Lloyd v. Haugh & Keenan Storage & Transfer Co.

• Decision Date: 04 January 1909
• Docket Number: 78,77
• Citation: 72 A. 516,223 Pa. 148
• Parties: Lloyd v. Haugh, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

72 A. 516

223 Pa. 148

Lloyd v. Haugh, Appellant

Nos. 77, 78

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

January 4, 1909

Argued October 22, 1908

Appeals, Nos. 77 and 78, Oct. T., 1908, by defendant, from judgments of C.P. No. 3, Allegheny Co., Aug. T., 1905, Nos 642 and 643, on verdicts for plaintiffs in cases of William F. Lloyd v. Haugh & Keenan Storage & Transfer Company and Maude P. Lloyd v. Haugh & Keenan Storage & Transfer Company. Affirmed.

Trespass to recover damages for the loss of household effects. Before KENNEDY, P.J.

At the trial it appeared that the plaintiffs delivered to the defendant household goods and personal effects to be hauled from Pittsburg to Sewickley. At a point about halfway between these places one of the wagons containing the goods burst into flames and was destroyed with its contents in a few minutes.

At the trial the court charged in part as follows:

This case has taken a great deal of time in its trial, much more than it should have, if we had known the whole situation and the facts in the start. [As you have heard from the rulings of the court, much that would ordinarily have been for your consideration has been stricken out by the ruling of the court, so that your duty is very much simplified; in other words, I can say to you, you have but one duty to perform and one thing to ascertain, namely, the value of the goods of the plaintiffs that were lost while in the custody or possession of this defendant.] There are two separate cases here, and you will have to find two verdicts, one in favor of Mr. Lloyd and one in favor of Mrs. Lloyd. [The defendant is a corporation engaged in the general business of hauling or moving, among other things, household goods and effects; and some time in the month of May, 1905, about two years and eight months ago, this defendant undertook to move the household goods and effects of these two plaintiffs from their residence, on Moorewood avenue, in the eastern part of the city, to Shields station, on the Fort Wayne road, some distance below Allegheny City, perhaps sixteen or eighteen miles, and in accordance with that undertaking the defendant received into its possession on May 22 or 23, 1905, these goods, which it is claimed have been lost or destroyed belonging to the plaintiffs.] [As you have heard, the court has ruled that this defendant is a common carrier under the law, and is, therefore, liable for the loss of the goods of these plaintiffs; so that you have no business with the determination of the question as to whether the defendant was negligent in the carrying of the goods or not, but the sole question for your determination is the value of the goods that were lost while in the custody of the defendant.] It seems that on May 23, these goods while in the course of transportation by the defendant to Shields station, there being six loads altogether, one of these wagon loads was destroyed by a fire at or near Dixmont station, on the same railroad, and the plaintiffs claim, and are entitled to, the value of those goods which were so lost or destroyed. These goods, the value of which you have to determine, are claimed by the plaintiffs to be of great value. Those of Mr. Lloyd are claimed to be worth between $2,100 and $2,200, while those belonging to Mrs. Lloyd are claimed by her to be worth between $3,500 and $3,600, the two claims amounting to between $5,000 and $6,000. [These plaintiffs ask a verdict from you for the amount claimed by them, and they have offered a large amount of testimony showing the value of these goods.] The defendant has offered a large amount of testimony tending to show the value. While the plaintiffs claim these amounts, the defendant maintains that the value is not anything like the value set up by the plaintiffs. The defendant claims that many of the articles going to make up these large amounts were not worth anything at all, or, if worth anything, that it would be very small in market value. [Now, the value that you are to ascertain for these goods that were lost while in the custody of the defendant, is what is called the market valuation of these goods; that is, as to a great portion of the goods here that were lost. As to the goods of a personal nature, such as wearing apparel and other goods or effects of a personal nature, and which have no market value -- and there seems to be a great many of that kind here -- as to those that have no market value, the rule which you will follow is their value to the plaintiffs, not any fanciful or imaginary value they may have put on the articles as may be worth to them only, but what is the value of those articles in money to them -- not any valuation outside of their money value. That is the rule which you will follow in estimating the amounts to be awarded to these plaintiffs, severally. I cannot give you any other rules than what I have stated for you to follow in making up your verdicts to these plaintiffs. You will follow your own good judgment in getting at it from all this mass of testimony, and it will be your duty to consider it all. It is not necessary for me to go over the testimony in detail, but you must consider it all in trying to reach a fair market value for these goods that were lost or destroyed while in the custody of the defendant corporation. And as to the others, such as I have mentioned, of a personal nature, that have no market value, you will ascertain what is their value in money to these several plaintiffs.]

Verdict and judgments for William F. Lloyd for $1,720 and for Maud P. Lloyd for $2,860. Defendant appealed.

Errors assigned among others were (1, 5) above instructions, quoting them.

The judgment is affirmed.

F. C. McGirr, with him John Marron, for appellant. -- Defendant was not a common carrier: Piedmont Mfg. Co. v. R.R. Co., 19 S.C. 353; Verner v. Sweitzer, 32 Pa. 208; Jaminet v. American Storage & Moving Co., 109 Mo.App. 257; Gordon v. Hutchinson, 1 W. & S. 285; Steinman v. Wilkins, 7 W. & S. 466; Willock v. R.R. Co., 166 Pa. 184.

Under the evidence, it was a question for the jury whether or not the defendant was a common carrier: Pennewill v. Cullen, 5 Harr. (Del.) 238; Avinger v. Ry. Co., 29 S.C. 265; Fuller v. Bradley, 25 Pa. 120; Verner v. Sweitzer, 32 Pa. 208; Harrington v. McShane, 2 Watts, 443; Taylor v. Wells, 3 Watts, 65.

The defendant was not liable for the loss of Mrs. Lloyd's goods under the evidence; the question of spontaneous combustion should have been submitted to the jury: Lawson on Carriers, sec. 14, p. 15.

The proper measure of damages in this case was not given by the court: International R.R. Co. v. Nicholson, 61 Tex. 550; Gillingham v. Dempsey, 12 S. & R. 183; Warden v. Greer, 6 Watts, 424; Leech v. The Miner, 1 Phila. 144; Fox v. Hayward, 4 Brewster, 32.

George B. Gordon, with him Wm. Watson Smith, for appellees. -- The defendant in this case was a public carrier. The evidence establishing this was entirely uncontradicted: Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Lord Raymond, 909; Gordon v. Hutchinson, 1 W. & S. 285; Harrington v. McShane, 2 Watts, 443; Verner v. Sweitzer, 32 Pa. 208; Beckman v. Shouse, 5 Rawle, 179; Jackson Architectural Iron Works v. Hurlbut, 158 N.Y. 34 (52 N.E. Repr. 665); Caye v. Pool, 108 Ky. 124 (55 S.W. Repr. 887); Farley v. Lavary, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1252 (54 S.W. Repr. 840); Liverpool, etc., Steam Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397 (9 S.Ct. Repr. 469).

The law is established by the cases that we have heretofore cited that whether or not a man has the responsibilities of a common carrier is a question of law: Ambler v. Phillips, 132 Pa. 167; Coxe v. Heisley, 19 Pa. 243.

It was not necessary that the defendant should make a contract with Mrs. Lloyd in order to be liable for the loss of her effects. There was no evidence to submit to the jury that the goods were destroyed by spontaneous combustion. The court's instructions to the jury as to damages were correct: Laubaugh v. R.R. Co., 28 Pa.Super. 247; Trout v. Kennedy, 47 Pa. 387; Green v. R.R. Co., 128 Mass. 221; Fairfax v. R.R. Co., 73 N.Y. 167; Parmelee v. Raymond, 43 Ill.App. 609.

Before MITCHELL, C.J., FELL, BROWN, MESTREZAT, POTTER, ELKIN and STEWART, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE STEWART:

We shall not attempt to discuss separately each of the twenty-one assignments of error in these appeals. The learned counsel agree that together they raise but five questions; these we shall consider in the order they have been presented.

1. Was the defendant a common carrier? The learned trial judge held as matter of law that it was. Briefly these were the facts undisputed. The defendant, an incorporated company, though chartered to do a general warehouse and storage business, does not confine itself strictly to the particular business for which it was chartered, but engages as well in the business of moving household goods in the city of Pittsburg and vicinity. The president of the company, speaking to this point, says in his testimony that general hauling of household goods is one of the particular lines of business in which the company engages, and that it solicits business of this kind by public advertisements in various ways, by signs upon its wagons, upon fences, when that is allowed, by cards intended for general distribution, and by the bills and tags used in the course of business. These advertisements speak for themselves, and unquestionably establish the fact, independent of everything else in the case, that the defendant does hold itself out to the public as engaged in the moving of household goods, thereby inviting employment along this line. None of these advertisements contain a suggestion of limited...