Lloyd v. City of N.Y.
| Decision Date | 04 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 12 Civ. 03303CM.,12 Civ. 03303CM. |
| Citation | 43 F.Supp.3d 254 |
| Parties | Devon LLOYD, Brandi Simmons, and Chayrmar Brown, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, Dora B. Schriro, and Luis Rivera, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Michael Lacovara, Rahim Moloo, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, Joseph Terence Gallagher, Davis Polk & Wardwell L.L.P., New York, NY, Emily Barbara Holland, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.
Serena Mabel Longley, Martin John Bowe, Jr., NYC Law Department, New York, NY, for Defendants.
Plaintiffs Devon Lloyd, Brandi Simmons, and Chayrmar Brown (“Plaintiffs”) bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), against the City of New York through its Department of Correction (“DOC”), Dora B. Schriro, the Commissioner of the New York City Department of Correction, and Luis Rivera, the warden of the Anna M. Kross Center (“AMKC”) (“Defendants”). Plaintiffs claim that they have been denied the ability to practice their Muslim religion while incarcerated at the AMKC, a correctional facility located on Rikers Island in New York City.
Plaintiffs were among eight individuals whose cases, originally brought pro se, were consolidated under the above caption and docket number as related cases concerning the religious accommodations for Muslim inmates at AMKC. (Order at 1, Nov. 16, 2012, Docket No. 28.)
On December 4, 2012, the Court appointed the firm of Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer U.S. LLP as pro bono counsel for the Plaintiffs in this action. (Docket No. 40.)
On February 11, 2013, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Consolidated Complaint (“SACC”) on behalf of all eight original Plaintiffs. (Docket No. 53.) Plaintiffs' claims, like those of all eight original plaintiffs, arise from DOC's policies and practices concerning Muslim inmates at AMKC during the time Plaintiffs were incarcerated and continuing through today. (SACC ¶¶ 1–4, Docket No. 53.)
On February 28, 2013, Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint, arguing, among other things, that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. (Mot. to Dismiss, Feb. 28, 2013, Docket Nos. 55–57.)
On September 26, 2013, the court issued a Decision and Order converting Defendants' motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, and granting Defendants' motion with respect to five of the original eight plaintiffs. Smith v. City of New York, No. 12 Civ. 3303(CM), 2013 WL 5434144, at *30 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2013). With respect to Plaintiffs Lloyd, Simmons, and Brown, the Court determined that there existed genuine issues of fact related to exhaustion, and ordered an evidentiary hearing “to ascertain whether those plaintiffs are excused from exhausting their administrative remedies before filing this lawsuit.” Id.
The court conducted the evidentiary hearing on January 13 and 14, 2014. I concluded that Plaintiffs had two live claims—for Defendants' failure to provide a dedicated worship space (a masjid) for Muslim inmates, and Defendants' failure to provide them with religious materials, such as the Koran, (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (“FFCL”) 36)—because there was no administrative remedy “available” that could have been exhausted. (Id. 37–38).
On March 17, 2014, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss, again seeking to dismiss the SACC pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Defendants argue that Plaintiffs (1) fail to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or RLUIPA; (2) fail to state a claim for municipal liability against the City of New York; and (3) fail to sufficiently allege that Defendants Schriro or Rivera were personally involved in any constitutional violation. (Mot. to Dismiss, Mar. 17, 2014, ECF Nos. 105, 106.)
The following facts are taken from the SACC and are assumed to be true for the purposes of the motion to dismiss.
AMKC is a DOC correctional facility on Rikers Island for male inmates who, for the most part, stay there temporarily during trial and/or prior to sentencing and are later released or transferred elsewhere. (Compl. ¶ 19.) AMKC has the largest capacity of any facility on Rikers Island, consisting of 40 housing areas spread over 40 acres capable of accommodating nearly 3,000 inmates.
Plaintiffs each were detained at AMKC during all or part of 2012. (SACC ¶ 2.) Each of the Plaintiffs is a practicing Muslim and was a Muslim during the time of his incarceration at AMKC. Id.
DOC implements its policies in all of its correctional facilities, including AMKC, by promulgating guidelines (the “Directives”). These Directives cover the religious practices and activities of inmates. (SACC ¶ 21.) The system-wide Directives are implemented by each facility's warden via Command Level Orders. Id.
DOC Directives concerning religious practice provide that inmates and detainees have the unrestricted right to hold any religious belief or belong to any religion, and that inmates and detainees should be permitted to practice their religions in any manner that does not present a clear and present danger to the safety and security of an institution or disrupt its orderly administration.
DOC Directives provide that inmates and detainees are permitted to select a religious affiliation and to participate in religious programming, which includes congregate religious services. (SACC ¶ 23.) DOC facilities are required to schedule appropriate congregate religious services and to provide appropriate spaces for such services. Id.
Plaintiffs allege that the DOC policies and practices actually in place at AMKC do not reflect those outlined in the DOC Directives. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Muslim inmates at AMKC “are not provided with adequate prayer facilities.” (Compl. ¶¶ 3–4.) Plaintiffs allege that they were forced to conduct their daily prayers and weekly “Jumu'ah” worships services in the AMKC gymnasium, which is an unsuitable space for worship because it is crowded with Corrections Officers and other inmates, and otherwise failed to serve as a reasonable accommodation for religious practice. (Compl. ¶¶ 29–30, 40, 48.)
On other occasions, Plaintiffs had to congregate in the AMKC Christian chapel, which contained pews that made it impossible for Plaintiffs to kneel for prayer, as well as Christian images that were discordant with Muslim beliefs. (Compl. ¶ 29.)
Moreover, AMKC did not provide a dedicated space for Plaintiffs to wash their hands and feet in preparation for prayer, despite the fact that such ritual ablutions are a requirement before prayer. (Compl. ¶¶ 3, 29.)
Plaintiffs further allege that, while Christian and Jewish inmates had “free access to plentiful religious texts and other materials,” Muslim inmates “were not afforded adequate supplies of basic religious materials, like copies of the central Muslim sacred text, the Koran.” (Compl. ¶ 30.)
Plaintiffs claim that they sent a letter to Defendant Schriro, the DOC Commissioner, advising her of the violations of their civil rights occurring at AMKC. (Compl. ¶ 43.) Plaintiff Lloyd admits that he received a reply letter from the office of Defendant Schriro, stating that the New York City Department of Correction had received Lloyd's letter and that the issues described in the letter had been forwarded to the appropriate unit for investigation. (Decl. of Devon Lloyd in Opp'n to Mot. To Dismiss (“Lloyd Decl.”) Ex. A, ECF No. 79.) The response letter was signed by Maggie Peck, the Executive Director of Constituent Services and External Affairs. (Id. )
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Rivera, the Warden of AMKC, “would have been informed of Plaintiffs' grievances regarding the violations of their civil rights, but failed to act on that information or otherwise to remedy the wrong.” (Compl. ¶¶ 44, 52.) They do not specify how Defendant Rivera was so informed. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant Rivera was “ultimately responsible for the establishment and maintenance of policies and practices relating to religious programming and facilities at AMKC” and/or “grossly negligent in failing to train or supervise staff in procedures that did not violate Plaintiffs' rights.” (Compl. ¶¶ 44, 52.)
Plaintiffs' SACC contains two factually substantive complaints: (1) Defendants failed to provide Muslim inmates with an adequate/appropriate worship space at AMKC; and (2) Muslim inmates at AMKC were not afforded an adequate supply of basic religious materials, such as copies of the Koran. Each of these substantive complaints give rise to three causes of action. Two are constitutional torts pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 : (1) violation of Plaintiffs' free exercise rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and (2) discrimination against adherents to their religion in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs also assert that Defendants' violated Plaintiffs' free exercise rights as generated by RLUIPA.
I conclude that Plaintiffs have stated claims for relief under Section 1983 and RLUIPA, but only with respect to Defendants' failure to provide Muslim inmates with an adequate or appropriate space for worship. Plaintiffs' claims concerning the failure to provide religious materials to Muslim inmates at AMKC are dismissed.
In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen, Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 237 (2d Cir.2007) ; Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 510 (2d Cir.2007). However, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion...
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