Lloyd v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary
Decision Date | 14 May 1964 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 13890. |
Citation | 229 F. Supp. 364 |
Parties | Willie LLOYD v. WARDEN, MARYLAND PENITENTIARY. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Robert S. Rody, court-appointed, Baltimore, Md., for petitioner.
Robert F. Sweeney, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore, Md., for respondent.
In this habeas corpus proceeding brought by a Maryland state prisoner, his court-appointed counsel presses two points: (1) that under the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence petitioner (Lloyd) was denied the right of appeal from his conviction and was denied the assistance of counsel in connection therewith; and (2) that a coerced confession was improperly admitted at his trial.1
Lloyd is a Negro, born in Sebrell, Virginia. He dropped out of school in the second grade, and at the time of his arrest and trial for the offenses involved in this case, he could write his name but was otherwise practically illiterate. His only prior conviction was by the Traffic Court for driving without a license, for which he was sentenced to a term of six months.
On November 27, 1959, at about 2:30 p. m., petitioner was arrested without a warrant, but this Court finds with probable cause, shortly after the robbery of a store on Broadway in Baltimore City. He was indicted for assault with intent to murder (#4559), for robbery with a deadly weapon (#4560), and for possessing a deadly weapon (#4561). Upon arraignment, on December 30, 1959, Judge Prendergast, presiding in the Criminal Court of Baltimore City, was satisfied that Lloyd was indigent and appointed counsel for his defense.
A trial on the several charges was held in the Criminal Court of Baltimore City before Judge Carter on January 15, 1960. The proceedings at that trial have never been transcribed by the court reporter, although petitioner has repeatedly asked for a copy. At the hearing in this Court, the reporter from the Criminal Court of Baltimore City brought her notes and read into the record such portions of the proceedings and testimony as counsel for petitioner or counsel for the State wished this Court to consider. Such a procedure is less satisfactory than having available a full transcript of the proceedings, because certain facts must be inferred which might be clarified by a full transcript. This Court suggests to the State that it would be in the interests of justice and ultimate economy to make provision for the furnishing of transcripts in such a case as this.
The evidence at the trial in the Criminal Court indicated that another man known to Lloyd only under the sobriquet "Brother", armed with a pistol, robbed the till in the back room of the store. The man on duty in the front part of the store testified that during the robbery Lloyd held an open razor to his throat. Lloyd admitted being in the store and having a razor in his possession at the time, but presented an exculpatory explanation.
As part of its case, the State offered a confession signed by Lloyd at a police station about two hours after his arrest. His questioning by the police was not unduly prolonged, but petitioner testified in the Criminal Court and at his hearing in this Court that the confession was obtained after he had been struck in the face by a police lieutenant and beaten or jabbed with nightsticks by other officers present. He presented at his trial a bloody handkerchief as evidence of the bleeding from his lip after he had been struck. At the hearing in this Court, his testimony with respect to the details of the beating differed in some respects from his testimony at the trial; but if believed would show that the confession was coerced. At the trial three of the officers testified briefly but flatly that no force had been used. Their testimony was read into evidence at the hearing on the pending petition. It does not appear that the trial judge or any other State Court has ever made any finding of fact with respect to the alleged coerced confession. This Court finds from the evidence presented to it that the trial judge admitted the confession in evidence over objection. In view of the ruling which this Court is making on the alleged denial of the right to appeal, it is not necessary to determine at this time whether the confession was in fact coerced; it is sufficient to say that the evidence in the Criminal Court presented a serious issue which might properly have been raised by Lloyd on appeal from the conviction.
In case #4559 Lloyd was convicted of simple assault and sentenced to ten years; in #4560 he was convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon and was sentenced to twenty years; in #4561 he was convicted of possessing a deadly weapon and was sentenced to two years; the sentences to run concurrently. This Court finds that petitioner's trial counsel did not discuss with petitioner the possibility of a motion for a new trial before the sentencing, which took place immediately after the verdicts, that he left the courtroom immediately thereafter, and that he never discussed with petitioner the possibility of an appeal nor explained to him what would have to be done to perfect an appeal. This Court does not hold that such failure always amounts to a denial of procedural due process, but the bar and the bench of the State and Federal Courts in Maryland should take appropriate steps to assure that upon conviction all defendants are informed of their rights of appeal and of the requirements for perfecting an appeal.
On February 2, 1960, petitioner sent to the Clerk of the Criminal Court the following letter, which was prepared for him by a fellow prisoner:
The Clerk made the following docket entry in each of the three cases: "February 4, 1960 — an Appeal to the Court of Appeals of Maryland filed in proper person". On February 5 the Clerk wrote Lloyd as follows:
Enclosed with the letter was a mimeographed form headed "Petition to Prosecute an Appeal as an Indigent Defendant", wherein the petitioner was required to submit, under oath, detailed information about his personal affairs bearing on the question of indigency and was also required to supply the following information:
"5. In my opinion the reasons for the appeal are as follows :"
The Clerk's letter and the last paragraph of the form of petition were not in accordance with the applicable Maryland Rules of Procedure, adopted by the Court of Appeals, which provided:
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