ludloff v. Hanson, 220 Md. 218, 224, 151 A.2d 753 (1959).

In order to find liability on the part of the storeowner the jury must find, (1) that the storeowner had actual or constructive notice of a condition which created an unreasonable risk of harm to the invitee, (2) that the storeowner should have anticipated that the invitee would not discover the condition or realize the danger, or would fail to protect herself from the danger, and (3) that the storeowner failed to take reasonable means to make the premises safe or to give adequate warning of the condition to the invitee. Gast, Inc. v. Kitchner, 247 Md. 677, 685, 234 A.2d 172 (1967); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965).

Many years ago this Court noted that different levels connected by steps is a relatively normal condition to be anticipated by persons of ordinary sensibilities, and that an owner of premises would not be liable to an invitee for injuries sustained by falling on the steps, absent something unusual about the construction or surrounding conditions of them. Long v. Joestlein, 193 Md. 211, 217, 66 A.2d 407 (1949). If stairs and steps do not normally create an unreasonable risk of harm, what is it about the steps at the entrance...