LOCAL 1006, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Wurf

• Decision Date: 10 November 1982
• Docket Number: No. 76 C 2744.,76 C 2744.
• Citation: 558 F. Supp. 230
• Parties: LOCAL 1006, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, Thomas J. Byrnes, Juanita Jenkins, Margaret Hershberger, Robert Widlic, Gordon Doliber, Jr., William R. Rothman, Corrine Peters, Janet Kish, Arthur R. Strobeck, Jr., and Michael Calliouet, as Officers and Trustees of Local 1006, and Individually, and All Other Members of Local 1006 that are similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Jerome WURF, a/k/a Jerry Wurf, Joseph Ames, Henry Bayer, Paul Booth, Christine George, Yette Hansen, Kim Pittman, Richard Wilson, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, Donald Johnson, Nolan B. Jones, I. Lawrence Richardson, Raymond Tillman, Peter Valone, William M. Bowling, and William J. Boys, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

558 F. Supp. 230

LOCAL 1006, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, Thomas J. Byrnes, Juanita Jenkins, Margaret Hershberger, Robert Widlic, Gordon Doliber, Jr., William R. Rothman, Corrine Peters, Janet Kish, Arthur R. Strobeck, Jr., and Michael Calliouet, as Officers and Trustees of Local 1006, and Individually, and All Other Members of Local 1006 that are similarly situated,¹ Plaintiffs, v. Jerome WURF, a/k/a Jerry Wurf, Joseph Ames, Henry Bayer, Paul Booth, Christine George, Yette Hansen, Kim Pittman, Richard Wilson, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, Donald Johnson, Nolan B. Jones, I. Lawrence Richardson, Raymond Tillman, Peter Valone, William M. Bowling, and William J. Boys, Defendants.

No. 76 C 2744.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, E.D.

November 10, 1982.

Ellis E. Reid, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.

Barbara Hillman, Cornfield & Feldman, Chicago, Ill., for union defendants.

Michael Hayes, Roger Flahaven, Asst. Attys. Gen., Chicago, Ill., for state defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

WILLIAM T. HART, District Judge.

On the eve of trial of this old, complex, and hard-fought case, all of the defendants filed a joint motion for summary judgment.² They have submitted legal memoranda in support of their motion, with no accompanying affidavits. The plaintiffs have opposed the motion with their own legal memorandum, also unsupported by affidavit.

The Court has considered the filings, and because of the inadequacy of the briefs has done extensive research on its own. For the reasons stated below, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

The parties are at issue on plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint, filed on April 10, 1979. The plaintiffs are ten individuals and a labor union, Local 1006 of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO ("Local 1006"). The defendants include two groups: (1) seven individuals plus an international labor union, The American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO ("the International Union") (This first group is usually referred to as "the union defendants.")³; and (2) seven individuals who were employees or agents of the State of Illinois at the time of the events complained of in this action ("the state defendants"). The focus of the plaintiffs' action concerns the relationships in 1975-1976 among these three groups.

This single count Third Amended Complaint has been brought pursuant to the following statutes: 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-504, 1981, 1983, 1985(3), and 2000d. The plaintiffs also claim to be suing under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. They allege numerous facts and legal theories as grounds for recovery. Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(b) states in relevant part: "Each claim founded upon a separate transaction or occurrence ... shall be stated in a separate count ... whenever a separation facilitates the clear presentation of the matter set forth." Unfortunately, Rule 10(b) has not been followed here. It would have been an aid to counsel and to the Court had this rule been observed.

Nevertheless, the Court has studied the Third Amended Complaint and finds the gist to be as follows. Many of the members of Local 1006 were state employees working for the Illinois Bureau of Employment Security during the relevant period. The plaintiffs voiced numerous complaints to federal and state officials reflecting their beliefs that certain practices and procedures at the Bureau of Employment Security were in violation of federal law. Meanwhile, the relationships between and among the state, the International Union, and Local 1006 grew increasingly tense.

These growing tensions culminated in a strike by Local 1006 on July 7, 1976. On July 28, 1976, about 300 striking employees were suspended pending discharge by the State of Illinois. As part of a deal struck by the state and the International Union, most of those suspended were rehired a few months later, but some thirty-three employees, including the individual plaintiffs in this action, were discharged.^3a

Sometime prior to the strike, the state had declined to recognize Local 1006 as the bargaining representative for the employees in the Bureau of Employment Security, and instead gave such recognition to the International Union. On July 28, 1976 — the same day the state began discharge proceedings against the striking employees — the International Union imposed an administratorship on Local 1006 and replaced the leaders of Local 1006 with persons of the International's choosing. The plaintiffs allege a complex conspiracy between the state defendants and the union defendants to abridge in various ways the plaintiffs' statutory and constitutional rights.

The Court believes that three basic grievances are alleged: (1) the individual plaintiffs were discharged from their employment due to the unlawful actions of the defendants; (2) the defendants, or at least some of them, were instrumental in the unlawful and improper refusal to recognize Local 1006 as the bargaining representative of its members; and (3) the union defendants, in concern with the state defendants, improperly imposed an administratorship on Local 1006, thereby stripping it of its power and its members of their political voices.

The defendants now argue that all these matters have been fully adjudicated to conclusion in other proceedings. First, the Illinois Civil Service Commission had hearings as to the propriety of the discharges of certain members of Local 1006, and the decisions were appealed to final judgments in the Circuit Court of Cook County and the Illinois Appellate Court. Second, the Illinois Office of Collective Bargaining held administrative hearings on the question of the certification of Local 1006 as the bargaining representative for numerous state employees. Finally, the propriety of the International Union's imposing an administratorship on Local 1006 was fully adjudicated before the Judicial Panel of the International Union itself.

The thrust of defendants' motion for summary judgment is that the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel, as most recently articulated in Lee v. City of Peoria, 685 F.2d 196 (7th Cir.1982), clearly entitle them to summary judgment on plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint.

II. Res Judicata

The defendants are correct that Lee v. City of Peoria and certain other recent cases hold that the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel are to be applied to claims arising under the civil rights laws and the United States Constitution. Lee v. City of Peoria decided that these principles apply to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985. Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982), held that these principles are applicable to Title VII actions. In recent years the Supreme Court has shown its approval of the application of res judicata and collateral estoppel to nearly all claims. Kremer, supra; see also Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980).

This does not merely reflect a general philosophy of comity or even just plain good sense. Congress has embodied the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel in 28 U.S.C. § 1738, which states in relevant part:

The ... judicial proceedings of any court of any such State ... shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States ... as they have by law or usage in the courts of such States

...

The Supreme Court recently said that "though the federal courts may look to the common law or to the policies supporting res judicata and collateral estoppel in assessing the preclusive effect of decisions of other federal courts, Congress has specifically required all federal courts to give preclusive effect to state-court judgments whenever the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged would do so." Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. at 96, 101 S.Ct. at 415. This Court is bound by statute to apply these principles where appropriate.

The applicable standards have been clearly set forth in Lee v. City of Peoria, supra at 199:

The doctrine of res judicata is that a final judgment on the merits in a court of competent jurisdiction bars the same parties or their privies from relitigating not only the issues which were in fact raised and decided but also all other issues which could have been raised in the prior action. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 24 L.Ed. 195 (1877); Morris v. Union Oil Co. of California, 96 Ill.App.3d 148, 51 Ill.Dec. 770, 421 N.E.2d 278 (1981). The essential elements of the doctrine are generally stated to be: (1) a final judgment on the merits in an earlier action; (2) an identity of the cause of action in both the earlier and the later suit; and (3) an identity of parties or their privies in the two suits.

As stated above, the defendants argue that three prior adjudications correspond to the three causes of action which they find in the Third Amended Complaint, and that under the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel the instant action is barred. The Court will address each argument in turn.

A. The Discharges

Defendants argue that the propriety of these plaintiffs' discharges has been adjudicated through the administrative process and brought to final judgment in the courts. See Strobeck v. Illinois Civil Service Commission, 70 Ill.App.3d 772, 26 Ill. Dec. 911, 388 N.E.2d 912 (1st Dist.1979); and Battle v. Illinois Civil Service Commission, 78 Ill.App.3d 828, 33 Ill.Dec. 597, 396 N.E.2d 1321 (1st Dist.1979). If these adjudications are to bar even part of the Third Amended Complaint, the essential elements as set forth in Lee v. City of Peoria must be satisfied.

1. Identity of Parties or Their Privies in the Two Suits

a. The Defendants

The Court first looks to whether the...