Lloyd v. Victory Carriers, Inc.

• Decision Date: 01 December 1960
• Citation: 402 Pa. 484,167 A.2d 689
• Parties: Leeverne LLOYD v. VICTORY CARRIERS, INC., Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 689

167 A.2d 689

402 Pa. 484

Leeverne LLOYD v. VICTORY CARRIERS, INC., Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Dec. 1, 1960.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 28, 1961.

William C. Schultz, Jr., Krusen, Evans & Shaw, Eugene Lippman, Albert R. Beal, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Joseph R. Thompson, Philadelphia, for Jarka Corporation of Philadelphia, appellee.

Freedman, Landy & Lorry, Philadelphia, for Leeverne Lloyd, appellee.

Before CHARLES ALVIN JONES, C. J., and MUSMANNO, BENJAMIN R. JONES, COEHN, BOK, and EAGEN, JJ.

COHEN, Justice.

This is an appeal from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County sustaining additional defendant-appellee's preliminary objections and dismissing the joinder complaint of defendant-appellant.

The plaintiff, Leeverne Lloyd, a longshoreman [employee] sued in trespass for injuries allegedly received through the negligence of the original defendant, Victory Carriers, Inc. [shipowner], and the unseaworthiness of the vessel. The plaintiff was employed by the additional defendant, Jarka Corporation of Philadelphia [stevedore], which sent him aboard the vessel to perform stevedoring services.

The shipowner impleaded the stevedore on the ground that if the shipowner were liable to the employee for negligence and unseaworthiness, such negligence and unseaworthiness were the result of the stevedore's failure to properly perform its services. Therefore, it was claimed, the stevedore was liable over to the shipowner.

The stevedore objected to the third-party complaint on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action. The court below sustained the preliminary objection and dismissed the third-party complaint. This appeal followed.

The overriding issue in this case is the extent to which federal maritime law applies and the extent to which state procedural rules apply. It is settled beyond question that in an action such as this, in which a longshoreman or a seaman is involved, federal maritime law must govern all substantive matters regardless of whether the suit is brought in the state or federal court. Chelentis v. Luckenbach Steamship Company, 1918, 247 U.S. 372, 38 S.Ct. 501, 62 L.Ed. 1171; Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Company, 1942, 317 U.S. 239, 63 S.Ct. 246, 87 L.Ed. 239; Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 1953, 346 U.S. 406, 74 S.Ct. 202, 98 L.Ed. 143. Normally, the procedural law of the forum will be applied unless the particular element of procedure so influences the litigants' substantive rights as to require the adoption of the federal practice in that area. See Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Company, supra. Cf. Guaranty Trust Company of New York v. York, 1945, 326 U.S. 99, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079. Whether a specific element is substantive or procedural is necessarily a matter of federal law.

We must be guided in our appraisal of federal law by the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Company, supra. In that case an action was brought by a seaman in a Pennsylvania state court for damages under the Jones Act (46 U.S.C.A. § 688) and for maintenance and cure under the law of admiralty. Plaintiff conceded that he had executed a release in favor of defendant, but he sought to escape the effect of the release by alleging fraud on the part of the defendant in securing the release. Under Pennsylvania law the burden would have been upon the plaintiff to prove the existence of fraud, whereas under federal admiralty law the burden would have been upon defendant to sustain the release. This Court in 1942, 344 Pa. 69, 23 A.2d 503, held that the question of burden of proof was a procedural one and that the Pennsylvania law applied. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that federal admiralty law applied. 'The right of the petitioner to be free from the burden of proof imposed by the Pennsylvania local rule inhered in his cause of action. Deeply rooted in admiralty as that right is, it was a part of the very substance of his claim and cannot be considered a mere incident of a form of procedure.' (Emphasis supplied.) 1942, 317 U.S. at page 249, 63 S.Ct. at page 252.

Since joinder, normally a matter of trial convenience, see 3 Moore, Federal Practice § 20.02 (1948), would be considered an aspect of procedure, we must decide whether the right to implead in this particular situation is so deeply rooted in the substantive law of admiralty as to require our courts to follow the federal law in this area.

We recognize that the Federal Rules of Admiralty do authorize joinder of third parties and that a federal court in admiralty would probably permit joinder in the case at bar. See Admiralty Rules, rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A. However, that rule is discretionary. See Cargill, Inc. v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 5 Cir., 1956, 235 F.2d 240; In re Hocking's Petition, D.C.N.J.1956, 146 F.Supp. 207. Joinder in this very situation was allowed by the United States Supreme Court in the litigation that firmly established the shipowners' right to indemnification from the stevedore. Ryan Stevedoring Company v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation, 1956, 350 U.S. 124, 76 S.Ct. 232, 100 L.Ed. 133. It should be noted, however, that the right of indemnification was at issue and not the procedural aspect of joinder. We can assume that if joinder were at issue the Supreme Court would have treated the problem as a matter within the discretion of the trial judge. See Rule 20(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A.

In view of the fact that the right of indemnification was finally settled only four years ago, that joinder in both diversity and admiralty cases in the federal courts is a discretionary matter, and that the substantive rights of the parties to bring an independent action remain unchanged, it is apparent that the right to implead the stevedore is not, by any means, 'deeply rooted in admiralty.' Therefore, we believe that federal law would regard joinder as a matter of procedure to be governed by state rules.

The question then becomes whether joinder should be allowed under Rule 2252 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, 12 P.S.Appendix:

'(a) In any action the defendant or any additional defendant may file as of course, a praecipe for a writ, or a complaint, to join as an additional defendant any person not a party to the action who may be alone liable or liable over to him on the cause of action declared upon or jointly or severally liable thereon with him.'

In order to determine the applicability of rule 2252(a), we must again examine the federal substantive law. The stevedore clearly is not subject to joinder on the basis of sole liability since, as the employer, it is covered under the provisions of Section 5 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 905, which relates to exclusive remedy under that Act. Section 5 provides as follows: 'The liability of an employer prescribed in section 4 shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee * * *.' (Emphasis supplied.) The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq., is identical to the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, Article III, Section 301(a), as amended, 77 P.S. § 431, as far as the result on this issue is concerned although its terminology is much stricter than the Pennsylvania Act. It is clear that where either of the Acts is applicable, the employer may not be joined as solely liable since plaintiff has no common law cause of action against his employer. See Swanson v. Marra Brothers, Inc., 1946, 328 U.S. 1, 66 S.Ct. 869, 90 L.Ed. 1045. The defendant does not dispute this conclusion.

The same provision of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, supra, which forbids the joinder of an employer as an additional defendant on the theory of sole liability has been interpreted by the federal courts as prohibiting any rights by a third party tortfeaser to contribution from a plaintiff's employer. See Halcyon Lines v. Haenn...