Lloyd v. Lloyd

• Decision Date: 27 April 1954
• Docket Number: No. 114,114
• Citation: 104 A.2d 595,204 Md. 352
• Parties: LLOYD v. LLOYD.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 352

204 Md. 352

104 A.2d 595

LLOYD v. LLOYD.

No. 114.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

April 27, 1954.

John Wood, Jr., Westminster, for appellant.

Donald C. Sponseller, Westminster, for appellee.

Before BRUNE, C. J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, HENDERSON and HAMMOND, JJ.

BRUNE, Chief Judge.

In this case, a husband brought suit for an absolute divorce on the ground of voluntary separation; his wife admitted the separation but denied that it was voluntary. From the dismissal of his bill of complaint, the husband appeals. The pertinent statutory provision is Code 1951, Article 16, § 33, which authorizes an equity court to grant a divorce a vinculo matrimonii 'when the husband and wife shall have voluntarily lived separate and apart, without any cohabitation, for three consecutive years prior to the filing of the bill of complaint, and such separation is beyond any reasonable expectation of reconciliation'.

Appellant married appellee on July 5, 1944, at Hanover, Pennsylvania, and they spent a brief honeymoon at Starner's Dam in Carroll County, Maryland. After appellant returned to his duties in the wartime service of his country, appellee resided at her parents' home in Hanover, where appellant visited her whenever he had a leave. However, she and the appellant were able to live together for a few months first in Philadelphia, then in New London, Connecticut, and later in California. A son was born July 21, 1946. Shortly after appellant's discharge from the armed forces in November, 1947, they purchased a house at Starner's Dam. Each contributed toward the purchase price. Appellee's mother testified that the wife's contribution was three times that of the husband. At the wife's suggestion, this house was sold about six months later, and a new home was purchased at Littlestown, Pennsylvania.

The wife's health, good until pregnancy, had become impaired after the birth of the child. Her condition was diagnosed, early in 1948, as multipe sclerosis. This progressive disease so handicapped her in the performance of her normal household duties that by the fall of 1949 the husband, who was attending Gettysburg College in the morning and working at the Cambridge Rubber Company at night, had to perform an increasing number of household duties. Appellee's mother came, one day a week, from Hanover to do the cleaning.

Appellee then suggested that they sell the Littlestown house and move to Hanover. This the husband declined to do. On October 21, 1949, the wife and child were taken, at her request, by her parents to their home in Hanover, where they have remained ever since.

The Chancellor has ably summarized the conflicting versions of the events leading up to the separation. First, we quote below from his summary of the husband's version: 'After living there for several months, the wife became dissatisfied and wanted to sell the property and buy one in Hanover. Properties were scarce and prices were high, and he did nothing. They stayed at the Littlestown home against her wishes. He claimed that his mother-in-law interfered in every possible way because she resented him very much; that she would upset his wife and then he and his wife would have 'verbal battles.' He then testified that in October, 1949, his wife felt they 'couldn't get along' and that she would take the child and go to her parents' home. He refused to take her, and one day when he came from College he found she had gone with the baby. He learned that his father-in-law, accompanied by William Bair, had removed some furniture, including the furniture from the child's room, and all of their clothing. He objected to taking his wife to visit her mother because of the mother's interference and because she was instilling in her daughter belief in voodoo or witchcraft.'

'[The husband's mother] testified she visited her son's home and that she could plainly see that her visits were displeasing to the defendant, that the wife was very much dissatisfied and wanted to go to her mother. While her son treated his wife very nice, she would nag him and she heard her curse him on several occasions.'

Of the other side of the case, the Chancellor said (in part): 'Mrs. Mary Berwager, the mother of the defendant [appellee] testified that her daughter * * * has multiple sclerosis and was unable to do her work and look after the child. * * * On October 21, 1949, the defendant said to her father, 'Dad, can Jim [the child] and I come home.' The father answered affirmatively and her daughter and grandson came to her home. At that time her daughter could nto walk alone and could not feed herself. She is now bedfast and has been so for three years. * * * The defendant could not appear in Court, and by agreement of counsel her testimony was taken at Hanover, Pennsylvania. The reporter stated, 'It was necessary to use an interpreter (Mrs. Mary Berwager), because of the inability of the witness (the defendant) to enunciate properly.' She said she left her home in October, 1949, when she could not longer do her work. When asked if she wanted to leave her husband she said 'mo' and her reply was 'no' to the question 'Did you want him to leave you?''

From the settlement of the proceeds from the sale of the Littlestown house, appellee received $1,283.68. The husband has been paying approximately $17 a week toward the support of his wife and child; and appellee has been receiving an additional sum (now $41.50 per month) from the Veterans' Administration out of the husband's disability compensation.

No 'reconciliation' (if such a term is appropriate on the facts of such a case as this) has ever been sought by either of the parties; there has been no cohabitation for over three years, and, as the Chancellor found, 'from the physical condition of the wife, it is apparent they will not live together again.'

There is no question as to the existence or seriousness of the affliction from which the wife was suffering. Undoubtedly, some of the irritations and friction testified to in the case were attributable to the nature and effects of multiple sclerosis, as it is described in Alpers, Clinical Neurology (2nd Ed.) 673, 674, 687. This neurological disease, the cause of which is unknown, appears most frequently in individuals between the ages of nineteen and thirty, and is sometimes precipitated by pregnancy and childbirth. The author states that: 'Emotional disturbances of some sort are usually present. Liability of emotional responses, with inability or decreased ability to inhibit emotional reactions, is probably the most common manifestation. These affective disorders are part and parcel of the disease, are very frequent, and in a fair number of instances they precede the neurological signs.'

The quoted language may, in some measure, explain testimony of appellant's mother that appellee was 'very nervous' since marriage, on occasions lost her temper, and argued with, 'cursed', and 'said nasty things' to appellant. Some light may also be shed upon the 'crying spells' to which appellant testified.

It seems clear, on the other hand, that during the parties' residence at...