Lloyd v. Morton

Decision Date14 February 2023
Docket Number18-CV-6979 (WFK)
PartiesDERRICK LLOYD, Petitioner, v. ROBERT I. MORTON, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
MEMORANDUM & ORDER

WILLIAM F. KUNTZ, II, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Derrick Lloyd (Petitioner), proceeding pro se brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his conviction for Murder in the Second Degree and Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree. Petition, ECF No. 1; Am. Petition (“Am. Pet.”), ECF No. 21. Petitioner argues (1) his conviction was against the weight of the evidence and the evidence against Petitioner was not legally sufficient; (2) he was deprived of due process due to the admission of a prior photo array identification and prior in-court identifications; (3) he was deprived of his right to a fair trial when the trial court permitted the prosecution to present a rebuttal witness; (4) he was deprived of his right to a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct; and (5) the trial court vindictively enhanced his sentence after Petitioner successfully appealed his initial conviction. Am Pet. at 1-2.[1] For the reasons below, the Petition is DENIED in its entirety.

BACKGROUND
I. The Shooting

On the evening of December 31, 1990, Rukaiyah Long-Ankrum, Karima Crosby, and Cassandra Cannon went to Times Square to celebrate New Year's Eve. Resp. Opp. at 1-2, ECF No. 27. They then went to a friend's gathering in Building 5704 in the Glenwood Houses in Brooklyn, New York, before later leaving to sit outside on a bench in front of Building 5624. Id. at 2. After hearing what appeared to be a party in an apartment at 5624 Farragut Road, the three friends tried to go inside but were denied entry by a man wearing a kufi (knitted cap). Id. at 2-3.

The three friends then went back to the bench from which they came and were joined by several other friends, including William Smith. Id. at 3.

Approximately ten minutes after Smith joined the group, Petitioner exited Building 5624. At that point, Crosby recognized Petitioner as the male in the kufi who denied them entry to the party. Petitioner then approached the group, looked at Smith, and demanded to know: “where is the drunk guy who came up to the party, beefing? I want answers, and I want answers now.” R. 159-60, 213, 295-97, 368, 396, 399.[2] Smith responded: “Everyone wants answers, but sometimes they can't always have them.” R. 159, 214, 297, 328, 369, 380-81.

After this exchange, Smith and Petitioner started to argue. Resp. Opp. at 5. Petitioner then pulled a short black gun from his waistband and pointed it at Smith. Id. In response, Smith stated: “If you're going to bust me, bust me now.” Id. Petitioner then shot Smith, killing him. Id.

Long-Ankrum saw Petitioner shoot Smith; Crosby heard the shot, saw a flash, and then observed Smith on the ground; and Cannon saw Petitioner fire the gun and observed a flash, as well. R. 168-69, 180-81, 224, 244-47, 297-98. After witnessing this incident, the three women subsequently ran back to Crosby's house and called the police. Resp. Opp. at 6. Long-Ankrum and Crosby then went to the precinct where they were interviewed by the police. Id.

Now-retired Detective Stanley Long interviewed Long-Ankrum and Crosby. Id. He also interviewed Lisa Lloyd, Petitioner's sister, who at that time resided on the second floor of Building 5624 in the Glenwood Houses. Id. at 8. Based on their testimony, Detective Long identified Petitioner as a suspect.

Petitioner was apprehended in Alabama on August 31, 2007. Id. at 9. Petitioner's first trial, which was held in 2010, ended in a hung jury. See People v. Lloyd, 185 A.D.3d 1057, 1058 (2d Dep't 2020). Petitioner was tried a second time in 2011 and was convicted of Murder in the Second Degree and Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree. However, the Appellate Division, Second Department reversed that judgment and ordered a new trial. See People v. Lloyd, 115 A.D.3d 766, 770 (2d Dep't 2014).

Petitioner was tried a third time in 2016. During the 2016 trial, Long-Ankrum, Crosby, and Cannon each testified and identified Petitioner as the individual who shot Smith. R. 140250, 266-345, 346-417. The prosecution also introduced these witnesses' in-court identifications from Petitioner's prior two proceedings and a photo array identification by Long-Ankrum from January 1, 1991. R. 186-88, 249-50, 302-04, 382-83, 476-77.[3] In response, Petitioner raised an alibi defense: his former girlfriend and the mother of his child, Karen Wynter, testified that Petitioner was with her at the time of the shooting. R. 496-568. Petitioner's sister, Lisa Lloyd, who hosted the party in Building 5624, also testified that Petitioner was not present at the party. R. 608-09, 680-81. Another attendee, Michael Massey, further testified that he did not recall seeing anyone at the New Year's Eve party wearing a kufi. R. 591. Petitioner also testified he was with Ms. Wynter from December 31, 1990, until the afternoon of January 1, 1991. R. 72484.

In rebuttal, the prosecution introduced Patricia (“Teisha”) Drakes, who testified she met Petitioner at the party and that he was wearing a kufi. Ms. Drakes also testified Petitioner's sister threatened her and told her not to speak to the police, and that she moved out of the state in fear for her safety. R. 703-23.

The jury convicted Petitioner of Murder in the Second Degree and Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree. R. 957-59. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of twenty-three years to life imprisonment on the murder count and seven-and-a-half to fifteen years of imprisonment on the weapons conviction. Sent. 16. The trial court later resentenced Petitioner to three-and-a-half to seven years on the weapons conviction. Sent. 21.

II. Post-Conviction Activity

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department (Appellate Division), claiming: (1) the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and the evidence was not legally sufficient; (2) he was deprived of a fair trial when the trial court admitted a prior photographic array identification procedure and testimony of prior in-court identifications; (3) the trial court improperly admitted the rebuttal testimony of Ms. Drakes; (4) he was deprived of a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct in the crossexamination of defense witnesses and in the summations; and (5) the sentence was excessive and harsh. Petitioner's Brief on Direct Appeal (“Pet. App. Br”), ECF No. 27-6.

The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the judgment of conviction. See Lloyd, 185 A.D.3d at 1058. First, the Appellate Division held Petitioner failed to preserve his legal sufficiency claim on appeal but, in any event, the evidence was legally sufficient and the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. Id. The Appellate Division also ruled the defense opened the door to allow the prosecution's witness to testify about her prior photographic array identification procedure, and that prior identification evidence was admissible. Id. The Appellate Division rejected Petitioner's claim that he was deprived of a fair trial because of Ms. Drake's rebuttal testimony, finding it was properly admitted as rebuttal testimony. Id. at 1059. The Appellate Division also held Petitioner's sentence did not violate his due process rights and was not vindictive or excessive. Id. Lastly, the Appellate Division held Petitioner's remaining claims of prosecutorial misconduct were unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, without merit. Id.

By letter dated August 3, 2020, Petitioner requested leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, which that court denied on December 24, 2020. People v. Lloyd, 36 N.Y.3d 974 (2020). In his present petition before the Court, Petitioner raises the same claims he raised on direct appeal in state court, which that court denied.[4] See Am. Pet. For the reasons set forth below, this Court also denies these claims.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Court's review of the Petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254. As here, when the petitioner's claims have been rejected on the merits by a state court, the court “may grant a writ of habeas corpus only if that decision ‘was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States' or if the decision ‘was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.' McCormick v. Jacobson, 16-CV-1337 (ERK) (LB), 2021 WL 5965038, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2021) (Korman, J.) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). Judicial review under the statute's “unreasonable application” standard is “extremely deferential,” id., and a “state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court's decision.” Chrysler v. Guiney, 806 F.3d 104, 118 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

DISCUSSION
I. Legal Sufficiency and Weight of the Evidence

Petitioner first argues he was deprived of his due process rights because the conviction was against the weight of the evidence. He contends the witness identifications were not proved beyond a reasonable doubt and there was no physical evidence, confession, or any other evidence to support the conviction. Am. Pet. at. 1. However, “the argument that a verdict is against the weight of the evidence states a claim under state law, which is not cognizable on habeas corpus.” McKinnon v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Corr. Facility, 422...

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