Lloyd v. Pokorny
Decision Date | 03 August 2020 |
Docket Number | Case No. 2:20-cv-2928 |
Parties | SUSAN LLOYD, Plaintiff, v. THOMAS POKORNY, et. al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
OPINION AND ORDER
Defendants the Supreme Court of Ohio, Ohio Supreme Court Chief Justice Maureen O'Connor ("Chief Justice O'Connor"), the Office of the Ohio Disciplinary Counsel ("OODC"), Ohio Disciplinary Counsel Joseph Caligiuri ("Disciplinary Counsel Caligiuri"), Assistant Disciplinary Counsel Amy Stone ("Assistant Counsel Stone"), and the State of Ohio (collectively the ) filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 30). Plaintiff Susan Lloyd ("Plaintiff") has responded (ECF No. 32). For the reasons stated herein, the State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 30) is GRANTED.
Plaintiff filed this action on September 23, 2019 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) On June 5, 2020, the case was transferred to this Court. (See ECF No. 45.) Plaintiff sued the following Defendants: Judge Pokorny, Chief Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court of Ohio, Scott Drexel, Assistant Counsel Stone, Disciplinary Counsel Caligiuri, OODC, Jason Whitacre, Scott Flynn, Flynn, Keith, and Flynn, LLC, Lindsay Molnar, David Perduk, Perduk and Associates Co., LLC, Chris Meduri, the State of Ohio, Portage County, Portage Courthouse, Clerk of Courts Fankhauser, Tory Reeves, Court Reporter DiNardo, Joshua Thornsbery and Michael Szabo (collectively "Defendants"). (See id.) Plaintiff sued the individual defendants both in their official and personal capacities.1 Plaintiff's Complaint was 129 pages. (See id.) On December 11, 2019, in response to extensive Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 briefing by several of Defendants, Plaintiff amended her Complaint. (See Am. Compl., ECF No. 23.) The Amended Complaint is 155 pages. (See id.)
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint includes 44 causes of action all related to a civil case filed in Portage County, Ohio, Lloyd v. Thornsbery, et al., No. 2016CV00230 (the "Thornsbery case.") (See id.) In the Thornsbery case Plaintiff sued a former neighbor and others who allegedly harassed her. (Id. ¶ 27.) The defendants ultimately prevailed, and Plaintiff's appeal is pending in the Ohio Eleventh District Court of Appeals.2
The allegations include violations of the United States Constitution, violations of Ohio and federal criminal statutes, common law claims of abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and bribery, violations of the appellate "abuse of discretion" standard of review, violations of Ohio's Sunshine laws, violations of various Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, violations of various Ohio Local Rules of Civil Procedure, violations of Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct, violations of the Ohio Rules of Superintendence of Ohio Courts, violations of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act and Federal Trade Commission Debt Collection Practices, and discrimination based on sex and disability. (Id. ¶ 4.)
Specifically, with regards to the State Defendants, Plaintiff alleges the following:
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint asks for a series of relief which can be divided into three categories. First, Plaintiff asks for relief relating to the Thornsbery case and other state court actions including: providing Plaintiff a new trial with a new judge, amending Judge Pokorny's orders, dismissing the sanctions against Plaintiff ordered in the Thornsbery case, dismissal of the determination that Plaintiff is a vexatious litigator made in the Thornsbery case, Judge Pokorny's recusal from the Thornsbery case and "every other case in Ohio," reevaluation of Plaintiff's previously dismissed state court complaints, and transfer of the Thornsbery case out of Portage County, Ohio. (See id. ¶¶ 691-97.) Second, Plaintiff asks for the following injunctive relief: reevaluation the criminal activity Plaintiff previously complained about, a public apology, restoration of Plaintiff's ability to post on Portage County and Ohio websites and social media, training for Ohio officials on the use of service dogs, an order prohibiting Defendants fromviolating other individuals' civil rights, disbarment of Defendants Jason Whitcare, Scott Flynn, Lindsay Molnar, David Perduk, Amy Stone, Chief Justice Maureen O'Connor, Judge Pokorny, and Troy Reeves, removal of Court Reporter DiNardo's court reporter license, and prosecution of Michael Szabo and Joshua Thornsbery for crimes including drug use and violence. Finally, Plaintiff asks for monetary relief including: $100,000 in actual and punitive damages, a fine imposed for violation of Plaintiff's civil rights, expenses for Plaintiff's relocation out of Portage County, and compensation from Mr. Szabo and Mr. Thornsbery for Plaintiff's financial loss as a result of Defendants' criminal behavior.
The Ohio Defendants move to dismiss the claims against them for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.3 (Defs.' Mot. Dismiss at 10-21, ECF No. 28.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) provides for dismissal when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Without subject matter jurisdiction, a federal court lacks authority to hear a case. Thornton v. Sw. Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131, 1133 (6th Cir. 1990). "The Rooker-Feldman doctrine states that district courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over challenges to state court determinations." Caddell v. Campbell, No. 1:19-cv-91, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24315, at *11 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 12, 2020); see also Hall v. Callahan, 727 F.3d 450, 453 (6th Cir. 2013) (). Federal courts must give full faith and credit to final judgments from state courts and lack jurisdiction toreview those decisions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to any case in which a plaintiff attempts to bring an impermissible attack on a state court judgment. Caddell, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24315 at *12.
In addition, under the Eleventh Amendment, federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear suits by private citizens against a State unless the State consents to the suit or unless Congress, pursuant to a valid exercise of power, indisputably consents its intent to abrogate state immunity." Bedford v. Kasich, No. 2:11-cv-351, 201 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51903, at *11 (S.D. Ohio May 4, 2011) (citing Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304 (1990)); Smith v. Ohio Legal Rights Serv., No. 2:10-cv-1124, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46024, at *15 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 29, 2011).
Additionally, "[a]n entity acting as an arm of the state enjoys Eleventh Amendment Immunity from federal suit to the same extent as the state itself." Yancey v. Los Angeles Superior Court, No. 5:03-cv-122, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 330, at *10 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 2, 2004) . This is because a suit against a state official in his official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather a suit against the official's office and as such is no different than a suit against the state itself. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
Eleventh Amendment immunity for state officials is limited, however, by the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, which the Supreme Court has described as applying "when a federal court commands a state official to do nothing more than from refrain from violating federal law." Va.Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 248 (2011). In these instances, courts apply a "legal fiction" that the state official is not the state for purposes of sovereign immunity. See id. As a result, when a state official is sued only for prospective, non-monetary relief, such as an injunction, Eleventh Amendment immunity does not...
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