Lloyd v. State

• Decision Date: 18 February 2013
• Docket Number: No. 30A04–1207–CR–431.,30A04–1207–CR–431.
• Citation: 984 N.E.2d 258
• Parties: Dennis L. LLOYD, Jr., Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

984 N.E.2d 258

Dennis L. LLOYD, Jr., Appellant–Defendant,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.

No. 30A04–1207–CR–431.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Feb. 18, 2013.

Appeal from the Hancock Superior Court; The Honorable Terry K. Snow, Judge; Cause No. 30D01–1110–FD–1884.

Donald E. Hamilton, New Castle, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

MEMORANDUM DECISION—NOT FOR PUBLICATION

KIRSCH, Judge.

Dennis L. Lloyd, Jr. (“Lloyd”) was convicted after a jury trial of possession of cocaine ¹ as a Class D felony and resisting law enforcement ² as a Class A misdemeanor. He appeals his convictions and raises the following consolidated and restated issues on appeal:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence obtained by the police as a result of a stop of Lloyd's vehicle and a search of his person; and

II. Whether systematic racial discrimination in the Hancock County jury system constituted a denial of Lloyd's right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 13 of the Indiana Constitution.

We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On the afternoon of October 24, 2011, Hancock County Deputy Sheriff Gary Stanley (“Deputy Stanley”) was patrolling a rural area of Hancock County when he drove past a residence at 6229 West County Road 300 North and observed two vehicles, a green minivan and a black Ford Explorer, backed up to the residence. Deputy Stanley also saw a large male on the front porch of the residence pacing back and forth and possibly looking into the windows. Deputy Stanley found this behavior to be odd because of his knowledge of the occupant of the home. The residence was occupied by a severely handicapped twenty-year-old woman, who was paralyzed from the jaw down and confined to an air mattress on the front living room floor, and who must be cared for by others. He also knew that the front door was not utilized by the occupant due to her need of a wheelchair ramp. Additionally, Deputy Stanley knew that the residence was in a high burglary and theft area. Because Deputy Stanley was suspicious of the two vehicles backed up to the house, he radioed Hancock County Sheriff's Deputy Jarrod Bradbury (“Deputy Bradbury”) ³ to have him accompany Deputy Stanley to the residence. They met up a short distance away from the residence and drove their patrol cars to the home to investigate.

When the deputies arrived at the residence, the Ford Explorer appeared to be attempting to leave. Deputy Stanley pulled into the driveway behind the Ford Explorer, and Deputy Bradbury pulled in behind Deputy Stanley. Deputy Stanley approached the driver's side of the Ford Explorer, and Deputy Bradbury approached the passenger side. The driver, who was later identified as Lloyd, was the sole occupant of the vehicle. Deputy Stanley also identified Lloyd as the large male he had observed pacing back and forth in front when he initially drove by the residence.⁴

Lloyd's window was rolled down an inch or two, and Deputy Stanley asked that Lloyd roll the window down so the deputy could speak with him. Lloyd did not comply until after Deputy Stanley had requested him to do so three times. Deputy Stanley requested identification from Lloyd, but Lloyd did not provide any. Lloyd refused to look at the deputy and was moving around in the vehicle. After Lloyd complied with the request to roll down his window, Deputy Stanley smelled the odor of burnt marijuana coming from the vehicle. Deputy Stanley then requested that Lloyd exit the vehicle, but Lloyd did not comply. Deputy Stanley repeated his request several times, and Deputy Bradbury came over to the driver's side to assist Deputy Stanley in removing Lloyd from the vehicle. When Deputy Bradbury opened up the driver's side door and attempted to remove Lloyd, Lloyd forcibly resisted by pushing away from and trying to strike the deputy. Deputy Stanley then threatened to use his taser on Lloyd if he did not allow the deputies to remove him from the vehicle.

Once Lloyd finally agreed to exit the vehicle, Deputy Bradbury handcuffed him, and Deputy Stanley conducted a patdown search of Lloyd's person. During this search, a baggie was found in Lloyd's pants pocket that contained a powdered rock-like substance that field tested positive for cocaine. After being read his Miranda rights, Lloyd admitted that the substance recovered from his pocket was, in fact, cocaine. A knife was also recovered from Lloyd's person.

The State charged Lloyd with Class D felony possession of cocaine and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. Prior to trial, Lloyd filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained by the deputies. A hearing was held, and the trial court denied the motion. A jury trial was held on June 4, 2012, at the conclusion of which the jury found Lloyd guilty as charged. He was sentenced to two years with one year suspended and one year of probation for his possession of cocaine conviction and to a concurrent sentence of one year for his resisting law enforcement conviction. Lloyd now appeals.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Admission of Evidence

Lloyd argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence at trial because it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.⁵ Although Lloyd originally challenged the admission of the evidence through a pre-trial motion to suppress, he appeals following a completed jury trial and thus challenges the admission of such evidence at trial. The admission or exclusion of evidence is entrusted to the discretion of the trial court. Collins v. State, 966 N.E.2d 96, 104 (Ind.Ct.App.2012) (citing Farris v. State, 818 N.E.2d 63, 67 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied ). We will reverse a trial court's decision only for an abuse of discretion. Id. We will consider the conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial court's ruling and any uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant. Id. (citing Taylor v. State, 891 N.E.2d 155, 158 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), trans. denied, cert. denied555 U.S. 1142 (2009)). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or it misinterprets the law. Id. In determining whether an error in the introduction of evidence affected an appellant's substantial rights, we assess the probable impact of the evidence on the jury. Id. (citing Oldham v. State, 779 N.E.2d 1162, 1170 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied ).

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects an individual's privacy and possessory interests by prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. Washington v. State, 922 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (citing Howard v. State, 862 N .E.2d 1208, 1210 (Ind.Ct.App.2007)). Generally, a search warrant is a prerequisite to a constitutionally proper search and seizure. Id. (citing Halsema v. State, 823 N.E.2d 668, 676 (Ind.2005)). When a search is conducted without a warrant, the State has the burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement existed at the time of the search. Malone v. State, 882 N.E.2d 784, 786 (Ind.Ct.App.2008)).

A. Investigatory Stop

One such exception to the warrant requirement is that a police officer may briefly detain a person for investigatory purposes without a warrant or probable cause if, based upon specific and articulable facts together with rational inferences from those facts, the official intrusion is reasonably warranted, and the officer has reasonable suspicion that criminal activity “may be afoot.” Washington, 922 N.E.2d at 111–12 (citing Moultry v. State, 808 N.E.2d 168, 170–71 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968))). Thus, reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative stop must be based on specific and articulable facts known to the officer at the time of the stop that led the officer to believe that criminal activity may be afoot. Potter v. State, 912 N.E.2d 905, 907 (Ind.Ct.App.2009). Reasonable suspicion requires more than mere hunches or unparticularized suspicions. Id. “In reviewing the question of reasonable suspicion, courts look to the ‘totality of the circumstances of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing .’ “ Segar v. State, 937 N.E.2d 917, 921 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quotations omitted)). The State has the burden of proving that an investigatory stop, as an exception to the general warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, is supported by reasonable suspicion. Id.

Lloyd argues that the deputies did not have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot at the time they approached his vehicle to speak with him. He contends that, although Deputy Stanley clearly had reasonable suspicion when he observed a male at the front door of the residence looking in the windows, by the time the deputy approached Lloyd, such reasonable suspicion “was severely reduced.” Appellant's Br. at 8. Lloyd asserts that the deliveryman's explanation for his presence at the residence should have lessened any reasonable suspicion that the deputies had that criminal activity was afoot and that the deputies no longer needed to demand information from him. We disagree.

While patrolling a rural area of Hancock County, Deputy Stanley saw two vehicles, a green minivan and a black Ford Explorer, backed up to the residence as he drove past. He observed a large male pacing back and forth on the front porch of a residence and possibly looking in the windows of the residence. Deputy Stanley found this to be suspicious because he was aware that the resident at that address was severely handicapped,...